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INTRODUCTION

Perhaps it was imprudent for me to agree, in response to the request
of the symposium organizers, to address the future of disability law.
Nobel Prize-winning physicist Neils Bohr supposedly once said that
"[p]rediction is very difficult, especially about the future."' Columnist
and author Jim Bishop wrote, "The future is an opaque mirror. Anyone
who tries to look into it sees nothing but the dim outlines of an old and
Prognosticating is a very tricky and uncertain
worried face." 2
undertaking.
I cannot pretend to have any particular gift for crystal ball gazing
in disability matters. When I joined the staff of the National Council on
the Handicapped in 1984, I was unsure whether it was worth the effort to
push the idea of comprehensive disability nondiscrimination legislation
to the predominantly conservative Council. At a meeting with the late
Justin Dart who was Vice Chair of the Council, I shared my misgivings;
Justin's reaction was "Bob, I don't see how we could not do it."'3 We
1. Arthur K. Ellis, TEACHING AND LEARNING ELEMENTARY SOCIAL STUDIES 431 (Natural

History Press, 1970) (Bohr reportedly credited Danish cartoonist Storm P (Robert Storm Petersen) as
the source of the quotation, but its origin has also been attributed to a variety of other people,
including American baseball legend Yogi Berra, film producer Samuel Goldwyn, and many others.
See Charles Stimson and Andrew M. Grossman, Keep Track of Crack Cocaine Facts, WebMemo
at
available
2008,
4,
April
Foundation,
Heritage
The
#1882,
For a web page listing a number of
http://www.heritage.org/research/Crime/wm1882.cfm#_ftnl.
suggested originators of the quotation, see Larry Denenberg, Who first said "It is difficult to make
predictions, especially about the future" (or one of its many variants)?, available at
http://www.larry.denenberg.com/predictions.html.)
2.

Jim Bishop, NEW YORK JOURNAL-AMERICAN, March 14, 1959.

3.

Former Senator Lowell Weicker referred to my meeting with Justin in his article in the
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did, and, to my pleasant surprise, the Council endorsed the idea
unanimously and enthusiastically, and turned out to be vigorous advocates
for what became the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Again,
when I had penned the first draft of the ADA in the early months of
1987, I thought it might take decades for such legislation to be enacted, if
it was even introduced at all; a little less than three-and-a-half years later,
the ADA was signed into law.4
Likewise, when the Education for All Handicapped Children's
Act,5 the predecessor of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) was enacted in 1975, I thought that the Individualized Education
Program (IEP) process spelled out in the Act would be a very positive
and effective way to empower parents of children with disabilities by
making them equal partners with school personnel in figuring out what
particular educational program would be effective and appropriate for
each child with special education needs. I never anticipated that many
school districts would preempt effective parental participation by making
most decisions about the IEP prior to the team meeting with parents and
present the school's unilaterally devised offerings in a take-it-or-leave-it
or take-it-or-hire-a-lawyer fashion, and that many districts would
embrace a strategy of fighting almost all parental objections up the
procedural process and into the courts. I had no idea that what appeared
to be a worthwhile and promising advance in disability law would turn
out to be largely aproforma,often meaningless exercise.
And when Congress passed the Developmental Disabilities
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 19756 with its list of "Rights of the
Developmentally Disabled," 7 my immediate reaction was not to prophesy
that the Supreme Court would declare the "Rights" effectively
unenforceable in the courts. 8 Indeed, I wrote and filed a brief amicus
curiae with the Court on behalf of the National Association of Protection
and Advocacy Systems and forty-five individual states' P&As in which I
argued that Congress intended the Developmental Disabilities Bill of
Rights to be enforceable. 9
Temple Law Review.

Lowell P. Weicker Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with

DisabilitiesAct, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 387, 390-91 (1991).
4. Nor, as a teacher of constitutional law, did I in any way anticipate that the Supreme
Court would suddenly change the standards it had applied to determine congressional authority to
enact legislation and begin to invalidate or call into question statutes that clearly passed
constitutional muster at the time they were enacted; like most legal scholars, I never expected that
the Supreme Court would overrun the authority of both elected branches of government-supposedly
"coequal branches"-and question the validity of highly popular, overwhelmingly bipartisan
legislation passed by huge voting majorities, such as the ADA.
5. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (This statute was the predecessor of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.§ 1400 (2008)).
6. Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975).
7. Id. at § 201, 89 Stat. 502.
8. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that the
"bill of rights" provision of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act did not
create any substantive rights to "appropriate treatment" in the "least restrictive" environment in
favor of persons with mental retardation).
9. In my defense, I must say that by the time I filed the brief, I well understood that
Congress's formulation of the list of rights as a "finding" instead of a substantive provision
"establishing" or "imposing" the rights on funding recipients might prove a fatal flaw to judicial
enforceability. But this was less a prediction of what the Court was going to do than a simple
recognition of what we were up against based on the details of the legislative language; I still hoped
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Accordingly, my record for reading the tea leaves as to what is
about to happen in disability rights law has not always been particularly
impressive. 10 Fortunately, that is not what I propose to do in this paper.
Instead of predicting what is going to happen, I am going to focus on
suggesting what should, not necessarily will, happen. I undertake to
throw out some ideas about issues that are going to face us, and what
ought to or needs to happen. For that task, I do have some credentials.
In the early 80s, I was privileged to be hired to work in the Office
of General Counsel of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to help
write, with legally blind civil rights attorney Christopher Bell, the
Commission's first-ever report on disability discrimination. In the report
we developed-ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL
ABILITIESI-we marshaled disability statistics; social science studies;
federal laws; and a sizeable, growing, and somewhat muddled body of
caselaw to try to create a framework for making sense of, and guiding the
future development of, disability civil rights law. The report offered
"orienting principles" of disability nondiscrimination law, l2 adopted and
elaborated on the goal of "full participation" articulated by Professor
tenBroek, 13 provided a conceptual foundation for and definition of
reasonable accommodation, 14 and offered guidance about the extent to
which traditional civil rights concepts and analysis should apply to
disability rights law. "
When Chris Bell and I were unable to convince the Civil Rights
Commission to recommend specific federal legislative changes, we
proceeded on our own to write a law review article that provided what
we called a "statutory blueprint" for a federal law broadly prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of disability and clarifying the elements of
such a law. 16 One of its recommendations was that Congress should
and half-expected, misguidedly as it turned out, that we would prevail on the issue.
10. My ability to see the future in regard to disability rights issues did, however, compare
favorably to that of a couple of Supreme Court Justices, at least in one particular case. In a brief
amici curiae filed in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001), on behalf of principal
congressional ADA sponsors Senators Robert Dole, Tom Harkin, James M. Jeffords, and Edward M.
Kennedy, and Representative Steny Hoyer, I argued that permitting plaintiff Casey Martin to use a
golf cart on account of his serious mobility impairment would not destroy the integrity or threaten
the essential nature of PGA golf tournaments, and thus would not "fundamentally alter" PGA events.
Brief for the Honorable Robert J. Dole et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27, PGA
Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). In his dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by
Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's analysis, which asked whether a proposed
reasonable modification would alter an essential element of the sport or would give the individual a
competitive advantage, would prove to be "expansive and destructive," and lead to all sorts of
mischief in sports. Justice Scalia felt the holding not only raised the possibility that the cup in golf
might have to be enlarged for golfers with disabilities, but also imperiled "[e]ighteen-hole golf
courses, 10-foot-high basketball hoops, 90-foot baselines, 100-yard football fields," and would lead
to such scenarios as entitling a Little League player with attention deficit disorder to four strikes.
532 U.S. at 701-703 (J. Scalia, dissenting). Obviously, despite the Court's ruling in favor of Martin,
none of these disruptive eventualities has come to pass.
11.
U.S. COMMISSION ON
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES (1983).

CIVIL RIGHTS,

ACCOMMODATING

THE SPECTRUM OF

12. Id. at 86-101.
13. Id. at 67-85.
14. Id. at 102-129.
15. Id. at 141-158.
16. Robert L. Burgdorf Jr. & Christopher Bell, Eliminating DiscriminationAgainst Physically
and Mentally HandicappedPersons:A Statutory Blueprint, 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
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prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities in all contexts in
which Congress had prohibited other forms of discrimination, including
prohibiting disability discrimination by all entities that affect interstate
commerce. 17

Upon joining, in the mid-80s, the staff of the National Council on the
Handicapped, later re-designated the National Council on Disability
(NCD), an independent federal agency whose primary mission is to make
recommendations to the Congress, the President, and the American people
on disability issues, I was assigned to several tasks with hortatory
overtones. As staff author for NCD of its 1986 report, TOWARD
INDEPENDENCE,'

8

I

pulled

together

the

forty-five

legislative

recommendations that were drawn from detailed topic papers addressing
ten broad topic papers and adopted by the Council. I also got to write the
topic paper on "Equal Opportunity Laws" in which, building upon the
"Statutory Blueprint" Chris Bell and I had previously developed, I
proposed, and the Council adopted, a recommendation for the enactment
of "a comprehensive law requiring equal opportunities for individuals
with disabilities, with broad coverage and setting clear, consistent, and
enforceable standards prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
[disability]."' 9 In a follow-up report issued in 1988-ON THE
THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE-we were able to report that 80% of the
recommendations had been partially or fully accomplished, including the
enactment of twenty-one statutory provisions consistent with the
Council's recommendations.2 0 One recommendation that had not been
accomplished, however, was the call for a comprehensive law
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability. As a result, in the
process of preparing for the 1988 report, NCD asked me to draft such a
law, to be called "the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)." My draft
ADA bill was published in ON

THE THRESHOLD,

and was introduced in

Congress, with a few changes, 21 in 1988.22 This version of the ADA
provided the basis for revised ADA bills that were introduced in the
101st Congress in May 198923 and enacted in 1990.

More recently, after NCD had become concerned about the harm
caused to the ADA by a series of negative decisions of the United States
64 (JaniFeb. 1984).
17. Id. at 71.
18.
Nat'l
Council
on
the
Handicapped, TOWARD
INDEPENDENCE
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/1986/toward.htm
[hereinafter

(1986),
TOWARD

INDEPENDENCE].

19. Id., App. at A-50; Id. at 18.
20. NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE at xiii
(1988) (Andrea Farbman, ed.) [hereinafter ON THE THRESHOLD].
21. Certain changes were negotiated by representatives of national disability consumer
organizations in meetings with representatives of the National Council and potential congressional
sponsors. These included deletion from the bill of provisions covering the federal government, federal
grantees, and federal contractors (otherwise covered by Sections 501, 503, and 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973); and addition to the bill of provisions relating to access by persons with disabilities to
broadcasting and communications services.
22. S. 2345, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S5110 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988); H.R.
4498, 100th Cong. 2d Sess.; see 134 CONG. REC. El307 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1988).
23. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S4978 (daily ed. May 9, 1989); H.R. 2273,
101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H 1690 (daily ed. May 9, 1989).
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Supreme Court, the Council asked me to head up, as a consultant, a project
to develop a report containing a proposed legislative response to the
damaging rulings. Accordingly, I wrote a report for the Council titled
RIGHTING THE ADA2 4 that described the problematic decisions, explained
the mischief that they have caused, and presented a legislative proposal-an
ADA Restoration Act-to repair the damage and get the ADA back on
track. The report and the Restoration Act proposal will be discussed in
some detail subsequently in this paper.
In each of the instances I have mentioned, and in some of my other
writing, 25 I have had fortuitous opportunities and the requisite audacity to
try to suggest some paths that disability nondiscrimination law should
take. Accordingly, in response to the request of the symposium organizers
for me to address the future of disability law, I shall undertake, not to
foretell upcoming events, but to sketch some prospects and to outline some
possible courses that I believe will lead us in the direction that, for reasons
described below, Jacobus tenBroek would approve.

II.

BACK TO THE

FUTURE: THE PAST AS PRELUDE

On the time continuum that marks human events on earth, we build
in the present on the foundation of the past toward what we hope will be
a better future. Thus, the disability rights movement had its beginnings
in the relatively near past, has proceeded to the present state of affairs,
and needs to continue on into the future. My best guide in trying to
contribute toward a future disability law agenda will be signposts from
the past and present.
Fortunately, there are some very helpful,
enlightening signposts pointing the way. Without invoking cliches about
learning from history, I think we can derive some very important lessons
from the annals of the disability rights enterprise.
Going to court to challenge discrimination on the basis of disability has
no definitive starting point. In my casebook on the legal rights of
persons with disabilities published in 1980,26 1 included a case from 1893
in which a student excluded from school because he was considered "too
weak-minded to derive profit from education" sued the City of

24. National Council on Disability, RIGHTING THE ADA (2004)
25. My purposes in producing the first law school casebook on disability rights law,
published in 1980, included a desire to establish disability rights as a recognized academic field, and
to organize the field of law into logical sub-specialties. ROBERT L. BURGDORF JR., THE LEGAL
RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT (Paul H. Brookes Publishing Co.,
1980). Similarly, in my treatise on disability and employment law I tried to add a disability rights
movement perspective to a comprehensive review of the law on this topic. ROBERT L. BuRGDORF JR.,
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (1995). Shortly after the enactment of the ADA, I
wrote an article for the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review in the hope of advancing my
perspective on various provisions of the Act. Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities
Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 413 (1991). In 1997, 1 penned a lengthy article for the Villanova Law Review in which I
futilely sought to redirect the growing body of legal precedent narrowing the coverage of the ADA.
Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protectionfrom Disability Discrimination: The Special
Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REv. 409 (1997).
26. ROBERT L. BURGDORF JR., THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND TExT (1980).
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Cambridge, unsuccessfully, to challenge his exclusion. 27 By at least
1868, courts in the United States had announced that it was not
unreasonable for a blind or visually impaired person to proceed on the
public streets. 28
Such cases-summarized by Professor Jacobus
tenBroek in his landmark work The Right to Live in the World: The
Disabled in the Law of Torts,29 to be discussed subsequently-arose in
the context of torts litigation, in which defendant municipalities charged
that blind people who had been injured by dangerous conditions on the
streets or sidewalks were contributorily negligent for traveling
unattended.
While they did not address direct challenges to
discrimination on the basis of disability, decisions in which courts
rejected this contributory negligence defense implicitly and sometimes
explicitly recognized an entitlement of persons with disabilities to use the
public thoroughfares. 30 A direct condemnation of discrimination related
to travel occurred in 1897 when the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled
that a railroad, as a common carrier, had violated its legal obligations
when it refused to sell tickets to a man solely because he was blind.31
Even earlier, after the Civil War, disabled veterans had employed
pressure tactics, political activities, and court actions in their efforts to
obtain and enforce pension rights.
This very limited sampling of historical instances of legal
advocacy to establish and implement legal rights for people with
disabilities in America illustrates the haphazard occurrence and
sometimes nebulous character of such actions, and points up the
difficulty of establishing a clear starting point of disability
nondiscrimination litigation activity.
But if it is difficult to identify the exact beginning of court actions
challenging disability discrimination, it is much easier to ascertain the
precise origin of the conceptual foundation for the systematic use of such
actions, ultimately culminating in what we have come to call a Disability
Rights Movement-it all began in 1966 with the publication of two law
27. Watson v. City of Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864 (Mass. 1893).

For other similar early

decisions, see, for example, State ex rel. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Antigo, 172 N.W. 153

(Wis. 1919) (upheld board of education's authority to exclude student described as "crippled and
defective child") and Board ofEduc. v. State ex rel. Goldman, 191 N.E. 914 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934)

(parent of brain-injured child who had low score on I.Q. test unsuccessfully sued local board of
education that had excluded child from public schools).
28. Davenport v. Ruckman, 37 N.Y. 568 (1863). See also Town of Salem v. Goller, 76
Ind. 291 (1881) ("[T]he mere fact that [the plaintiff] was blind is not conclusive evidence of

negligence in venturing upon the sidewalks, which he had a fight to presume were in a safe
condition.").
29. Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World. The Disabled and the Law of Torts, 54
CAL. L. REv. 841, 866 n.146 (1966).

30. See, e.g., Balcom v. City of Independence, 160 N.W. 305, 310 (1916) ("It is said uniformly
that the blind and the halt have as much right to the use of the street as those who have possession of their

faculties"); Sleeper v. Sandown, 52 N.H. 244, 251, 1872 WL 8705, *8 (1872) ("[T]his plaintiff, although
blind, had the same fight to assume the existence of a rail on each side that any traveler passing either in
the daytime or in the night-time would have."); Shields v. Consolidated Gas Co.,193 A.D. 86, 90,
(1920) ("It is well settled that one who is blind or whose eyesight is impaired, is not thereby
deprived of the right to use the public highways, and that in venturing onto them he does not do so at
his peril.").

31.

Zackery v. Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 74 Miss. 520(1897).

32. Peter David Blanck & Michael Millender, Before Disability Civil Rights: Civil War
Pensionsand the Politics ofDisability in America, 52 ALA. L. REv. 1 (2000).
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review articles written (one as author and one as co-author) by the man
whom this symposium honors: Jacobus tenBroek. The first article, The
Disabled in the Law of Welfare,33 co-written with Political Science

Professor Floyd Matson, contained several important conceptual points
about disability, including identifying the societal tendency to lump4
people with disabilities together with others viewed as "deviants,"

recognizing certain commonalities in the treatment and experiences of
persons having different kinds of disabilities, 3 drawing a distinction
between "disability" and "handicap,

36

highlighting the role of public

attitudes and assumptions regarding disabilities, 37 and noting the
propensity to regard people with disabilities as incompetent and needing
charity.38 But most pertinent for present purposes was the article's
articulation of two alternative societal approaches to disability-what the

authors referred to as "custodialism" and "integrationism":
The older custodial attitude is typically expressed in policies
of segregation and shelter, of special treatment and separate
The newer integrative approach focuses
institutions.
attention upon the needs of the disabled as those of normal

people caught at a physical and social disadvantage. The
effect of custodialism is to magnify physical differences into
qualitative distinctions; the effect of integrationism is to
maximize similarity, normality, and equality as between the
disabled and the able-bodied.3 9
TenBroek and Matson wrote that integrationism "gives emphasis to the

normal capacities of the physically disabled and hence to their potential for
as equals in the social and economic life of the
full participation
' 40
community.

33. Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L.
REv. 809 (1966).
34. Id. at 812-14 ("The tendency to lump together all those who display a visible
difference, either of appearance or behavior-as in the physical scale of 'defectives' or the
sociological scale of 'deviants'-represents the survival in attenuated form of the cruder prejudices
of primitive societies.").
35. Id. at 814 ("Psychologically, socially, and legally, the disabled throughout history have
enjoyed among themselves a peculiar 'equality'; they have been equally mistrusted, equally
misunderstood, equally mistreated, and equally impoverished.").
36. Id. at 814 ("[A] meaningful distinction may be made between 'disability' and
'handicap'-that is, between the physical disability, measured in objective scientific terms and the
social handicap imposed upon the disabled by the cultural definition of their estate. 'A disability is
a condition of impairment, physical or mental, having an objective aspect that can usually be
described by a physician ...A handicap is the cumulative result of the obstacles which disability
interposes between the individual and his maximum functional level."') (quoting Kenneth W.
Hamilton, COUNSELING THE HANDICAPPED IN THE REHABILITATION PROCESS 17 (1950)).
37. Id. at 814-16 ("The legal and constitutional status of the physically disabled-like
their status in society and in the economy-is a reflection of underlying attitudes and assumptions
concerning disability and of social policies based upon those attitudes. For the most part it is the
culturaldefinition of disability, rather than the scientific or medical definition, which is instrumental
in the ascription of capacities and incapacities, roles and rights, status and security.").
38. Id. at 809-10 ("Throughout history the physically handicapped have been regarded as
incompetent to aid themselves and therefore permanently dependent upon the charity of others-in
short, as indigent beggars.").
39. ld. at 816.
40. Id. at 815.
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Having introduced the custodialism and integrationism alternatives
in the Law of Welfare article, Professor tenBroek went on to take a more
prescriptive approach in the second article-The Right to Live in the
World. The Disabled and the Law of Torts.4 1 In a section bluntly titled
"Integration the Answer," he wrote that in making disability policy
determinations, "[T]he courts, other agencies of government, and other
public and private bodies should be controlled by a policy of
integrationism-that is, a policy entitling the disabled to full
participation in the life of the community and encouraging and enabling
them to do so .... He argued that such an approach had already been
officially adopted and was applicable to the courts:
[T]his policy is now, and for some time has been, the policy
of the nation, declared as such by the legislatures of the states
and by the Congress of the United States; and [] the courts
and others are thus bound to use that policy at least as a
guide, if not as a mandate, in reaching their decisions,
whatever 43
may be their views as to its desirability or
feasibility.
In support of his contention that integrationism and full
participation had been adopted as national and state policy, tenBroek
pointed to various federal and state laws, including rehabilitation
legislation, architectural barriers laws, special education laws, guide dog
and white cane statutes, and laws prohibiting of discrimination on the
basis of disability in particular contexts.44 Since 1966, the ultimate
objectives of integration and full participation articulated by Professor
tenBroek have been recognized by various government entities and
endorsed in disability legislation including, notably, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).45
TenBroek went on in The Disabledin the Law of Torts article to consider
the body of torts decisions involving disability through the lens of the
integration/custodialism distinction, and suggested reforms to make the
41.

tenBroek, supra note 29.

42. Id. at 843.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 843-47, and authorities cited therein.
45. See, e.g., ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 11,at 67-68 ("[G]ovenment

bodies at all levels of modem American society have, with relative consistency, chosen full participation
as the desired objective for handicapped people.") and the authorities cited therein; ON THE THRESHOLD,
supra note 20, at 28 ("[T]he Nation's proper goals regarding persons with disabilities are to assure
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and, wherever possible, economic selfsufficiency for such citizens."); 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(3)(F) ("right of individuals to... enjoy full inclusion
and integration in the economic, political, social, cultural, and educational mainstream of American

society"), (a)(6)(B) ("the goals of the Nation properly include the goal of providing individuals with
disabilities with the tools necessary to ...achieve equality of opportunity, full inclusion and integration in

society, employment, independent living, and economic and social self-sufficiency, for such
individuals"), & (c)(3) ("It is the policy of the United States that all programs, projects, and activities
receiving assistance under this chapter shall be carried out in a manner consistent with the principles
of... inclusion, integration, and full participation of the individuals"); S. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 56 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6406 (people with disabilities have a basic human
right of full participation in life and society). Section 12101(a)(8) of the ADA provides that "the Nation's
proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).
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law reflect the integrationist approach.4 6 In the process, he argued that
people with disabilities have a constitutional and legal right to live in the
world, to freedom of movement within that world, and to equal access to
places of public accommodation; and that artificial barriers that keep
such individuals from moving about throughout society are or should be
illegal.47
Apart from other qualities and groundbreaking contributions to
disability law, the Law of Welfare and Law of Torts articles provided
several fundamental notions that provided guidance to the disability
rights movement that began to emerge in the decade that followed, and
that continue to afford direction as we proceed toward the end of the first
decade of the 21 st century:
1)

the guiding star of full participation and integration as
the ultimate objectives of disability rights advocacy;

2)

the perception of people with disabilities as "normal
people caught at a physical and social disadvantage";

3)

the difference between deficits incident to disability
and those imposed unnecessarily by society as an
outgrowth of negative attitudes and misdirected
practices; and

4)

the creative use of existing legal precedents and
theories to establish, expand, and enforce legal rights of
people with disabilities.

In 1969, only about three years after the seminal tenBroek articles,
two important publications came out that explicitly recognized the
prototype that the civil rights efforts of African Americans during the
sixties offered for individuals with disabilities in their efforts to improve
their status in American society. In an article titled Uncle Tom and Tiny
Tim: Some Reflections on the Cripple as Negro,48 Professor Leonard
Kriegel suggested that, as people with disabilities were seeking equality and
dignity, they should adopt as a model the approaches taken by black people
in their civil rights struggles. Another professor, Richard Allen, wrote a
monograph titled The Legal Rights of the Disabled and Disadvantaged49 in
which he suggested that people with disabilities have many of the same
problems-in education, job opportunities, and social participation-as
poor people and racial and ethnic minorities. He proposed that all these
groups are seeking similar goals such as normalization, fairness, and respect
for the dignity and worth of each individual. He advocated a shift "from
charity to rights" and called for recognition of "a common right to full
46. 54 CAL. L. REV. 841 (1966).
47. tenBroek, supra note 29, at 848-52, 910-18.
48. Leonard Kriegel, Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some Reflections on the Cripple as Negro, 38
AM. SCHOLAR 412 (1962).
49. Richard Allen, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE DISABLED AND DISADVANTAGED (U.S. Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1969).

2008]

Restoring the ADA and Beyond

enjoyment of that fundamental concept of our jurisprudence: Equal Justice
50
under Law; they who have for so long had precious little of either."
Professor Allen went a step further and outlined some ways in which such
principles could be pursued in the context of court actions and legislation,
thereby mapping out a blueprint for the litigative and legislative activities
on behalf of individuals with disabilities in the 1970s and thereafter.
To me, these four publications together provide a pretty good
roadmap for the disability rights movement-or perhaps a more accurate
analogy would be an AAA TripTik, that accurately portrays the starting
point, suggests a route for proceeding, and indicates the location of the final
destination being sought. The four publications serve as a useful measuring
stick for looking at how far the disability rights movement has come, and
where we still need to go.
1II.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE RESTORATION OF THE ADA

51

One very obvious part of any future disability rights agenda is to
repair the damage to the Americans with Disabilities Act resulting from
ill-advised judicial decisions. The enactment of the ADA was a huge
step forward; the negative court interpretations of the statute represent a
step back, not nearly as momentous as its enactment but quite substantial
in their detrimental effects. Correction of these distortions of our
principal civil rights guarantee must surely be at the top of objectives in
the near future.
In July of 1990, Congress and the George H.W. Bush
Administration realized the momentous and long-needed objective of
according people with disabilities protection from discrimination-the
right to be treated equally and to challenge unfair treatment against
them-by enacting the ADA. In this legislation, the two elected
branches of government made a compact with the American people that
America would no longer tolerate discrimination on the basis of
disability, and if people encountered such discrimination they could
Unfortunately, the judiciary-the unelected
challenge it in court.
branch-has largely taken away important parts of the protection of the
ADA and access to the courts to enforce it by drastically and
aggressively limiting the coverage of the ADA. Today, large numbers of
people with disabilities around the country find that they no longer have
the rights the Congress (by overwhelmingly favorable bipartisan voting
majorities) and the President gave them.

50. Id. at 1.
51. Materials in this section are derived in substantial part from testimony that I delivered
to the House Committee on Education and Labor in January-ADA Restoration Act of 2007:
Hearing on H.R. 3195 before the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 110th Cong., January 29,
2008 (statement of Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., Professor, University of the District of Columbia, David
A. Clarke School of Law)-which was based, in turn, on material derived from sections I had
written for the RIGHTING THE ADA report of the National Council on Disability (2004), the series of
topic papers that led up to it, and other NCD reports that I helped develop.
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In a variety of ways, the ADA has lived up to the high hopes that
accompanied its passage. The provisions of the ADA that address
architectural, transportation, and communication accessibility have
changed the face of American society in numerous concrete ways. A
vast number of buildings and other structures have been affected by
provisions of the ADA that make it illegal to design or construct any new
place of public accommodation or other commercial facility without
making it readily accessible to and usable by people with disabilities, or
to alter such a facility without incorporating accessibility features. 52 The
ADA's mass transit provisions ended decades of disagreements and
controversy regarding exactly what is required of public transportation
systems to avoid discriminating on the basis of disability. The ADA
contains detailed provisions describing requirements for operators of bus,
rail, and other public transportation systems, and intercity and commuter
rail systems.53 Although implementation has been far from perfect and
ADA provisions do not answer all the questions, much progress in
transportation accessibility has been made. The ADA's employment
provisions have dramatically affected hiring practices by barring invasive
preemployment questionnaires and disability inquiries and the misuse of
preemployment physical information. These provisions also have made
job accommodations for workers with disabilities more common than
The ADA's
they were before the ADA was enacted.
telecommunications provisions have resulted in the establishment of a
nationwide system of relay services, which permit the use of telephone
services by those with hearing or speech impairments, and a closed
captioning requirement for the verbal content of all federally funded
television public service announcements.
Other provisions of Title II of the ADA (covering state and local
governments) and Title III (covering public accommodations) have
eliminated many discriminatory practices by private businesses and
government agencies. The ADA has had a particularly strong impact in
promoting the development of community residential, treatment, and
care services in lieu of unnecessarily segregated large state institutions
and nursing homes. The Act provided the impetus for President George
W. Bush's "New Freedom Initiative," issued in February 2001,
committing his administration to assuring the rights and inclusion of
people with disabilities in all aspects of American life; and for Executive
Order No. 13217, issued on June 18, 2001, declaring the commitment of
the United States to community-based alternatives for people with
disabilities.
At the ADA signing ceremony, the first President Bush declared
that other countries, including Sweden, Japan, the Soviet Union, and
each of the 12 member nations of the European Economic Community,
had announced their desire to enact similar legislation. In the years since
52. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181-12189 (1990).
53. Id.at § 12131-12165 (1990).
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its enactment, numerous other countries have been inspired by the ADA
to seek legislation in their own jurisdictions to prohibit discrimination on
the basis of disability. These countries have looked to the ADA, if not as
a model, at least as a touchstone in crafting their own legislative
proposals.
In 1988, while the original ADA bills were pending before
Congress, the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV) Epidemic endorsed the legislation and recommended that
the ADA should serve as a vehicle for protecting from discrimination
people with HIV infection. The ADA has proved to be the principal civil
rights law protecting people with HIV from the sometimes egregious
discriminatory actions directed at them.
In a broader sense, the ADA has, as the Council has observed in a
report issued in 2000, "begun to transform the social fabric of our
nation":
It has brought the principle of disability civil rights into the
mainstream of public policy. The law, coupled with the
disability rights movement that produced a climate where
such legislation could be enacted, has impacted
fundamentally the way Americans perceive disability. The
placement of disability discrimination on a par with race or
gender discrimination exposed the common experiences
of prejudice and segregation and provided clear rationale for
the elimination of disability discrimination in this country.
The ADA has become a symbol, internationally, of the
promise of human and civil rights, and a blueprint for policy
development in other countries. It has changed permanently
the architectural and telecommunications landscape of the
United States. It has created increased recognition and
understanding of the manner in which the physical and social
environment can pose discriminatory barriers to people with
disabilities. It is a vehicle through which people with
disabilities have made their political influence felt, and it
continues to be a unifying focus for the disability rights
movement.54
This is not to ignore the fact that there are huge gaps in
enforcement of the ADA's requirements or that some covered entities
have taken an I-won't-do-anything-until-I'm-sued attitude toward the
obligations imposed by the law. Indeed, the Promises to Keep report,
from which the preceding quotations were taken, described a variety of
problems and weaknesses in federal enforcement of the ADA and
presented recommendations for remedying such deficiencies.
Numerous people with disabilities, however, have declared that the
ADA has played an important role in improving their lives. In 1995,
NCD issued a report titled Voices of Freedom: America Speaks Out on
54. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, PROMISES TO KEEP: A DECADE OF FEDERAL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 1 (2000).
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the ADA, in which it presented a large number of statements by
individuals with disabilities talking about the impact of the ADA. The
following is a tiny sampling of the thousands of statements NCD
received:
The ADA is fantastic. I can go out and participate. The ADA
makes me feel like I'm one of the gang. (Sandra Brent,
Arkansas)
Even though we had the Rehab Act of 1973, it took the ADA
to make real change. The ADA has given me hope,
independence, and dignity. (Yadi Mark, Louisiana)
Because of the ADA, I have more of the opportunities that
other people have. Now I feel like a participant in life, not a
spectator. (Brenda Henry, Kansas)
A successful person with a disability was once thought of as
unusual. Now successful people with disabilities are the rule.
It's the ADA55that has opened the door. (Donna Smith-Whitty,
Mississippi)
The report presented statements by people with disabilities about
their experiences with the ADA in various aspects of their lives,
including access to the physical environment, access to employment
opportunities, communication mobility, and self image. The report
concluded that,
[T]he actual research data and the experiences of people with
disabilities, of their family members, of businesses, and of
public servants, [demonstrates] that this relatively new law
has begun to move us rapidly toward a society in which all
Americans can live, attend school, obtain employment, be a
part of a family, and be a part of a community in spite of the
presence of a disability. What is needed now is a renewed
commitment to the goals of the Act (which were crafted
under unprecedented bipartisan efforts), sufficient resources
to support further education and training concerning the
ADA, and effective enforcement. 56
In a similar vein, President George W. Bush declared the following
in 2002:
In the 12 years since President George H.W. Bush
signed the ADA into law, more people with disabilities are
participating fully in our society than ever before. As we
mark this important anniversary, we celebrate the positive

55.
26(1995).

NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, Voices of Freedom: America Speaks Out on the ADA

56. Id. at 27.
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effect this landmark legislation has had upon our Nation, and
we recognize the important influence it has had in improving
employment opportunities, government services, public
accommodations, transportation, and telecommunications for
those with disabilities.
Today, Americans with disabilities enjoy greatly
improved access to countless facets of life; but more needs to
be done. We must continue to build on the important
foundations established by the ADA. Too many Americans
with disabilities remain isolated, dependent, and deprived 57of
the tools they need to enjoy all that our Nation has to offer.
B.

Judicial Resistance

In light of the overwhelming endorsement of the ADA by
Congress in enacting it, by the Presidents in office at and since its
enactment, and by the majority of the general public, it is surprising and
disappointing that the judiciary all too often has given the Act the cold
shoulder. Problematic judicial interpretations have blunted the Act's
impact in significant ways. The National Council on Disability,
numerous legal commentators, and large numbers of people with
disabilities have become increasingly concerned about certain
interpretations and limitations placed on the ADA in decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court.
This is not to suggest that all the rulings of the high court on the
ADA have been negative. Among favorable decisions, the U.S. Supreme
Court has (1) upheld the ADA's integration requirement and applied it to
prohibit unnecessary segregation of people receiving residential services
from the states; 58 (2) held the ADA applicable to protect prisoners in
state penal systems; 59 (3) held that the ADA prohibits discrimination by a
dentist against a person with HIV infection; 60 (4) ruled that the ADA
required the PGA to allow a golfer with a mobility impairment to use a
golf cart in tournament play as a "reasonable modification"; 61 and ruled
that the ADA protects the rights of people with disabilities to have access
to the courts.62 But while not all of the Court's ADA decisions are
objectionable, those that are have had a serious negative impact. They
have placed severe restrictions on the class of persons protected by the
ADA, have narrowed the remedies available to complainants who
successfully prove violations of the Act, have expanded the defenses
available to employers, and have even called into question the very
57. President George W. Bush, Presidential Proclamation on the Anniversary of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, (July 26, 2002).

58. Olmstead v. L. C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
59. Pa. Dep't. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
60. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
61. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).

62. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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legality of some parts of the Act. NCD's policy paper, The Impact of the
Supreme Court's ADA Decisions on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, explores the effect such decisions have had on individuals
with disabilities.63
Media coverage of the Court's ADA decisions has made matters
worse.
While such coverage has not been uniformly negative, a
significant portion of it has been misleading, presenting the Act in a
highly unfavorable light and placing a negative "spin" on the ADA, the
court decisions interpreting it, and its impact on American society.
NCD's extensive and detailed policy paper, Negative Media Portrayals
of the ADA, discusses prevalent media-fed myths about the ADA.64
C.

SurprisingProblems with the Definition of Disability

When Congress passed the ADA and President George H.W. Bush
signed it into law, hardly anyone expected trouble in the courts with the
definition of disability. Congress played it safe by adopting in the ADA
a definition of disability that was the same as the definition of
"handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act. That definition was enacted in
1974 and clarified in regulations issued under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. Because the definition was a broad and relatively
uncontroversial one, defendants seldom challenged plaintiffs' claims of
having a disability.65 In 1984, a federal district court noted that, after 10
years' experience with the Rehabilitation Act definition,
only one court
66
"handicap."
a
have
to
not
plaintiff
504
Section
a
found
In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that the
definition of "handicap" under Section 504 was very broad. In School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline, the Court took an expansive and
nontechnical view of the definition. 67 The Court found that Ms. Arline's
history of hospitalization for infectious tuberculosis was "more than
sufficient" to establish that she had "a record of' a disability under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.68 The Court made this ruling even
though her discharge from her job was not because of her
hospitalization. 69 The Court displayed a lenient interpretation of what a
plaintiff needed to show to invoke the protection of the statute. It noted
that, in establishing the new definition of disability in 1974, Congress
had expanded the definition "so as to preclude discrimination against '[a]

63. Nat'l Council on Disability, No. 7: The Impact of the Supreme Court's ADA Decisions
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT POLICY BRIEF
SERIES:
RIGHTING
THE
ADA,

http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/decisionsimpact.htm.
64. Nat'l Council on Disability, No. 5: Negative Media Portrayals of the ADA, POLICY
BRIEF

SERIES:

RIGHTING

THE

ADA,

http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/policybrief.htm.
65. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 621, 622
(1999).
66. Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
67. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
68. Id. at 281.
69. Id.
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person who has a record of, or is regarded as having, an
impairment [but
70
who] may at present have no actual incapacity at all.'
The Court declared that the "basic purpose of Section 504" was to
ensure that individuals "are not denied jobs or other benefits because of
the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others" or "reflexive
reactions to actual or perceived [disabilities]" and that the legislative
history of the definition of disability "demonstrates that Congress was as
concerned about the effect of an impairment on others as it was about its
effect on the individual.",7' The Court elaborated as follows:
Congress extended coverage.., to those individuals who are simply
"regarded as having" a physical or mental impairment. The Senate
Report provides as an example of a person who would be covered under
this subsection "a person with some kind of visible physical impairment
which in fact does not substantially limit that person's functioning."
Such an impairment might not diminish a person's physical or mental
capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person's
ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the
impairment.72
When Congress was considering the ADA, the Supreme Court's
decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline was the leading
legal precedent on the definition of disability. The Arline ruling was
expressly relied on in several ADA committee reports discussing the
definition of disability, including the report of the House Judiciary
Committee, which quoted the exact language of the Court as set out
above.
This was the legal background when Congress adopted the
essentially identical definition of disability in the ADA. To further
ensure that the definition of disability and other provisions of the ADA
would not receive restrictive interpretations, Congress included in the
ADA a provision requiring that "nothing" in the ADA was to "be
construed to apply a lesser standard" than is applied under the relevant
sections of the Rehabilitation Act, including Section 504, and the
regulations promulgating them. In his remarks at the ADA signing
ceremony, President George H.W. Bush pointed with pride to the ADA's
"piggybacking" on Rehabilitation Act language:
The administration worked closely with the Congress
to ensure that, wherever possible, existing language and
standards from the Rehabilitation Act were incorporated into
the ADA. The Rehabilitation Act standards are already
familiar to large segments of the private sector that are either
federal contractors or recipients of federal funds. Because
the Rehabilitation Act was enacted 17 years ago, there
is already an extensive body of law interpreting the
requirements of that Act.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 279.
Id.at285.
Id.at 282-83.
H.R. REP. No. 101 485, at 30 (1990).
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Accordingly, at the time of the ADA's enactment, it
seemed clear that most ADA plaintiffs would not find it
particularly difficult to establish that they had a disability.
NCD issued two policy papers that discuss the care with
which the ADA definition of disability was selected and the
breadth of that definition.74
For some time after the ADA was signed into law, the pattern of
broad and inclusive interpretation of the definition of disability,
established under Section 504, continued under the ADA. In 1996, a
federal district court declared that "it is the rare case when the matter of
whether an individual has a disability is even disputed., 75 As some
lower courts, however, began to take restrictive views of the concept of
disability, defendants took note, and disability began to be contested in
more and more cases.
Beginning with its decision in Sutton v. United Airlines in 1999,
the U.S. Supreme Court started to turn its back on the broad, relaxed76
interpretation of disability endorsed by the Court in the Arline decision.
By the time of the Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams decision in 2002, the Court was espousing the view that the
definition should be "interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard
for qualifying as disabled. 77 This stance is directly contrary to what the
Congress and the President intended when they enacted the ADA.
The result of the Court's harsh and restrictive approach to defining
disability places difficult, technical, and sometimes insurmountable
evidentiary burdens on people who have experienced discrimination.
The focus of many time-consuming and expensive legal battles is on the
characteristics of the person subjected to discrimination rather than on
the alleged discriminatory treatment meted out by the accused party. The
ADA was intended to regulate the conduct of employers and other
covered entities, and to induce them to end discrimination. To the extent
that these parties can divert the focus to a microscopic dissection of the
complaining party, central objectives of the law are being frustrated.
Other governments and judicial forums have rejected the Supreme
Court's restrictive interpretation of disability. Thus, courts in the
individual states 78 and in other countries 79 have embraced more inclusive
74. Nat'l Council on Disability, No. 2: A Carefully Constructed Law, THE AMERICANS
WITH

DISABILITIES

ACT

POLICY

BRIEF

SERIES:

THE

RIGHTING

ADA,

Nat'l Council on
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2002/carefullyconstructedlaw.htm;
Disabilities, No. 4: Broad or Narrow Constructionof the ADA, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT

POLICY

BRIEF

SERIES:

RIGHTING

THE

ADA,

http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2002/broadnarrowconstruction.htm.
75. Morrow v. City of Jacksonville, 941 F. Supp. 816, 823 n.3 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
76. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
77. 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
78. See, e.g., Stone v. St. Joseph's Hospital of Parkersburg, 538 S.E.2d 389, 400-04 (W.
Va. 2000), in which the Supreme Court of West Virginia, after acknowledging that the state law had
been amended in 1989 to adopt the federal three-prong definition of disability, chose to reject the
"restrictive approach" of federal interpretation of the definition, endorsing an "independent
approach... not mechanically tied to federal disability discrimination jurisprudence." The court
also cited a number of cases from other states that had interpreted the definition of disability more
expansively than under federal nondiscrimination laws. Id. at 405 and n.23. Likewise, in Dahill v.
Police Dep't of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956 (2001), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court embraced
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interpretations of who has a disability under nondiscrimination laws. And
legislatures in the states 80 and in other countries 8 1 deliberately have
rejected the narrow approach under U.S. law as enunciated in the
Supreme Court's decisions.
D.

Specific Problems with the Interpretationof Disability

In its Righting the ADA report, the National Council on Disability
described nine issues to which the Supreme Court's narrow approach to
the definition of disability in the ADA had led it to deviate from the
legislative intent with harmful consequences. These issues were:
1)

Consideration of Mitigating Measures in Determining
Disability;

2)

Substantial Limitation of a Major Life Activity;

3)

Employment as a Major Life Activity;

virtually every argument advanced by disability rights advocates that the United States Supreme
Court had rejected in Sutton v. United Airlines, and ruled that mitigating measures should not be
considered in determining whether an individual has a "handicap" under Massachusetts
antidiscrimination law.
According to the Dahill Court, the public policy underlying the
antidiscrimination statute supported its interpretation that mitigating measures should be excluded,
while embracing the Sutton standard would "exclude[ ] from the statute's protection numerous
persons who may mitigate serious physical or mental impairments to some degree, but who may
nevertheless need reasonable accommodations to fulfill the essential functions of a job." Id. at 962
and n.10.
79. See, e.g., Granovsky v. Canada, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, in which the Supreme Court of
Canada expressly rejected the restrictive approach of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sutton v. United
Airlines, noted the "ameliorative purpose" and "remedial component" of the disability
nondiscrimination provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and adopted an
approach in which the focus is "not on the impairment as such, nor even any associated functional
limitations, but is on the problematic response of the [defendant] state to either or both of these
circumstances." The Court added that it was the alleged discriminatory action "that stigmatizes the
impairment, or which attributes false or exaggerated importance to the functional limitations (if
any)." Id. para. 26. Similarly, in Quebec v. Montreal, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665 (Can.), the Supreme
Court of Canada noted that "[h]uman rights legislation is [to be] given a liberal and purposive
interpretation," and ruled, "The objectives of the Charter, namely the right to equality and protection
against discrimination, cannot be achieved unless we recognize that discriminatory acts may be
based as much on perception and myths and stereotypes as on the existence of actual functional
limitations. Since the very nature of discrimination is often subjective, assigning the burden of
proving the objective existence of functional limitations to a victim of discrimination would be to
give that person a virtually impossible task. Functional limitations often exist only in the mind of
other people, in this case that of the employer." Id. para. 39. The Court ruled that "a 'handicap,'
therefore, includes ailments which do not in fact give rise to any limitation or functional disability."
80. Some states, such as California and Rhode Island, have amended their disability
nondiscrimination statutes to reject federal case law narrowing the scope of individuals protected.
Others, such as Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York have never adopted the rigid and stringent
concept of "disability" consisting of an "impairment" which "substantially limits" one or more major
life activities. For a discussion of state laws that have deviated from the restrictive federal model,
see NCD's paper titled Defining "Disability" in a Civil Rights Context: The Courts' Focus on the
Extent of Limitations as Opposed to Fair Treatment and Equal Opportunity. Paper No. 6 of NCD's
POLICY

BRIEF

SERIES:

RIGHTING

THE

ADA

PAPERS,

http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/policybrief.htm.
81. For example, the definition of disability provisions of Australia's Disability
Discrimination Act of 1992 (4.(1))
and of Ireland's Employment Equality Act (1998) Stat. (2), both
of which were adopted after the ADA was enacted, are framed in very broad terms that encompass
not only a wide variety of currently existing conditions, but also include any condition that
previously existed but no longer does, that "may exist in the future," or that "is imputed to a person."
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4)

The "Class or Broad Range of Jobs" Standard;

5)

"Regarded As" Having a Disability;

6)

Validity of and Deference to Be Accorded Federal
Regulations Implementing the ADA's Definition of
Disability;

7)

Duration Limitation on What Constitutes a Disability;

8)

Per Se Disabilities; and

9)

Restrictive Interpretation of the Definition of Disability
to Create a Demanding Standard.

In regard to each of these issues, the report describes "What the
Supreme Court Did," analyzes the "Significance of the Court's Action,"
and gives specific "Examples of Impact" of the rulings.82 To provide a
graphic summary of the ways that the court decisions have deviated from
the intentions expressed by Congress when it enacted the ADA, when I
testified before the House Committee on Education and Labor in 2008, I
prepared a chart contrasting "What Congress Said" with "What the
Courts Are Now Saying"; the chart is attached as an appendix to this
paper. Similarly, the RIGHTING THE ADA report contains a section titled
"Principles and Assumptions Regarding the Definition of Disability
When the ADA Was Enacted That Have Been Disregarded or
Contradicted by the Supreme Court" which presents eleven important
ways in which the Court's ADA definitions decisions deviate from
expectations
in place when the ADA was negotiated debated and
83
enacted.
Before the Supreme Court upset the applecart, all the relevant
authorities were nearly unanimous in the view that mitigating measures
should not be considered in deciding whether a person has a disability
under the ADA. Even before the ADA was enacted, the committee
reports on the pending legislation declared clearly that mitigating
measures should not be factored in. The three ADA Committee Reports
that addressed the issue all concurred that mitigating measures are not to
be taken into account when determining whether an individual has a
disability. The House Committee on Education and Labor declared
unequivocally that "[w]hether a person has a disability should be
assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures. 84
The House Committee on the Judiciary likewise declared that "[t]he
impairment should be assessed without considering whether mitigating
measures ... would result in a less-than-substantial limitation., 85 To
illustrate the application of this approach, the Committee discussed the
82.
83.
84.
85.

RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 24 at 44-72.
Id. at 73-74.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 52 (1990).
H.R- REP. No. 101-485, at 28 (1990).
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examples of a person with epilepsy whose condition is mitigated by
medication and of a person with a hearing impairment whose hearing
loss is corrected by the use of a hearing aid. In the Committee's view,
these individuals would be covered by the ADA.
In a sharp break from the legislative history of the ADA, the
position of the executive agencies responsible for enforcing the ADA,
and the prior rulings of eight of the nine federal courts of appeal that had
addressed the issue, the Supreme Court decided, in its rulings in the
Sutton,86 Murphy,87 and Albertson 's88 cases, that mitigating measures
should be considered in determining whether an individual has a
disability under the ADA. The Supreme Court's position on mitigating
measures ignores the rationale that led courts, regulatory agencies, and
Congress to take a contrary position-that unless you disregard
mitigating measures in determining eligibility for ADA protection, you
shield much discrimination on the basis of disability from effective
challenge.
The result of the Court's rulings on mitigating measures turns the
ADA's definition of disability into an instrument for screening out large
groups of individuals with disabilities from the coverage of the Act, and
thereby insulating from challenge many instances of the pervasive unfair
and unnecessary discrimination that the law sought to prohibit. To the
extent that mitigating measures are successful in managing an
individual's condition, the Supreme Court's stance on mitigating
measures deprives the individual of the right to maintain an ADA action
to challenge acts of disability discrimination she or he has experienced,
because such a person is not eligible for the ADA's protection. This
means an employer or other covered entity may discriminate with
impunity against such individuals in various flagrant and covert ways.
NCD issued a policy paper examining the function and types of
mitigating measures, discussing the near consensus in the law prior to the
Supreme Court's taking a contrary position, and describing the
repercussions of the Court's position.89
Taking the condition of epilepsy to illustrate, before the Supreme
Court's rulings in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg, "a person [with]
epilepsy would receive nearly automatic ADA protection," 90 consistent
with statements in the ADA legislative history and regulatory guidance.
The ADA regulatory commentary of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and the DOJ specifically declared that an
individual with epilepsy would remain within the coverage of the ADA
even if the effects of the condition were controlled by medication.
The situation changed dramatically with the Supreme Court's
mitigating measures decisions. To the extent that a covered entity can
86. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).

of the

87. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
88. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
89. Nat'l Council on Disability, No. 11: The Role of MitigatingMeasures in the Narrowing
ADA 's
Coverage,
POLICY
BRIEF
SERIES:
RIGHTING
THE
ADA,

http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/mitigatingmeasures.htn.
90. Toddv. Academy Corporation,57 F. Supp. 2d448, 453-54 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
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successfully demonstrate (after extensive, intrusive discovery into the
details of the person's condition) that an individual's epilepsy is
effectively controlled by medication, the individual cannot challenge the
discriminatory actions of the covered entity. This is true even if the
employer or other covered entity has an express policy against the hiring
of people with epilepsy; puts up signs that say, "epileptics not welcome
here"; inaccurately assumes that all persons with epilepsy are inherently
unsafe; or has the irrational belief that epilepsy is contagious. The
unfairness or irrationality of the covered entity's actions and motivations,
including stereotypes, fears, assumptions, and other forms of prejudice,
cannot be challenged by a person whose condition is mitigated. The end
result is that it is a rare plaintiff who is in a position to challenge even the
most egregious and outrageous discrimination involving a condition that
can be mitigated. One study, by the Epilepsy Legal Defense Fund, found
that, of thirty-six cases in which courts had ruled on the issue since the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Sutton v. United Airlines, thirty-two
had decided that epilepsy was not a disability.
Epilepsy is an illustrative example, but the same principles apply
to diabetes, various psychiatric disabilities, hypertension, arthritis, and
numerous other conditions that, for some individuals, can be controlled
by medication. Moreover, the same problems arise with conditions for
which techniques and devices other than medication provide an avenue
for mitigation. Thus, a company that discriminates against people who
use hearing aids will be insulated from challenge by people for whom the
hearing aids are effective in offsetting, to some degree, diminution of
functional ability to hear.
Other mitigating measures, including
prosthetic devices, can raise the same issues-to the extent that they are
successful, they may lead to an argument that the person does not have a
disability, even if she or he is discriminated against precisely because of
the underlying condition or even the use of the mitigating measure itself.
Obviously, this is directly contrary to the stated intentions of the
congressional committees and the Congress as a whole.
E.

TenBroek Saw It, Why Can't the Courts?

Two of the basic conceptual insights in the tenBroek/Matson
articles discussed in Section II of this article were the following:
the perception of people with disabilities as "normal people caught at a
physical and social disadvantage"; and
the difference between deficits incident to disability and those imposed
unnecessarily by society as an outgrowth of negative attitudes and
misdirected practices.
Courts that have espoused restrictive interpretations of the
definition of disability under the ADA have truly missed the boat on
disability, in large part because they have not appreciated these two
principles. All too often, the courts have exhibited long-held, antiquated
notions about disability and about the role of government in addressing
disability. If courts think of people with disabilities as not capable of
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working, for example, anyone who is able to work must not be disabled.
Similarly, access barriers were historically viewed by many people as
being barriers because of an individual's disability, as opposed to the
problem being the barrier itself. When a person with a mobility
impairment could not cross a street with curbs, the person's disability
was considered to be the reason, as opposed to recognizing that the
design of the curb was deficient because it was done with only certain
types of people in mind, when it could just as easily have been designed
to be usable by all. The ADA embodies a social concept of
discrimination that takes the view that many limitations resulting from
actual or perceived impairments flow, not from limitations of the
individual, but, rather, from the existence of unnecessary barriers to full
participation in society and its institutions. The social model is at
variance with the medical model of disability that centers on assessments
of the degree of a person's functional limitation. 91 Professor tenBroek
anticipated the more enlightened modem thinking in his identification of
the difference between deficits incident to disability and those imposed
unnecessarily by society as an outgrowth of negative attitudes and
misdirected practices.
Perhaps even more significantly, tenBroek's perception of people
with disabilities as "normal people caught at a physical and social
disadvantage" captures a seemingly simple, but hugely important principle
that the courts have often not grasped. In my previous writing, I have
commented:
In his remark, Professor tenBroek captured a truth that is both
the guiding star and essential foundation..,. -that
individuals with disabilities are just people, not essentially
different from other people. Though this proposition is
relatively simple to state, its acceptance is the single most
universal aspiration of most individuals with disabilities, a
central tenet of the Disability Rights Movement, and
a sine
92
qua non of real equality for people with disabilities.

91. In light of the courts' failure to appreciate and apply the social model of disability
discrimination, NCD's RIGHT[NG THE ADA report suggests that the social model should be made
explicit by incorporating it as an additional ADA finding as follows:
Discrimination on the basis of disability is the result of the interaction between
an individual's actual or perceived impairment and attitudinal, societal, and
institutional barriers; individuals with a range of actual or perceived physical
or mental impairments often experience denial or limitation of opportunities
resulting from attitudinal barriers, including negative stereotypes, fear,
ignorance, and prejudice, in addition to institutional and societal barriers, including
architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, and the refusal to
make reasonable modifications to policies, practices, or procedures, or to
provide reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids and services.
RIGHTING THE ADA, supranote 24, at 109.
92.
Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination:The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability,

42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 534 (1997). 1 elaborated on the significance of tenBroek's observation in a
section Icalled "People with Disabilities as Regular Joes and Janes":
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The "integration" and "full participation" that tenBroek advocated
as the ultimate objectives of disability laws imply that individuals with
disabilities shall not be unnecessarily differentiated from the rest of
society. To this end, analysis under nondiscrimination laws should not
focus on differentiating characteristics of the person alleging
discrimination, but instead on scrutinizing the practices and operations of
covered entities to determine whether they are discriminatory when
examined in light of latent flexibility in structuring and modifying tasks,
programs, facilities, and opportunities. "Legal standards imposed under
these laws should serve to eliminate practices, policies, barriers, and
other mechanisms that discriminate on the basis of disability, not to
eliminate as many people as possible from the protection provided in
these laws. In short, these laws seek to promote real equality, not to
protect a special group. 93
Despite common misconceptions that there are two distinct groups
in society-those with disabilities and those without-and that it is
possible to draw sharp distinctions between these two groups, people
actually vary across a whole spectrum of infinitely small gradations of
ability with regard to each individual functional skill. And the
importance of particular functional skills varies immensely according to
the situation, and can be greatly affected by the availability or
unavailability of accommodations and alternative methods of doing
things. This human "spectrum of abilities" was recognized in the 1983
report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights-ACCOMMODATING

THE

described above.
The
Commission noted that, while the popular view is that people with
disabilities are impaired in ways that make them sharply distinguishable
from nondisabled people, instead of two separate and distinct classes,
there are in fact "spectrums of physical and mental abilities that range
from superlative to minimal or nonfunctional. 9 4 In some of its
publications, the National Council on Disability has explained and
SPECTRUM

OF

INDIVIDUAL

ABILITIES,

This helps to explain why terminology in regard to disabilities has been a sensitive
issue. People with disabilities have come to recognize that processes by which they
are assigned labels have reinforced the perception that they are substantially different
from others. In response, they have strongly insisted that "we are people first," and
have demanded that their common humanity be acknowledged rather than their
differences magnified. It also explains why many individuals with disabilities resist
attempts to characterize them as "special" or their daily accomplishments as
"inspirational" or "courageous." At best, such characterizations mark the individual
so labeled as extraordinary and different from the rest of the population and one
whose accomplishments and success are a surprise. At worst, they suggest that the
speaker really means, "Being who you are is so bad that I could not face it; I would
just give up," "Your limitations are so severe that I don't see how you accomplish
anything," or even "I would rather be dead than to live with your impairments."
People with disabilities do not view their going about the tasks and trials involved in
ordinary activities and trying to have accomplishments and success as something
atypical and heroic. They would prefer to be seen for what they are, as ordinary
individuals pursuing the same types of goals-love, success, sexual fulfillment,
contributing to society, material comforts, etc-as other folks.
Id. at 534-535 (footnotes omitted).
93. Id. at 535-36 (footnotes omitted).
94. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note I 1.
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elaborated on the spectrum of abilities concept.9 5
In addition, authorities on disability are generally in agreement that
the concept of disability entails a social judgment; people come to have a
disability when they are viewed and treated as having one by other
people.
As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights put it in
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES, "[P]eople
are made different-that is socially differentiated-by the process of
being seen and treated as different in a system of social practices that
crystallizes distinctions .... ,,96 Thus, the experience of disability is
closely linked to the concept of discrimination.
Individuals may
encounter discrimination on the basis of disability whether or not they
previously thought of themselves as having a disability, and whether or
not they meet foreordained, medically oriented criteria. To achieve its
purposes of eliminating discrimination and achieving integration, the
ADA should reduce the unnecessary differentiation of people because of
actual, perceived, or former physical and mental characteristics. It
emphatically should not force people to demonstrate their differentness
as a prerequisite to receiving protection under the Act.
The ADA is based on a social or civil rights model (sometimes
referred to as a socio-political model), in contrast to the traditional
"medical model." It views the limitations that arise from disabilities as
largely the result of prejudice and discrimination rather than as purely the
inevitable result of deficits in the individual. Sociology Professor
Richard K. Scotch, a disability policy author, has written:
In the socio-political model, disability is viewed not as a
physical or mental impairment, but as a social construction
shaped by environmental factors, including physical
characteristics built into the environment, cultural attitudes
and social behaviors, and the institutionalized rules,
procedures, and practices of private entities and public
organizations. All of these, in turn, reflect overly narrow
assumptions about what constitutes the normal range of
human functioning.9 7
Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger has written that the ADA's
concept of disability views it "not only in terms of the internal attributes
of the arguably disabled individual, but also in terms of external
attributes of the attitudinal environment in which that person must
function. 'Disability,' under this conception, resides as much in the
attitudes of society as in the characteristics of the disabled individual. 98
She elaborated on the ADA's adoption of the social model as follows:
[T]he drafters of the ADA sought to transform the institution

95. See, e.g., Negative Media Portrayalsof the ADA, supra note 64.
96. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 11, at n. 17.
97. Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 214-15 (2000).

98. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 476,480-81 (2000).
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of disability by locating responsibility for disablement not
only in a disabled person's impairment, but also in
"disabling" physical or structural environments. Under such
a construction, the concept of disability takes on new social
meaning. It is not merely a container holding tragedy, or
occasion for pity, charity, or exemption from the ordinary
obligations attending membership in society. The concept of
disability now also, or to a certain extent instead, contains
rights to and societal responsibility for making enabling
environmental adaptations. The ADA was in this way crafted
to replace the old impairment model of disability with a
socio-political approach.
The National Council on Disability has discussed the necessity for
applying the social model of disability under the ADA. 99 In the topic
paper accompanying its initial proposal of an Americans with
Disabilities Act, NCD expressly rejected the "medical model" and the
need for people to demonstrate the severity of their limitations as a
precondition to being protected from discrimination. 00 In its RIGHTING
THE ADA report, NCD included a section titled "Incorporation of a
Social Model of Discrimination." The Council declared:
The ADA embodies a social concept of discrimination that
views many limitations resulting from actual or perceived
disabilities as flowing, not from limitations of the individual,
but, rather, from the existence of unnecessary barriers to full
participation in society and its institutions. This is in contrast
to the medical model of disability that centers on assessments
of the degree of a person's functional limitation.l1t
Accordingly, NCD called for the enactment of a specific provision of its
ADA Restoration Act proposal to make the endorsement of the social
model explicit.102 This is in addition to provisions addressing more
directly the narrow interpretations of the definition of disability.
F.

Other Kinds of Problems Resultingfrom Supreme CourtRulings

Apart from problems with the definition of disability, the
RIGHTING THE ADA report discusses in detail several other kinds of
problems that have resulted from ill-advised ADA rulings of the
Supreme Court. These include the following:
1. In Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources,'0 3 the Supreme Court

99. See, e.g., Negative Media Portrayals ofthe ADA, supra note 64.
100. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE, supra note 18 at A-22 to A-23.
101.

RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 24, at 109.

102. Id.
103. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
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rejected the "catalyst theory" that most lower courts had applied in
determining the availability of attorney's fees and litigation costs to
plaintiffs in cases under the ADA and other civil rights statutes, and
under other federal laws that authorize such payments to the "prevailing
party."
2. In Barnes v. Gorman,10 4 the Supreme Court ruled that punitive
damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, under Section 202 of the ADA, or under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
3. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal,105 the Supreme Court upheld as
permissible under the ADA the EEOC regulatory provision that allows
employers to refuse to hire applicants because their performance on the
job would endanger their health because of a disability, despite the fact
that, in the language of the ADA, Congress recognized a "direct-threat"
defense only for dangers posed to other workers.
4. In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,0 6 the Supreme Court recognized a
reasonableness standard for reasonable accommodations separate from
undue hardship analysis.
5. In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 107 the Supreme Court ruled that the
ADA ordinarily does not require the assignment of an employee with a
disability, as a reasonable accommodation, to a particular position to
which another employee is entitled under an employer's established
seniority system, but that it might in special circumstances. The Court
declared that "to show that a requested accommodation conflicts with the
rules of a seniority system is ordinarily to show that the accommodation
is not 'reasonable."'
The implications of these rulings are explained in some detail in
RIGHTING THE ADA and in the specific topic papers mentioned in the
report. 1°8 As those sources explain, the negative impact of such
decisions on the protection of people with disabilities under the ADA is
significant and disturbing.
G.

Getting the ADA Back on Track: Remedial Legislation'0 9

104. 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
105. 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
106. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
107. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
108. RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 24, at 85-98.
109. On September 25, 2008, after this article was written, the ADA Amendments Act of

2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, was signed into law. Although this law had its origins in
the ADA Restoration Act proposals discussed in this section and accomplishes some of the
objectives of those proposals, this article does not attempt to analyze the provisions of the ADA
Amendments Act, to point out its strengths and weaknesses, nor to identify the ways in which it is
consistent with and different from the legislative proposals that preceded it.
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Based on its analysis of what has happened since the ADA was
enacted the National Council on Disability reached the following
conclusion:
Incisive and forceful legislative action is needed to address
the dramatic narrowing and weakening of the protection
provided by the ADA, resulting from the Supreme Court's
decisions, and to restore civil rights protections. Millions of
Americans experience discrimination based on ignorance,
prejudice, fears, myths, misconceptions, and stereotypes that
many in American society continue to associate with certain
impairments, diagnoses, or characteristics. To revive the
scope and degree of protection that the ADA was supposed to
provide-to address "pervasive" discrimination in a
"comprehensive" manner, as the Act declares-and to put
ADA protections on a more equal footing with other civil
rights protections under federal law, it is necessary to remove
conceptual and interpretational baggage that has been
attached to various elements of the ADA. Any legislative
proposal should address, in some way, each of the problems
listed in Section II of this report [RIGHTING THE ADA] that
the Court's decisions have created.110
In NCD's RIGHTING THE ADA report, the Council presented a
legislative proposal for getting the ADA back on course-an ADA
Restoration Act bill-with an explanatory introduction and a section-bysection summary."' 1 It addressed both the problems with the restricted
interpretation of those eligible for protection of the ADA as persons with
a disability and other problems described in the previous subsection that
have resulted from negative ADA decisions of the Supreme Court; NCD
sought to offer specific legislative proposals to "restore" the ADA to its
original congressionally intended course.
Based on NCD's proposals regarding the definition of disability,
ADA Restoration Act bills were introduced in the 109th and 110th
Congresses. 112 As this symposium takes place, S. 1881 is pending in the
Senate and H.R. 3195 in the House of Representatives. Hearings have
been held in both houses of Congress and negotiations are proceeding.
In testimony before the House Committee on Education and Labor in
January 2008, I opined as follows:
The courts have made a royal mess of the three-prong
definition of disability in the ADA. This has occurred in
spite of very clear and explicit language and guidance
Congress provided in the Act and its legislative history.
Baffled individuals with all sorts of physical and mental
impairments find that they are not allowed to challenge

110. Id. at 99.
111. Id.at 123.
112. H.R. 6258, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 1881, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3195,110th Cong.

(2007).
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discrimination against them, based on legal rationales that
are
11 3
tortured, hypertechnical, and contrary to common sense.
While a detailed analysis of the bills is beyond the scope of this
article, my overall view is that the pending legislation addresses the most
serious distortions that have resulted from a constricted interpretation by
the courts of the ADA definition of disability. Consistent with informed
public policy, the bills return the primary focus away from misplaced
efforts to draw pedantic, absurd distinctions based on judicial
assessments of degree of limitation and return it to identifying and
eliminating discrimination on the basis of disability. To repair the tangle
of interpretations that have resulted from the Supreme Court's
announced proclivity for seeing to it that the ADA's coverage is
"interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as
disabled," ' 114 the bill would replace the concept of "substantial
limitation," with the straightforward concept of physical or mental
impairment, a concept that has a clear and settled definition. If the
legislation is enacted, a person who has been subjected to an adverse
employment action (or disadvantaged in regard to other types of services
or benefits of non-employment programs and entities covered by the
ADA) because of a physical or mental impairment will be protected by
the ADA.
In my view, the enactment of the pending legislation is a critical
step toward re-establishing the protection that the ADA was intended and
understood to provide.' 15 Following that, I would hope that some or all
of the other recommendations in the NCD version of the Restoration Act
would be considered by Congress and passed into law.
H.

Other Clarificationsand Improvements to the ADA

Even with the enactment in its entirety of the NCD Restoration Act
proposal, more would still need to be done to make the ADA maximally
effective. This stems in part from the fact that the NCD Righting the
ADA project only undertook to address problems resulting from
decisions of the Supreme Court entered before 2004, and not problems,
even if widespread and serious, engendered by rulings of the lower
courts. And some issues have arisen which relate to matters not covered
113. House Committee on Education and Labor in January-ADA Restoration Act of
2007: Hearing on H.R. 3195 before the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 110th Cong.,
January 29, 2008, p. 32 (statement of Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., Professor, University of the District of
Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law). I added:

Employers are able to say "Your condition is so problematic that I can't hire you," or
"so problematic that I must terminate you," and then turn around and argue in court,
successfully, that "your condition isn't serious enough to constitute a disability."
The focus of proceedings in most ADA cases is not on the alleged discrimination the
plaintiff experienced. Instead the focus is on an invasive and often embarrassing,
detailed dissection of the plaintiff's condition, limitations, and medical background.
Id.
114. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002).
115. See discussion at supra note 109.

270

TEXAS JOURNAL ON CIVIL LIBERTIES & CIVIL RIGHTS

[Vol. 13:2

or clearly addressed by the ADA, which suggest the need for some finetuning or amplification of the ADA's requirements. Disability litigators
and organizations can identify numerous such concerns. This subsection
presents only a sampling, as follows:
1.

Preclusion of ADA Rights for Applicants for, and Recipients

of, Disability Benefits
Some lower courts have ruled that people with disabilities who
apply for Social Security and other disability benefits and, in the process,
represent that they are unable to work, have thereby disqualified
themselves from showing that they are "qualified" for a job under the
ADA; these courts have ruled that such persons are "judicially estopped"
from invoking ADA protection because they cannot be permitted to
maintain that they are qualified in
light of their previous representations
6
of disability benefits eligibility."
The Supreme Court sought to clarify this situation to some extent in
1999. In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.,117 the Supreme
Court concluded that, because the ADA and the Social Security Disability
Act serve different purposes, a declaration of disability under one act does
not necessarily preclude recovery under the other, and a plaintiff's pursuit
of Social Security disability benefits does not automatically estop him or
her from pursuing an ADA claim. 1 8 The Court stated that the law does not
even erect a strong presumption against an SSDI recipient's success under
the ADA.' 19 The Court indicated, however, that a plaintiff in such
circumstances must explain why an SSDI contention regarding inability to
work is consistent with a representation in an ADA case that she or he
could "perform the essential functions"
of her or his previous job, at least
120
with "reasonable accommodation."'
Subsequent to the Cleveland decision, some courts have shown
themselves to be less receptive to judicial estoppel based on disability
benefits

representations. 121

Others,

however,

have

found

such

representations to be too large of a hurdle for particular ADA plaintiffs to
overcome. 22 Because of the significant differences of purposes, standards,
116. See, e.g., the authorities cited in Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., "Substantially Limited"
Protectionfrom Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructionsof the
Definition of Disability,42 VILL. L. REv. 409,489-505 (1997).
117. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
118. ld. at 797.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 798.
121. See, e.g., Murphey v. City of Minneapolis, 358 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir. 2004);
Parker v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000); E.E.O.C. v. Stowe-Pharr Mills,
Inc., 216 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2000); Giles v. General Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2001);
Nodelman v. Gruner & Jahr USA Pub., 2000 WL 502858, "7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr 26, 2000).
122. Johnson v. ExxonMobil Corp., 426 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2005); Lee v. City of Salem,
Ind., 259 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2001); McClaren v. Morrison Management Specialists, Inc., 420 F.3d
457 (5th Cir. 2005) (under Texas Commission on Human Rights Act); Moore v. Payless Shoe
Source, Inc., 139 F.3d 1210 (8th Cir.1998), judgment vacated, and remanded for ]ilrther
considerationin light of Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp. (526 U.S. 795 (1999)), 526
U.S. 1142 (1999), on remand, Moore v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 187 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 1999).
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and relevant time parameters between being "qualified" under the ADA and
eligibility for disability benefits,1 23 representations regarding one should
have nothing to do with the other. Either the ADA, disability benefits
legislation, or both should be amended to make this clear.
2.

ADA Coverage of Independent Contractors

Without any mention of independent contractors in the ADA,
discrimination against such contractors or their employees has been
assumed, wrongly I believe, not to be reached by the Act. In PGA Tour,
Inc. v. Martin,124 PGA Tour, Inc., had argued, and the district court had
agreed, that Title I of the ADA did not apply to the plaintiff because he
In his
was an "independent contractor" and not an "employee."
dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia underscored this view, observing that
"Title I protects only 'employees' of employers who have 15 or more
employees. It does not protect independent contractors.' 125 The
majority, however, did not make any ruling on the independent
contractor issue, but ruled that the plaintiff golfer was protected from
discrimination as a "client" or "customer" under Title III of the ADA.
In Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells, 126 the
Supreme Court recognized that the tests for determining whether or not
someone was an independent contractor or an employee were not very
helpful in determining whether physician shareholders were employees
under the ADA. This approach has led to what one legal commentator
described as "Collapsing the Distinctions,"' 127 and prompted another to
write that "a number of courts have recognized that the application of
a rigid fashion does not make much sense
any employment status
' 12 8 test in
in employment law."
The lack of clear boundaries for the classification "independent
contractor" and for distinguishing it from employee status, coupled with
the inconclusive resolution of the independent contractor question in the
Martin case, has left a large void for the lower courts to fill. In doing so,
they have generally rejected ADA protection for contractors.1 29 Such
123. See, Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42
VILL. L. REv. 409,494-506; 575-580 (1997).
124. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
125. Id. at 692 (J.Scalia, dissenting) (citations omitted).
126. 538 U.S. 440, 447-48 (2003).
127. Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protectionsfor Atypical Employees: Employment Law
for Workers without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.

L. 251, 281 (2006).
128. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation's Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected
Volunteers, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147, 173 (2006).
129. See, e.g., Wojewski v. Rapid City Regional Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 342 (8th Cir.
2006) ("While the ADA protects 'employees,' the Act does not protect independent contractors.");
Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Both statutes [ADA &

Title VII] protect 'employees' but not independent contractors."); Chadha v. Hardin Memorial
Hospital, 202 F.3d 267 (Table), 2000 WL 32023, *2 (6th Cir. 2000)) ("[T]he ADA does not cover an
independent contractor."); Case v. ADT Automotive, Inc., 163 F.3d 601 (Table), 1998 WL 671445
(8th Cir. 1998)); Birchem v. Knights of Columbus, 116 F.3d 310, 312 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he ADA
protects 'employees' but not independent contractors."); Dykes v. DePuy, Inc., 140 F.3d 31, 37 n.6

272

TEXAS JOURNAL ON CIVIL LIBERTIES & CIVIL RIGHTS

[Vol. 13:2

decisions have led to a denial of protection from disability discrimination
for individuals in a wide range of situations and activities; types of
independent contractor undertakings considered by the courts have
included that of a surgeon with staff privileges at a hospital,13 °
musicians,' 31 an anesthesiologist, 132 an auctioneer,133 an insurance
agent,134 a manufacturer's sales representative,135 a "verifier" for a
telemarketing firm, 36 workers at private bookstore on a state university
campus,1 37 a physical therapist, 138 and a temp worker.1 39 The courts
considering these cases have generally treated the determination that the
plaintiffs did not meet the criteria for being an "employee" under Title I
of the ADA as dispositive of ADA protection.
Given the ADA's focus on providing a "comprehensive prohibition
of discrimination on the basis of disability,"1 40 it is quite possible to
frame a strong argument that independent contractors who encounter
discrimination by entities covered by Title II and Title III of the ADA
were meant to be protected. The Sixth Circuit has made such a ruling in
regard to Title 1I, holding that an operator of city's public access cable
station with ankylosing spondylitis, a deforming hip disease, whom the
court ruled was an independent contractor, was protected from
discrimination by Title II of the ADA.1 41 The district court had ruled,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that the plaintiff was not an
"employee" for purposes of Title I. The Sixth Circuit took a broad view,
however, of Title II's prohibition of discrimination in "services,
programs, or activities" of a public entity, declaring: "We conclude that
(1) the discrimination referenced in the statute must relate to services,
programs, or activities; and (2) services, programs, and activities include
all government activities, including contracting such as that in this
case." 1 42 It elaborated that "the phrase 'services, programs, or activities'
encompasses virtually everything that a public entity does,"'' 43 and ruled
that "[t]he ADA and its regulations forbid the city from discriminating
against people who are, with reasonable accommodation, qualified to
(1st Cir. 1998) (parties' agreement); D'Agostino v. Ver-A-Fast Corp., 110 F. App'x 681, 2004 WL
2300092 (6th Cir. 2004); Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 992 (6th
Cir. 1997) ("In order to hold TTU liable under the ADEA and/or the ADA, plaintiffs must show that
TTU was their "employer" within the meaning of those statutes."); Reith v. TXU Corp., 2006 WL
887413, *7 (E.D. Tex., April 04, 2006) ("The Court has previously found that TXU was never

Plaintiff's employer and that TXU cannot therefore be liable for violating the ADA with respect to
Plaintiff.").
130. Wojewski v. Rapid City Regional Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 342 (8th Cir. 2006).
131.

Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486 (8th Cir. 2003).

132. Chadha v. Hardin Memorial Hospital, 202 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2000).
133.

Case v. ADT Automotive, Inc., 163 F.3d 601 (8th Cir.1998).

134. Birchem v. Knights of Columbus, 116 F.3d 310 (8th Cir. 1997).
135.
136.

Dykes v. DePuy, Inc., 140 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1998).
D'Agostino v. Ver-A-Fast Corp., l10 F. App'x 681, 2004 WL 2300092 (6th Cir.

2004).
137. Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 1997).
138. Lee v. Glessing, 2006 WL 2524185 (N.D.N.Y., August 30, 2006).
139. Reith v. TXU Corp, 2006 WL 887413 (E.D. Tex., April 04,2006).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l).

141. Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 568-569 (6th Cir. 1998).
142. Id. at 569.
143.

Id.
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'participate' in contracting with the city to provide services." 144
An analogous case can be made under the public accommodations
provisions of Title III of the ADA. Not only does Title III apply broadly
to "services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations,' 4 5
but Title III specifically designates as prohibited discrimination denials
of opportunities to participate or benefit from such services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations, "through contractual,
licensing, or other arrangements." 146 In addition, Title III also makes it a
violation "contractually or through other arrangements" to "utilize
standards or criteria or methods of administration ... that have the effect

of discriminating on the basis of disability."' 147 These provisions would
seem to provide ample basis for protecting contractors from
discrimination on the basis of disability. The National Council on
Disability has declared:
NCD believes that in pursuing the expressed congressional
goal of ADA "to provide a clear and comprehensive
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability," 42
U.S.C. 12101(b)(1), Congress fashioned Title III in extremely
broad terms intended to guarantee that no individual is
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of public accommodations. Accordingly,
people who perform, render services, or otherwise participate
in events or activities at places of public accommodation,
performers,
as
competitors,
characterized
whether
protected
should
be
contractors,
independent
participants,14or
8
by Title III.

The ADA should be amended to clarify that independent contractors of
covered entities are protected from discrimination on the basis of
disability.
Cyberspace and Other Non-Physical "Places" of Public

3.

Accommodation
Because Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis
of disability in "the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of
public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation,"'149 some dispute has arisen
about the coverage of websites or other types of services not tied to a
144. Id. at 570. See also McKibben v. Hamilton County, 215 F.3d 1327 (Table), 2000
WL 761879, **4 (6th Cir. 2000) (Johnson ruling does not apply when plaintiff is an employee).
145.
146.
147.
148.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(A)(i), (ii), and (iii).
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(D)(i).
Supreme Court Decisions Interpretingthe Americans with DisabilitiesAct, subpart

II(L), http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2002/supremecourt-ada.htm.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added).
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particular, concrete place where the service is rendered. Some, including
some courts, have taken the phrase "place of public accommodation"
hyper-literally and concluded that only a physical facility or site can
constitute a "place."
Disputes regarding whether a physical place where a provider
provides, and a consumer or other person obtains, a service, benefit, or
product-such as a store, a shop, or an office-is a prerequisite to Title
III coverage, and whether accessibility required by the ADA is limited to
access to a physical place, have occurred in several different contexts,
including web sites, telephone access, and insurance. The Department of
Justice (DOJ) has consistently taken the position that ADA accessibility
requirements apply to web sites, telephone access systems, and other
communication modalities of public accommodations covered under
Title III of the ADA and to public entities covered by Title II of the
ADA. In a 1996 letter to Senator Harkin, then Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights Deval Patrick observed that "[t]he Internet is an
excellent source of information and, of course, people with disabilities
should have access to it as effectively as people without disabilities."
More pointedly, he declared:
Covered entities under the ADA are required to provide
effective communication, regardless of whether they
generally communicate through print media, audio media, or
computerized media such as the Internet. Covered entities
that use the Internet for communications regarding their
programs, goods, or services must be prepared to offer those
50
communications through accessible means as well. 1
Subsequently, the DOJ has argued for coverage of the Internet
under Title III of the ADA in several amicus briefs,15' and it has
negotiated or approved complaint settlements requiring access in cases
involving non-physical location issues such as brokerage or credit card
statement accessibility.' 52
The DOJ has taken the position that
businesses which provide services over the Internet fall within the
definition of "public accommodations" covered by Title III, and that
Title III covers the services "of' a place of public accommodation, not
"at" the place of public accommodation.' 53 It has contended that the
150. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Ass't Att'y General, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice,
to
Hon.
Tom
Harkin,
U.S.
Senate
(Sept.
6,
1996),
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/cltr204.txt and at www.cybertelecom.org/ada/adaletters.htm, National
Disability Law Reporter, Vol. 10, Iss. 6, para. 240 (Sept. 11, 1997).
151. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the US Department of Justice, filed in the Fifth Circuit in
the
case
of
Hooks
v.
OKbridge
(No.
99-50891),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/hooks.htm, and the Department's amicus brief to the Eleventh
Circuit in Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions, Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crtibriefs/rendon.pdf.
152. See, e.g., Enforcing the ADA: A Status Report from the Department of Justice: AprilJune 2002, http://www.ada.gov/aprjun02.htm (settlement between credit card company and legally
blind man who complained that company refused his request for credit card statement and other
printed communications in 24-point type).
153. The 2d Circuit espoused this line of reasoning in Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198
F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1999) ("We find no merit in Allstate's contention that, because insurance
policies are not used in places of public accommodation, they do not qualify as goods or services "of
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only reason that Congress did not explicitly mention coverage of the
Internet as a public accommodation in the ADA is that the Internet did
not exist when the ADA was enacted. In response to the argument that
the ADA's protections apply only to services rendered on the premises
designated a "place of public accommodation," the DOJ has countered
that such reasoning would render a wide range of ordinary service
establishments outside the coverage of the Act whenever their services
are provided over the telephone, through the mail, via the internet, or at
some location outside the premises of the business. It noted that catalog
merchants, furniture delivery companies, courtroom lawyers, plumbers,
and food delivery services, for example, would be able to refuse to serve
patrons with disabilities.154 Companies that offer services both on-site
and through other means (such as a travel services that arrange
reservations both over the phone and at a walk-in office) would be
required to offer non-discriminatory services on-site, but be free to
discriminate over the phone or the Internet. And the DOJ has observed:
"Neither the language of the statute, nor the 155
underlying purposes of the
Act, require or permit such an absurd result."
The case law regarding Title III coverage of websites is still
developing, but has not been too bad overall. In National Federationof
the Blind, Inc. v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 56 NFB charged that AOL had
violated the ADA because AOL's proprietary web browser was not
accessible to persons with visual impairments as it interfered with the use
of screen-reader software to access the AOL system. The case was
settled by written agreement between the parties on July 26, 2000-the
10-year anniversary of the ADA's enactment-and voluntarily
dismissed. 57 AOL admitted no wrongdoing but agreed to issue an
accessibility policy, to make its AOL 6.0 software compatible with
screen reader assistive technology, and to consult
with the disability
158
community on software accessibility concerns.
a place of public accommodation." The term "of' generally does not mean "in," and there is no
indication that Congress intended to employ the term in such an unorthodox manner in Section
302(a) of Title III.").
154, As the DOJ has elaborated:
[Any other interpretation of Title 1Il] permits discrimination by more traditional
businesses that provide services in locations other than their premises. For example,
many businesses provide services over the telephone or through the mail, including
travel services, banks, insurance companies, catalog merchants, and pharmacies.
Many other businesses provide services in the homes or offices of their customers,
such as plumbers, pizza delivery and moving companies, cleaning services, business
consulting firms, and auditors from accounting firms....
[T]hose selling car
insurance over the telephone would be free to hang up on blind customers,
Publisher's Clearing House could refuse to sell magazines through the mail to people
with HIV, and colleges could refuse to enroll the deaf in their correspondence
courses.
Hooks brief at 9-10.

155. Id.
156. Civil Action No. 99-12303EFH (D. Mass., complaint filed November 16, 1999).
157. See, e.g., Hiawatha Bray, Group Behind Blind-Access Suit Resolves Suit with AOL,
BOSTON GLOBE at E4 (July 27, 2000).
158.
The
agreement
between
NFB
and
AOL
is
available
at
www.nfb.org/legacy/tech/accessibility.htm, and AOL's "Accessibility Policy" is available at
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Another Title III case regarding accessibility of a company's
website began in 2002, when Access Now, Inc., a nonprofit advocacy
organization for individuals with disabilities, and Robert Gumson, a
blind man, brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, alleging that Southwest Airlines' websiteSouthwest.com-was inaccessible to persons with visual impairments.
The plaintiffs contended that the lack of alternative text (alt text) for
graphic information presented on the computer screen, and other features
of Southwest.com's design rendered the website inaccessible to persons
using a screen reader in violation of Title III guarantees of: (1)
communication barriers removal; (2) auxiliary aids and services; (3)
reasonable modifications; and (4) full and equal enjoyment and
participation. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a
claim, finding that Southwest.com is not a place of public
accommodation based on the following reasoning:
[B]ecause the Internet Web site, Southwest.com, does not
exist in any particular geographical location, plaintiffs are
unable to demonstrate that Southwest's Web site impedes
such as a
their access to a specific, physical, concrete space
1 59
particular airline ticket counter or travel agency.'
The validity of the district court's restrictive rationale, contrary to
that of the Department of Justice and various commentators,1 60 seemed
headed for repudiation when the decision was appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit. A few months before the district court's ruling, the Eleventh
Circuit had entered a decision in Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions,Ltd.,
161 a ruling which the district court in the Southwest Airlines case referred
to, but whose rationale it seemed to deviate from. In Rendon, the Court
of Appeals held that an automated fast finger telephone selection process
for a television quiz show was a place of "public accommodation" under
Title III of the ADA, and rejected the rationale of the district court that
had dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint because the automated telephone
contestant selection process was not conducted at any single physical
location, and thus the plaintiffs had not identified "any place that is
subject to the public accommodation provisions of Title III."162
In Southwest Airlines, the district court's decision flew in the face
of the Eleventh Circuit's Rendon ruling by requiring that the plaintiffs
were required to identify "a Physical, Concrete Place of Public
http://corp.aol.com/corporate-citizenship/accessibility.
159. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321 (S.D. Fla.
2002).
160. See, e.g., Jeffrey Scott Ranen, Note, Was Blind But Now I See: The Argument for
389 (2002); Adam M. Schloss, WebADA Applicability to the Internet, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
Sight for Visually-Disabled People: Does Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act Apply to
Internet Websites?, 35 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS., 35 (2001); Matthew A. Stowe, Note,
Interpreting 'Place of Public Accommodation' Under Title III of the ADA: A Technical
Determination with Potentially Broad Civil Rights Implications, 50 DUKE L.J.297 (2000); Jonathan

Bick, Americans with Disabilities Act and the Internet, 10 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 205 (2000).
161. 294 F.3d 1279 (1lth Cir. 2002).
162. Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions, Ltd., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1346 (S.D.
Fla.,2000).
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Accommodation" and dismissing their complaint because they had not
done so.163 Accordingly, there was every reason to expect that the
Southwest Airlines decision would be reversed on appeal. Due to a
strange turn of affairs and some questionable strategic decisions, the
Eleventh Circuit did not have the chance to clarify the principles to be
applied to website accessibility.
In considering the appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
plaintiffs' trial court claim was based on the theory that the airline's
website, Southwest.com, was a place of public accommodation, but that
they had taken a different tack and contended, for the first time on
appeal, that Southwest Airlines as a whole was a place of public
accommodation and that the website was a "travel service" provided by
the public accommodation. As to the former contention-that the
Southwest.com website was a place of public accommodation-the
Eleventh Circuit considered it to have been abandoned on appeal because
it had not been raised nor briefed. 164 As to the argument that Southwest
Airlines was the public accommodation and the website part of the travel
service it provides, the court considered it settled law in that "an issue
not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal
will not be considered by this court,"' 65 and that this is particularly
in
66
cases, such as this, in which important issues are fact-driven.'
Based on this odd procedural posture, the Court of Appeals
concluded that it could not properly evaluate the merits of either of the
plaintiffs' theories, accordingly had no67 substantive question properly
before it, and had to dismiss the appeal.1
The Eleventh Circuit expressed some regret that it could not reach
the issues raised in the case:
In declining to evaluate the merits of this case, we are in no
way unmindful that the legal questions raised are significant.
The Internet is transforming our economy and culture, and
the question whether it is covered by the ADA--one of the
landmark civil rights laws in this country-is of substantial
public importance. Title III's applicability to web siteseither because web sites are themselves places of public
accommodation or because they have a sufficient nexus to
such physical places of public accommodation-is a matter
of first impression before this Court. Unfortunately, this case
does not provide
the proper vehicle for answering these
68
questions.

163. 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1319, 1322.
164. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1327-28, 1330 (1 1th Cir.
2004).
165. Id. at 1331 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

166. Id. at 1331-32.
167. Id. at 1330, 1335.
168. Id. at 1335. Another inconclusive resolution occurred in the case of Hooks v.
OKbridge, Inc., 232 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2000) (TABLE, TEXT IN WESTLAW, NO. 99-50891), in
which the plaintiff claimed that he had been barred from the defendant's online bridge tournaments

and associated bulletin boards because of his disabilities.

The district court entered summary
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Perhaps the most significant of the cases to date addressing the
coverage of websites by Title III, even though it is still at a pretrial stage,
is National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp., 169 in which the
National Federation of the Blind (NFB); the National Federation of the
Blind of California; and Bruce Sexton, who is blind, filed suit against
Target Corporation ("Target"), on behalf of a class of similarly situated
people, claiming that Target.com is inaccessible to blind persons, and
thereby violates the ADA and state laws prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of disability. In considering Target's motion to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim, the federal district court had to
address the argument that Title III did not cover the Target.com website.
The court flatly rejected the contention that Title III does not prohibit
''off-site discrimination":
The statute applies to the services of a place of public
accommodation, not services in a place of public
accommodation. To limit the ADA to discrimination in the
provision of services occurring on the premises of a public
accommodation would contradict the plain language of the
statute. To the extent defendant argues that plaintiffs' claims
are not cognizable because they occur away from a "place" 17
of0
public accommodation, defendant's argument must fail.
The court also considered and rejected Target's argument that the
plaintiffs had not stated a proper Title III claim because they had failed
1' 7
to assert that they had been denied "physical access to Target stores. 1
The court recognized that some courts, including the Ninth Circuit in
which the Target case district court is located, "have held that a plaintiff
must allege that there is a 'nexus' between the challenged service and the
place of public accommodation." 172 But, said the court, the need for a
judgment against the plaintiff on the grounds that Title III did not apply to OKbridge because it
provided services over the internet rather than at a physical place, and, alternatively, even if Title IlI
applied, OKbridge was "private club" exempt from ADA coverage under 42 U.S.C.§ 12187. Hooks
v. OKbridge, No. 99-214 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 1999) slip op. 7-8.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed

dismissal, 232 F.3d 208, but reportedly declined to follow the district court's reasoning, holding,
instead, that since the defendant had not been aware of the plaintiffs disabilities, it could not
possibly have intended to discriminate against him. See, National Council on Disability, When the
Americans with Disabilities Act Goes Online: Application of the ADA to the Internet and the
Worldwide
Web
(July
10,
2003)
available
at

http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/adaintemet.htm. Because neither the district court
nor the Eleventh Circuit decision is reported and because of the lack of clarity regarding the grounds
on which the case was dismissed, the Hooks decision is of limited precedential value. Perhaps the

most significant aspect of the case was the filing of a brief by the Department of Justice articulating
various arguments why Title Ill covers websites of public accommodations.
See
http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlbriefs/hooks.htm.
169. 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal., 2006).

170. Id. at 953 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 952 ("According to defendants, in order for plaintiffs' claim to be actionable
under the ADA, the 'off-site' discrimination must still deny physical access to Target's brick-andmortar stores.").

172. Id. ("Under Ninth Circuit law, a 'place of public accommodation,' within the meaning
of Title Ill, is a physical place. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104,
1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that places of public accommodation are 'actual, physical
places.')"). The court also observed that the Ninth Circuit had declined to join those circuits which
have suggested that a "place of public accommodation" may have a more expansive meaning, citing
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nexus does not entail the restrictive reading that Target was advocating:
However, consistent with the plain language of the statute, no
court has held that under the nexus theory a plaintiff has a
cognizable claim only if the challenged service prevents
physical access to a public accommodation. Further, it is
clear that the purpose of the statute is broader than mere
physical access-seeking to bar actions or omissions which
impair a disabled person's "full enjoyment" of services or
goods of a covered accommodation. Indeed, the statute
expressly states that the denial of equal "participation" or the
provision of "separate benefit[s]" are actionable under Title
111. 173

The court added that "[t]he case law does not support defendant's
attempt to draw a false dichotomy between those services which impede
physical access to a public accommodation and those merely offered by
the facility," and elaborated as follows:
Such an interpretation would effectively limit the scope of
Title III to the provision of ramps, elevators and other aids
that operate to remove physical barriers to entry. Although
the Ninth Circuit has determined that a place of public
accommodation is a physical space, the court finds
unconvincing defendant's attempt to bootstrap the definition
of accessibility to this determination, effectively reading74out
of the ADA the broader provisions enacted by Congress. 1
The court concluded that "to the extent that plaintiffs allege that
the inaccessibility of Target.com impedes the full and equal enjoyment
of goods and services offered in Target stores, the plaintiffs state a claim,
'
and the motion to dismiss is denied."175
It added that such reasoning
would not apply to information and services offered on Target.com to the
extent that they are "unconnected to Target stores" and "do not affect the
enjoyment of goods and services offered in Target stores."' 176 After
taking a look at the website, however, the court had some misgivings
about the applicability of the "unconnected" category:
It appears from a review of the website in question-which
the court notes is not in evidence but nonetheless does raise
some questions-that Target treats Target.com as an
extension of its stores, as part of its overall integrated
merchandising efforts. See www.target.com. This suggests
CarpartsDistribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesalers Assoc. of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12,

19-20 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that "public accommodations" encompasses more than actual
physical structures and includes the defendant insurance company); and Doe v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting, in dicta, that a "place of public accommodation"
encompasses facilities open to the public in both physical and electronic space, including websites).
173. Id. at 953-54, quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a) & 12182(b)(l)(A).
174. Id. at 955.
175. Id. at 956.
176. Id.
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to the court that perhaps with more evidence, the court's
determination of what may be covered under the ADA in this
kind of integrated merchandising may be subject to
amendment. The website is a means to gain access to the
store and it is ironic that Target, through its merchandising
efforts on the one hand, seeks to reach greater numbers of
customers and enlarge its consumer-base, while on the other
hand it seeks to escape the requirements of the ADA. A
broader application of the ADA to the website may be
appropriate if upon further discovery it is disclosed that the
store and website are part of an integrated effort.' 77
In January 2008, the court rejected another motion filed by Target to
dismiss the plaintiffs' ADA claims, and noted that the plaintiffs had
amended their complaint to add language reflecting the court's
requirement of "a nexus between the website and the physical store. 178
On balance, the case law regarding Title III coverage of websites
of public accommodations has been relatively favorable, albeit still not
totally conclusive. The meaning and ramifications of the concept of a
"nexus" between the online services and the public accommodation are
still being fleshed out. The big unanswered question concerns web
enterprises that provide services only online. The cases to date have
focused on identifying a physical "place" that constitutes a "place of
The ADA expressly includes a "service
public accommodation.
establishment" as a category of "public accommodation" covered by
Title I1. 179 An argument can easily be framed that an online service
enterprise is a "service establishment" and it is prohibited from
discriminating in regard to the "services,... privileges, [and]
advantages" it provides. 180 Yet the suggestion by some courts of the
need to demonstrate a nexus to a physical place where services are
rendered has seriously muddied the waters of this analysis.
The question of physical place has caused a split of authority in
regard to the coverage of insurance under Title III. An "insurance
office" is explicitly listed in the category of "service establishment" as a
type of public accommodation. 181 Some courts, however, including
particularly the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, have held that Title III
of the ADA applies only to physical places or that Title III only
proscribes interference with physical access to a place. 182 The Ninth
177. Id. at n.4.
178. National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp., Order Re: Defendant's Motion to
Strike the Second Amended Complaint and Dismiss Plaintiffs' ADA Claims, Slip Copy, 2008 WL

54377 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2008).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
182. See, e.g., Lenox v. Healthwise of Kentucky, Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 456-57 (6th Cir.
1998) (plaintiff may not proceed under Title Ill against health insurer which refused to cover costs of
heart transplant; "Even if the policy is deemed a good or service provided by a place of public
accommodation, [plaintiff] is not complaining about physical access to a place of public
accommodation or her ability to avail herself of the goods and services offered at a place of public
accommodation, such as an insurance company office."); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121
F.3d 1006, 1011 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084 (1998)); Ford v. Schering-Plough
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Circuit has explained its vision of what the ADA does and does not apply

to in relation to insurance services:
Certainly, an insurance office is a place where the public
generally has access. But this case is not about such matters
as ramps and elevators so that disabled people can get to the

office. The dispute in this case, over terms of a contract that
the insurer markets through an employer, is not what
Congress

addressed

provisions.'

83

in

the

public

accommodations

A number of courts, however, have disagreed with this narrow view of
Title III coverage, and held that Title III applies to full and equal
enjoyment of insurance policies and underwriting practices regardless of
the place where the company offers insurance. 184 The Seventh Circuit
has articulated such a view that Title III coverage of insurance is not
limited to physical access to insurance offices in the following terms:
An insurance company can no more refuse to sell a policy to
a disabled person over the Internet than a furniture store can
refuse to sell furniture to a disabled person who enters the
store ....

The site of the sale is irrelevant to Congress's goal

of granting the disabled equal access to sellers of goods and
services. What
matters is that the good or service be offered
1 85
to the public.

Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612-14 (3d Cir. 1998) (plaintiff fails to state claim against insurer under Title
IlI because disability benefits are not "public accommodations" and there is no question of physical
access to the insurer's office), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114-16 (9th Cir. 2000) ( "place of public accommodation" requires
connection between good or service complained of and an actual physical place; court found "no
nexus between the disparity in benefits and the services which ... [the company] offers to the public
from its insurance office"; although an insurance office is place of public accommodation, insurance
company administering employer-provided insurance policy is not place of public accommodation.).
183. Weyer, 198 F.3dat 1114.
184. See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesalers Assoc. of New
England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 18-20 (1st Cir. 1994) ("public accommodations" encompasses more than
actual physical structures and includes the defendant insurance company; Title III covers claim by
plaintiff with HIV against insurer which placed allegedly discriminatory cap on health benefits for
individuals with AIDS"); Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) ("the
owner or operator of a ... Web site, or other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic
space) that is open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and, once
in, from using the facility in the same way that the nondisabled do"; "an insurance company cannot
(at least without pleading a special defense ... refuse to sell an insurance policy to a person with
AIDS."); Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd. Retirement Plan of Pillsbury Co., 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir.
2001) (rejecting interpretation of "public accommodation" as denoting a physical site); Pallozzi v.
Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32-33 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1999) ("the statute was meant to
guarantee... more than mere physical access"; Title Ill covers not just access to "offices" but also
to goods and services off-site, including insurance policy obtained from company); Doukas v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 424-27 (D.N.H. 1996) (public accommodations not
limited to actual physical structures; "Under the plain language of Title III, an insurance office is a
'public accommodation' that is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of disability in the
provision of a good or service, which includes insurance products."). See, also, McNeil v. Time Ins.
Co., 205 F.3d 179, 186-87 (5th Cir. 2000) (Title III prohibits denying physical access and full and
equal enjoyment of business's goods and services, but does not regulate content and type of goods or
services), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1191 (2001).
185. Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd. Retirement Plan of Pillsbury Co., 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th
Cir. 2001).

282

TEXAS JOURNAL ON CIVIL LIBERTIES & CIVIL RIGHTS

[Vol. 13:2

Accordingly, there is a sharp split of authority regarding the extent of
Title III coverage of insurance.
Apart from website services and insurance, questions of whether
Title III of the ADA applies only to physical places or that Title III only
proscribes interference with physical access to a place have been at issue
in regard to some other types of service businesses. Discussed above
was Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions, Ltd.,186 in which the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that an automated fast finger telephone selection process for
a television quiz show ("Who Wants to be a Millionaire") was covered
by Title III, and rejected the notion that a plaintiff needed to identify a
particular physical location as a place of "public accommodation" where
alleged discrimination occurred. The court declared:
the definition of discrimination provided in Title III covers
both tangible barriers, that is, physical and architectural
barriers that would prevent a disabled person from entering
an accommodation's facilities and accessing its goods,
services and privileges, and intangible barriers, such as
eligibility requirements and screening rules or discriminatory
policies and procedures that restrict a disabled person's
ability to enjoy the defendant entity's goods, services and
privileges.' 87
And the court concluded that "[t]here is nothing in the text of the statute
to suggest that discrimination via an imposition of screening or eligibility
requirements must occur on site to offend the ADA."' 8 8 Significantly,
the Department of Justice submitted an amicus brief to the Eleventh
Circuit in Rendon supporting Title III coverage in the case. The DOJ
articulated the gist of the argument it made in the brief as follows:
"TITLE III OF THE ADA APPLIES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
GOVERNING
ACCESS TO THE
SERVICES AND PRIVILEGES OF A PLACE OF PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION EVEN WHEN IMPLEMENTED THROUGH
AN OFF-SITE AUTOMATED TELEPHONE SYSTEM., 189
The
Department contended that "[b]y its clear text, Title III requires a public
accommodation to provide individuals with disabilities more than simple
physical access to the accommodation's facilities," and declared that "the
Act applies not only to barriers to physical access to business locations,
but also to any policy, practice, or procedure that operates to deprive or
diminish disabled individuals' full and equal enjoyment of the privileges
and services offered by the public accommodation to the public at
' 90
large."'
The "physical place" factor proved to be a major hurdle in a case
in different context-that of digital cable T.V.-in the case of Torres v.

186. 294 F.3d 1279, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2002).

187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 1283 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1283-84.
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/rendon.pdf at p. 5.
Id.
at 6.

Restoring the ADA and Beyond

20081

AT&TBroadband, LLC. 19 1 In that action, a visually-impaired subscriber
to AT&T's digital cable service brought suit under Title III of the ADA,
alleging that the service's channel listing program was not accessible to
him. The court granted AT&T's motion to dismiss on the ground that
AT&T's cable system was not a "public accommodation" under the Act.
The court noted that "in no way does viewing the system's images
require the plaintiff to gain access to any actual physical public place,"
and elaborated as follows:
The plaintiff does not have to travel to some physical place,
open to the public, in order to experience the benefits of the
defendants' digital cable system. He simply turns on his
television set and has automatic access to the sounds and
images provided by the defendants' service.
The plaintiff does not even allege that he was denied access
to a physical place. He simply alleges that the defendants'
cable services are not as valuable to him as they would be if
impaired subscriber. That is not an
he were not a visually
192
ADA violation.
The court reviewed a selectively abridged list of public accommodations
mentioned in Title III, and observed that "[a] digital cable system is not
analogous to any of these categories or examples"; 193 significantly, the
court's list did not include the category of "other service establishment."
194 The court concluded that "neither the digital cable system nor its onscreen channel menu can be considered a place of public accommodation
within the meaning of the ADA."' 95
In Stoutenborough v. National Football League,' 96 the Sixth
Circuit upheld dismissal of a challenge by hearing impaired individuals
to a "blackout rule," which prohibits live local broadcast of home
football games that are not sold out; Thomas Stoutenborough and the
organization Self-Help for Hearing Impaired Persons had filed an ADA
claim against the National Football League, the Cleveland Browns, NBC,
ABC, CBS, and three Cleveland television stations. The district court
and Court of Appeals both interpreted Title III as requiring the
identification of a particular physical place where a public
accommodation rendered its services and the alleged discrimination
occurred. The Sixth Circuit declared that '[a]lthough a game is played in
a 'place of public accommodation' and may be viewed on television in
another 'place of public accommodation,' that does not suffice.
Moreover, the plaintiffs' argument that the prohibitions of Title III are
not solely limited to "places" of public accommodation contravenes the

191.

158 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

192. Id. at 1038.
193. Id. at 1037.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
195. 158 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
196. 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995).
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plain language of the statute."' 97 As the court construed it, "the
prohibitions of Title III are restricted to 'places' of public
accommodation, disqualifying the National Football League, its member
clubs, and the media defendants."' 198 The Sixth Circuit concluded that
"none of the defendants falls within any of the twelve 'public
accommodation' categories identified in the statute," nor did they operate
a "facility" as required by the language of Title III.1 99 Actually, the Title
III list of categories of public accommodations includes "stadium, or
other place of exhibition or entertainment," a "place of public gathering,"
a "place of recreation," a "place of exercise or recreation," and a "service
establishment., 200 There is no particular reason why T.V. transmission
of a football game would not be a "service,' and a business providing it
"a service establishment." Moreover, the definition of "facility" in ADA
Title III regulation includes "equipment"20 '-aterm that would seem to
encompass television transmission equipment and transmission facilities.
The Sixth Circuit ruled, however, that "[t]he televised broadcast of
football games is certainly offered through defendants, but not as a
service of public accommodation. 20 2
In Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines,203 a case dealing with travel
agencies that provided their clients with disabilities inaccurate
information about the accessibility of a cruise ship and the rooms they
had booked, the court did not view Title III as restrictively focused on
physical access and physical location where the services were provided.
The court expressly rejected the "line of authority ...holding that the
mandates of Title III of the ADA speak only to physical access," and
ruled that "[t]he language of Title III cannot reasonably be read to
require physical access alone. 20 4 The court declared that "[t]ravel
agents fall squarely within the ADA's definition of public
accommodations" and accordingly are obligated to treat customers nondiscriminatorily in the services they offer, "quite apart from the physical
accessibility of the Travel Agent's office. '20 5 Providing individuals with
disabilities "inadequate or inaccurate information regarding the disabled
accessibility of travel accommodations... deprives them of 'full and
equal enjoyment' of travel information services. ,,206
The upshot overall of the exaggerated concentration on physical
access and the "place" in the phrase "place of public accommodations"
in the ADA is that some courts are taking a highly restrictive view of
what a public accommodation is and where services must be provided to
be subject to Title III requirements, while other courts have read the
terms and standards more broadly, giving more emphasis to other
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
at 583.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7)(C), (D), (1), (L), & (F).
28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
59 F.3d at 583.
63 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1092.
Id., citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
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phrases in the statute and regulations, such as "comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination,,' 20 7 "service
establishment,, 20 8 "equipment," 20 9 "denial of opportunity to participate in
or benefit from ... services, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
of an entity,, 2 10 "full and equal enjoyment of ... services, ' '2 11 "shall be
privilege, advantage, or
discriminatory to provide.., a... service, ...
212
accommodations that is different or separate.,
From my perspective, the overemphasis on "place" in Title III is
misplaced. The original version of the ADA proposed by NCD 213 and
the initial ADA bills introduced in Congress in 1988214 merely referred to
"any public accommodation" and did not mention "place of public
accommodation." The phrase "place of public accommodation" was
inserted into the ADA as the bill was revised for reintroduction in the
The "place of public accommodation"
101st Congress in 1989.
formulation was derived from Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Actually, the scope of public accommodations covered in the pre-1989
versions of the ADA was identical to that of Title II, as the ADA bills
had simply cross-referenced "any public accommodation covered by title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ' '215 In those bills, these references
were in a section titled "Scope of Discrimination Prohibited" that listed
the entities and activities covered by the Act; a subsequent section titled
"Forms of Discrimination Prohibited" listed various types of
discriminatory actions that all the covered entities were prohibited from
engaging in.
In the revised bills introduced in 1989, the Act was divided into
separate titles addressing categories of covered entities-employers, state
and local government entities, public accommodations, etc. In addition
to a generic Title I that established general rules prohibiting
discrimination, each of the particular titles covering a specific category
of covered entity included provisions addressing discriminatory practices
in that area. In the section headed "Prohibition of Discrimination by
Public Accommodations," the 1989 bills established a "General Rule"
that "No individual shall be discriminated against in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place ofpublic accommodation, on the basis of
disability. 2 16
207. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).

209. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii).

212. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii).
213.

National Council on the Handicapped, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE at 29,

§ 4(a)(6) (1988) (Andrea Farbman, ed.).
214. S. 2345, § 4(a)(3), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 Cong. Rec. S. 5110 (Apr. 28, 1988); H.R.
4498, § 4(a)(3), 100th Cong. 2d Sess.; see 134 Cong. Rec. E 1307 (Apr. 29, 1988).
215.

National Council on the Handicapped, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE at 29, §

4(a)(6) (1988) (Andrea Farbman, ed.); S. 2345, § 4(a)(3), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 Cong. Rec. S. 5110
(Apr. 28, 1988); H.R. 4498, § 4(a)(3), 100th Cong. 2d Sess.; see 134 Cong. Rec. E 1307 (Apr. 29, 1988).
216. S. 933, § 402(a), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 2273, § 402(a), 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989).
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The only reason for the addition of "place of' was, as all of us who
were involved in revising the language can attest, to make the language
of the discrimination prohibition provision echo that of the public
accommodations provisions in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964217
on the theory that familiar language would be easier to explain and
endorse. The change in phrasing did not arise from any intent to
exclude, restrict, or remove anything from the scope of coverage in the
prior versions.
Actually, the 1989 bills engendered a substantial expansion, over
Title II, of the class of public accommodations that would be covered by
the ADA. Title II of the 1964 Act had addressed a range of
establishments that had generated serious segregation problems; it
defined the phrase "place of public accommodation" to include places
providing lodging to transient guests, such as inns, hotels, and motels
(except for certain small boarding houses); facilities that sell food for
consumption on the premises, such as restaurants, cafeterias, lunchrooms,
lunch counters, and soda fountains; gasoline service stations; and places of
exhibition or entertainment, such as motion picture houses, theaters, concert
halls, sports arenas, and stadiums.2 18 This is, of course, a significant class
of commercial establishments, but it pales in comparison to the array of
public accommodations covered by the ADA.
In conjunction with some concessions and compromises of the
disability community in revising the ADA bills for reintroduction in 1989, a
decision was made to greatly enlarge the coverage of public
accommodations. While Title II had addressed types of establishments that
were perceived as particular trouble spots in the desegregation efforts in the
early 1960s, the perception of disability advocates was that disability
discrimination was a serious problem in all sorts of businesses across the
commercial spectrum. Accordingly, as introduced in the 101st Congress,
the ADA bill defined "public accommodation" to include all privately
operated establishments whose operations affect commerce and are either
"used by the general public as customers, clients, or visitors" or "are
potential places of employment."2 1 9 Subsequently, while the bills were
pending in Congress, in response to concerns expressed by the George
H.W. Bush Administration about this somewhat generic formulation, the
definition was redrafted as a list of types of establishments covered as
public accommodations to produce the twelve broad categories
encompassed in the ADA as enacted. 220 The intent of those of us
217. Section 20 1(a) of Title I1provides: "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, and privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any
place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on
the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
219. S. 933, § 402(2)(A), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 2273, § 402(2)(A), 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989).
220. As enacted, title III of the ADA declares that the following entities are public
accommodations if their operations affect commerce:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging...
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or
entertainment;
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involved in developing the list was to make it so comprehensive that it
would be as broad as the formulation "used by the general public as
customers, clients, or visitors" it replaced.
The categories listed cover, with a few exceptions such as the sale
or rental of housing, 221 private clubs and religious organizations,2222 and
small boarding homes, 223 almost every facet of American life in which a

business establishment or other nongovernmental entity serves or comes
into contact with members of the general public. It covers all of the
types of establishments that are subject to Title II of the Civil Rights Act,
plus many others, such as sales, rental, service, and social service
establishments, that are not covered by Title II. During congressional
consideration of the ADA, the author of this article was the principal
spokesperson for such expanded coverage. Appearing before the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources in the role of a legal and
technical expert, I testified as follows:
Title II was designed to deal with the worst problems of
discrimination that were faced in 1964. It chose to attack
segregated hotels, motels, inns, restaurants, et cetera-places
where the sit-ins had been occurring.
[P]eople with disabilities are facing discrimination in those
places, but also in other places, and the concept of public
accommodations is one of places open to the public ... There

is no sense to having certain facilities that are more needed
by people with disabilities be closed off, when other facilities
are open to them.
For example, it makes no sense to bar discrimination against
people with disabilities in theaters, but not in shops; or
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or
rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair
service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office,
professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(1)a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or other
place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or
other social service establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or
recreation.
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
221. Discrimination on the basis of disability in housing is prohibited under the Fair
Housing Amendments Act. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341,
2342,42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 notes, 3602, 3602 note, 3604-08, 3610-14, 3614a, 3615-19, 3631.
222. 42 U.S.C. § 12187.
223. Excepted is "an establishment located within a building that contains not more than five
rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the
residence of such proprietor." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A). This incorporates the so-called "Mrs. Murphy's
Boarding House exception" established under Title II of the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(l).
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restaurants, and not in stores; or by places of entertainment,
but not in regard to such important things as doctors' offices.
It makes no sense that you can't be discriminated against on
the basis of disability if you want to buy a pastrami sandwich
at the local deli, but that you can be discriminated against
next door at the pharmacy where you need to fill a
prescription. 224
My testimony on this issue was quoted in ADA committee reports
in the Senate and the House.225 ADA advocates and the members of

news organizations shortened the reference to the irrationality of treating
pharmacies different from eating places in regard to discrimination to the
phrase "pastrami sandwiches but not prescriptions," and this slogan
became the battle cry for expansive coverage of public
accommodations.22 6

And based in large part upon this rationale,

Congress adopted the very broad definition of public accommodations in
the ADA.
At no point in the congressional consideration of the ADA was

there any suggestion of any intent to exclude off-premises services of
service-providing entities or services not provided at a specified physical
place from the coverage of Title III. To my knowledge, there is not a
scintilla of legislative history to that effect.

Because of the confusion and uncertainty engendered by the court
decisions that have construed Title III as applying only to physical places

or as proscribing only interference with physical access to a place,
clarification is needed. I propose that ADA Title III coverage should be

clarified as follows:
1)

A business that provides services over the internet is a

"service establishment" within the meaning of Title III of the
ADA; websites and other services provided online by entities

covered by Title III are subject to its requirements
and must
227
be made available in an accessible format.
224. Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1989: Hearings on S.933 Before the Committee on
Labor and Human Resources and the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 100
(1989).
225. S.Rep. No. 101-116, 101st Cong, 1st Sess., 11 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, 35 (1990).
226. Yost, "Tedious Meetings, Testy Exchanges Produced Disability-Rights Bill," Washington
Post, Aug. 7, 1989, at A4. In fact, a comparable argument for broad coverage of public
accommodations under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, had been proffered by Justice Douglas in 1964,
when he asserted that denials of equal access to places open to the public were not limited to
exclusions from and segregation in interstate transportation or to restaurants refusing service to black
persons, but also applied to hospitals refusing admission, to "a drugstore refusing antibiotics," or to a
telephone company that refused to install a telephone. Bell v. Maryland, 255 U.S. 226, 252-253
(1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). "Constitutionally speaking," he asked," why should Hooper Food
Co., Inc., or Peoples Drug Stores ...stand on a higher, more sanctified level than Greyhound Bus
when it comes to a constitutional right to pick and choose its customers?" Id. at 254-55. The
"pastrami sandwiches but not prescriptions" argument was successful in the ADA negotiation
process, as it had not been in fashioning the coverage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
227. The National Council on Disability (NCD), has recommended that the Department of
Justice should develop guidelines clarifying the extent and manner in which websites are covered by
Title Ill. NCD, NATIONAL DISABILITY POLICY: A PROGRESS REPORT (January 15, 2008), p. 60,
at
Recommendation
2.5,
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2)
Businesses that use computerized media, including the
internet, for communications regarding their programs,
goods, or services must offer those communications through
accessible means.
3)
Services provided by public accommodations are
covered by the requirements of Title III and must be offered
in an accessible, nondiscriminatory fashion regardless of
whether the services are provided over the telephone, through
the mail, via the internet, by radio or television transmission,
by fiber optic cable or satellite transmission, or in some other
communication medium, or at some location outside the
premises of the business.
The coverage of insurance by Title III is somewhat more complex.
As noted above, an "insurance office" is listed as a type of public
accommodation. 228 And Title III makes it unlawful for such an entity to
deny opportunities to individuals with disabilities or otherwise treat them
unequally in regard to any of the "goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations" provided. 229 This obviously includes
insurance coverage-the primary type of goods, services, privileges, or
advantages provided by an "insurance office." A provision in Title V of
the ADA, however, establishes a safe harbor, subject to certain
conditions, for "an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health
maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit
plans, or similar organizations,',2 30 and for persons or organizations who
are involved in "establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the
terms of' such insurance plans.2 3 1 These protections are applicable only
to the extent that the listed entities act in accordance with state law and
insurance practices regarding administration of insurance risks.232 While
presented in the form of protected practices, these provisions also make
insurers and purchasers and administrators of insurance subject to
potential liability if they do not act consistently with state law or proper
insurance underwriting practices.23 3
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/doc/RevisedProgressReport.doc.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2).
232. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201(c)(1) & (c)(2).
233. That these provisions impose restrictions upon insurance practices was expressly
noted in committee reports. The Senate report and the report of the House Committee on the
Judiciary used identical language in providing examples of the application of the provisions
regarding insurance:
For example, a blind person may not be denied coverage based on blindness
independent of actuarial risk classification. Likewise, with respect to group health
insurance coverage, an individual with a pre-existing condition may be denied
coverage for that condition for the period specified in the policy but cannot be
denied coverage for illnesses or injuries unrelated to the pre-existing condition.
S. Rep. No. 101-116, 85 (1989); H.R. Rep. No.101-485, 71 (1990).
following analysis:

Both reports also included the
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I have previously written of the prohibitions contained in the
Businesses providing or
insurance provisions of Title V.234
administering insurance are prohibited from: (1) underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering risks relating to disabilities in a
(2) establishing,
manner that is inconsistent with state law; 235
sponsoring, observing, or administering the terms of a benefit plan based
upon underwriting, classifying, or administering risks relating to
disabilities that is inconsistent with state law; 236 (3) using the
underwriting, classifying, or administering of risks, or establishing,
sponsoring, observing, or administering the terms of a benefit plan as a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of other provisions of the Act; 237 (4)

establishing, sponsoring, observing, or administering the terms of a
benefit plan which is not "bona fide; ''2 38

(5) denying coverage or

otherwise disadvantaging an individual in the underwriting and
classification of risks because of disability where such denial or
disadvantaging is "independent of actuarial risk classification" 239 or is
not "based on sound actuarial principles; '240 and (6) denying coverage
for illnesses or injuries based upon a pre-existing condition of disability
when the illness or injury is unrelated to the pre-existing condition.24 1

Because of the line of cases discussed above 242 in which courts
have ruled that Title III protects only physical access to insurance offices

and does not prohibit discrimination in regard to the insurance policies
and other services they provide, clarification of ADA coverage is
necessary to make it clear that insurance policies and services provided
by insurance companies, whether provided in an office, off-site, through
the mails, online, or otherwise, are subject to the requirements of Title
III.

In addition, as a separate issue, the ADA's coverage should be

clarified and the insurance provisions in Title V should be reconsidered
toward a goal of providing more extensive protection to people who
Moreover, while a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage based on
classification of risk would be allowed under this section, the plan may not refuse to
insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or limit the amount, extent, or kind of
coverage available to an individual, or charge a different rate for the same coverage
solely because of a physical or mental impairment, except where the refusal,
limitation, or rate differential is based on sound actuarial principles or is related to
actual or reasonably anticipated experience.
Id. The latter report went on to make the Act's implications upon insurance practices abundantly
clear: "In sum, ADA requires that underwriting and classification of risks be based on sound
actuarial principles or be related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience." H.R. Rep. No.101485, 71 (1990).
234. Robert L. BurgdorfJr., The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Analysis and Implications
of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 487-89, 507-509
(1991).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
238. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201(c)(2)& (c)(3).
239. S.Rep. No. 101-116, 85 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, 71 (1990). Illustrating this
requirement, the reports both state: "For example, a blind person may not be denied coverage based on
blindness independent of actuarial risk classification." Id.
240. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, 71(1990).
241. S.Rep. No. 101-116, 85 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, 71 (1990).
242. See supranotes 181-185, and accompanying text.
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encounter discrimination in insurance on account of disability.
4.

Examinations and Courses

While the ADA was being considered by Congress, the House
Committee on the Judiciary adopted an amendment creating a new
section in Title III dealing with examinations or courses related to
applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for professional,
educational, or trade purposes. 243 A person offering such courses or
examinations must do so in "a place and manner" that is accessible to
persons with disabilities or must "offer alternative accessible
arrangements." 244
The "place," "manner," and "alternative...
arrangements" terminology makes it clear that accessibility encompasses
both the ability to get physically to the examination or course site and to
have access to accommodations affecting the way in which the course or
test is administered to permit individuals with disabilities an equal
opportunity to perform well.
The pervasiveness of courses and
examinations as gateways to educational, trade, and professional
opportunities makes this section of the Act quite significant; obvious
examples include bar examinations and review courses, medical boards,
CPA examinations, college entrance and law school admission tests,
trade courses and certification tests, and professional continuing
education courses.
A problem with the "examinations or courses" provision of Title
III is that it only imposes requirements regarding the accessibility of the
site where the exams or courses are held and the manner in which they
are administered. It does not say anything about the uses that a testing
entity can make of information it has garnered about who has been
provided an "alternative accessible arrangement" or the disabling
conditions of test-takers. To obtain such an accommodation in testing, a
would-be test-taker must request such an accommodation and usually is
required to submit documentation of a disabling condition and the need
for the accommodation. Neither the statutory language nor the DOJ
regulation 245 says anything about the test-taking entity keeping such
information confidential or under what conditions it may be shared or
used. This can lead to real problems. For example, the Law School
Admission Council (LSAC), which administers the Law School Aptitude
Test (LSAT), routinely flags, in its reporting of LSAT scores to law
schools, students who received accommodations of extra time when they
took the test. As the LSAC declares on its website, "If you receive
additional test time as an accommodation for your disability, LSAC will
send a statement with your LSDAS Law School Reports advising that
your score(s) should be interpreted with great sensitivity and
flexibility. '246 The LSAC reportedly does not disclose the reason the
243.
244.
245.
246.

42 U.S.C. § 12189.
Id.
See 28 C.F.R. § 36.309.
At http://www.isac.org/LSAT/accommodated-testing.asp.
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accommodation was needed unless authorized to do so by the test-taker.
Law schools are not supposed to demand information about the nature
and extent of prospective students' disabilities, but the flagging gives
them a clear tip-off of the likelihood that these particular students have
disabilities. I am aware of instances in which admission counselors have
informed law school applicants that their applications are more likely to
receive favorable attention if they explain why they needed an
accommodation when they took the test.
Such blatant disclosure of the provision of reasonable
accommodations or "alternative accessible arrangements"-whose sole
purpose is to give that test-taker a fair and equal chance to demonstrate
what he or she can do, on a level playing field-is sharply contrary to the
principles espoused elsewhere in the ADA. As Professor Jennifer JollyRyan has written, "Flagging LSAT scores of test takers with disabilities
stigmatizes law school applicants in the admissions process and is
contrary to the goal of federal law in placing test takers with disabilities
on an equal footing by assessing their abilities, rather than their
disabilities. 2 47 Title I goes to considerable lengths to make sure that
information about a person's disability is kept confidential and
undisclosed, and cannot be used to prejudice the person's chances to be
accepted.248 Similar protections need to be added to the "examinations
and courses" provision in Title III, either by DOJ regulation or, if
necessary, by adding it to the ADA statutory language. Testers should be
strictly and clearly prohibited from disclosing which test-takers needed
accommodations because of physical or mental impairments in order to
have an equal opportunity to demonstrate their skills and aptitudes on
application, aptitude, and other standardized tests.
5.

Other ADA Refinement Issues

Any attorney who represents clients with disabilities in ADA
actions probably has a list of things about the ADA that she or he would
like to see fixed or clarified. Although many aspects of the ADA and its
enforcement that need improvement are real and compelling, a full
discussion of such issues is well beyond the scope of this article and the
knowledge-base of the author. Even mentioning a few disparate issuessuch as clarifying the burdens of proof as to various elements of the
reasonable accommodation requirement; ongoing problems with
effective communication in various contexts, including particularly in
medical treatment situations; accessibility requirements in particular
249
contexts, such as pedestrian crossings at roundabout intersections;

247. Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, The Fable of the Timed and Flagged LSAT: Do Law School
Admissions Committees Want the Tortoise or the Hare? (Social Science Research Network, 2007)
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=979590.
248. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c).
249. See, e.g., Jerry Wolffe, Making Roundabouts Safe: Agreement Mandates Protections
March
7,
2008,
at
THE
OAKLAND
PRESS,
For
Pedestrians,
http://www.theoaklandpress.com/stories/030708Aloc.20080307310.shtml.
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20
providing equal opportunities in athletics for students with disabilities;
and chemical sensitivity and fragrance issues 251-seems futile in light of
the scores of other issues that could be listed.

IV.

AND BEYOND-A SKETCHY SURVEY OF FUTURE ISSUES AND

DIRECTIONS

This section presents some ideas about steps and initiatives that

250. On May 13, 2008, the Governor of Maryland signed into law the Fitness and Athletics
Equity for Students with Disabilities Act, requiring county boards of education to ensure, inter alia,
that students with disabilities have equal opportunities to participate in mainstream special education
programs; to try out for and, if selected, participate in mainstream athletic programs; and to be
afforded reasonable accommodations to enable them to participate to the fullest extent possible in
mainstream physical education and athletic programs. 2008 Md. Laws ch. 464 (Md. Senate Bill 849;
Md. House Bill 1411). See Preston Williams, High Schools: Disabled Athletes to Get Equal
Opportunities in Md., WASHINGTON POST, April 9, 2008, E2; John-John Williams IV, Disabled
Athletes Equal-Access Bill Passes: Within Three Years, Schools Must Allow Disabled to Compete,
baltimoresun.com, April 9, 2008, available at www.baltimoresun.com/news/local/politics/balsp.disabled09apr09,0,6049210.story; Maryland Department of Disabilities, Press Release: Governor
Signs Legislation That Provides Athletic Opportunitiesfor Students with Disabilities; Protection
Against
Bullying,
May
13,
2008,
available
at
http://www.mdod.maryland.gov/News%20and%2OFeatures.aspx?id=1076. The legislation grew out
of court suits filed by a high school wheelchair athlete. McFadden v. Cousin, No. AMD 06-648
(D.Md. 2006), (preliminary injunction granted permitting wheelchair racers to participate in races
alongside non-wheelchair racers; ruling summarized in McFadden v. Grasmick, 485 F. Supp. 2d
642, 644 n.4 (D. Md., May 12, 2007)); McFadden v. Grasmick, 485 F. Supp. 2d 642 (D. Md., May
12, 2007) (motion for preliminary injunction to have wheelchair races at the Maryland public
schools championships count in team standings denied). See Associated Press, Paralyzed Athlete
Allowed in Meets: Agreement Lets Teen Join High School Track Team, January 10, 2007, available
at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/preps/299045-preplO.html; Eli Saslow and Alan Goldenbach,
Howard Racer Suffers Legal Blow: Teen Wants Points In Wheelchair Events to Count,
WASHINGTON POST, May 15, 2007, A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/05/14/AR2007051401614.html.
251. Sensitivity to chemicals or fragrances can give rise to ADA discrimination claims if a
claimant is able to show that the individual's condition meets the ADA definition of disability (it
substantially limits a major life activity, etc.). From July 1992 to September 2007, chemical
sensitivity claims comprised 0.3% of the EEOC's ADA merit factor resolutions. U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, ADA Charge Data By Impairments/Bases-Merit Factor
Resolutions, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-merit.html.
The Job Accommodation
Network has published an accommodation and compliance paper that contains information about the
condition, ADA information, accommodation ideas, and resources for additional information.
Tracie DeFreitas Saab, Accommodation and Compliance Series: Employees with Multiple Chemical
Sensitivity and Environmental Illness, Job Accommodation Network, available at
http://www.jan.wvu.edu/media/MCS.html (updated Aug. 4, 2007). See, generally, Andrew K.
Kelley, Comment: Sensitivity Training: Multiple Chemical Sensitivity and the ADA, 25 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF.
L.
REv.
485,
(Winter
1998),
available
at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3816/is_ 199801/ai n876698 1.
Apart from the ADA, sensitivity to chemicals and fragrances can become a legal issue in a
variety of ways. In Minnesota, for example, state Representative Karen Clark, concerned that
scented products may trigger asthma or chemical sensitivity reactions in students, proposed
legislation to ban "perfumes, air fresheners, scented lotions, and scented cleaning products" and
other "fragrances" to create a "fragrance-free environment" in the Minneapolis public schools. H.F.
2148,
85th
Leg.
Sess.
(Minn.
2007),
available
at
https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/bldbill.php?bill=H2148.0.html&session=ls85.
Subsequently, Representative Clark scaled back her initiative and introduced a bill to establish a
"fragrance-free schools education campaign," in lieu of a ban. H.F. 3944, 85th Leg. Sess. (Minn.
2008),
available
at
https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/bldbill.php?bill=H3944.0.html&session=ls85.
See Martiga Lohn, Minnesota Lawmaker Wants Minneapolis Schools to Go FragranceFree,
LA
CROSSE
TRIBUNE,
March
11,
2008,
available
at
http://www.lacrossetribune.com/articles/2008/03/11/mn/4m.txt.
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would help the advancement of the rights and status of people with
disabilities in the future, and suggests some emerging or foreseeable
issues upon which action is likely to be called for or advantageous. It is
far from a complete or comprehensive menu of issues or directions that
might be suggested, and should be viewed as more of a sampling that
may, and hopefully will, stimulate more thought about future directions
and the identification of many other similar and dissimilar ideas as to
where the disability rights movement could or should go in the coming
years and decades.
A.

Forceful,Responsive, Effectual, Potent DisabilityRights

Movement
In 1985, during a presentation at a National Advocacy Program of
the Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA), I caused a bit of an uproar
when I said that "the disability rights movement should stop being so
wimpy. '' 252 As examples of public disrespect by public officials and
agencies at the time, I referred to the Supreme Court's ruling in the
Pennhurst case that the Developmental Disabilities Bill of Rights was
not enforceable; Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt's notorious
statement that a commission under his control included "a black, a
woman, two Jews and a cripple"; 25 3 the remarks of Eileen Gardner, a
special assistant to Secretary of Education in the Reagan administration,
who had declared that people become ill or disabled because they have
"summoned" the conditions to "fit their level of internal spiritual
development"-essentially that disability is the result of spiritual
imperfection or sin; 254 and the convening of a Fair Housing Conference
at an inaccessible facility.
Since 1985 there has been considerable disability advocacy
activity. Successful battles were waged to avoid the rolling back of
Section 504 and IDEA (EAHCA at the time) regulations during the
Reagan administration; the Gallaudet protests embodied a powerful
assertion of self-determination by deaf students and faculty; ADAPT
protesters proclaiming "We will ride!" stalked the transit industry all
over the country to challenge inaccessibility of public transit systems;
amazing grassroots organizing, focusing of political clout, and symbolic

252. Second Wind: The Disability Rights Movement Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,
New Horizons Under the RehabilitationAct 3, 6, Paralyzed Veterans of America (1986).
253. Comments to U.S. Chamber of Commerce regarding the U.S. Coal Commission on
September 21, 1983, quoted in Dale Russakoff, Watt's Off-the-Cuff Remark Sparks Storm of
Criticism, The Washington Post, Sept. 22, 1983, Al.
254.

See, From the Writings of Eileen Marie Gardner , The Washington Post; Apr 17,

1985, A4; Phil McCombs, Eileen Gardner'sAgenda for the Soul, The Washington Post, May 17,
1985, BI; Keith B. Richburg, Education Aide Defends Stance on Handicapped,The Washington
Post, Apr 18, 1985, A3; Philosophy of Education, The Washington Post; Apr 18, 1985, A22; Keith
B. Richburg, Controversial Officials Quit Education Dept., The Washington Post, Apr 19, 1985, A3;
Keith B. Richburg, Bennett Assailed ForAide's Views On Handicaps,The Washington Post, Apr 17,
1985, AI; Joan Brest Friedberg, June B. Mullins, Adelaide Weir Sukiennik, PORTRAYING PERSONS
WITH DISABILITIES: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF NONFICTION FOR CHILDREN AND
TEENAGERS (R.R. Bowker, 1992); Discordover the Disabled,Time, April 12, 1985.
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activities of various kinds, including wheelchair-users climbing out of
their chairs and scooting up the steps of the U.S. Capitol, were
undertaken to support the passage of the ADA; various kinds of public
demonstrations have been held in support of deinstitutionalization and
getting federal money to follow people into community residential
alternatives; PVA, NFB, the Bazelon Center, and scores of other groups
have spearheaded litigation to establish and expand the rights of people*
with disabilities, and individual plaintiffs, often with the support of
P&As, other public interest advocates, and private attorneys, have gone
to court to assert their rights; and many, many other creative and often
effective actions have been taken by various individuals and
organizations that collectively comprise the disability rights movement.
And yet I think we too often still fall short of the doggedly
consistent, well-orchestrated, concerted activism that we need. We still
have not established the kind of continuing presence, the unfailing voice,
that would earn us, if not raw fear,255 at least grudging respect for our
interests and concerns, and an expectation that we shall not stand silent
while being trod upon. All too frequently, the rights and interests of
people with disabilities have been, in the current vernacular, "dissed" by
the agencies of the government that has repeatedly pledged to provide us
equality and full participation. In response, our outcry has been
relatively muted. Discussed in some detail above is the outrageous
spectacle of the highest court in the land deciding, in spite of abundant
contrary legislative history and traditional civil rights analysis, to
minimize the protection afforded by our principal civil rights law-the
ADA-by subjecting it to a tortured interpretation whereby eligibility for
protection from discrimination is "interpreted strictly to create a
demanding standard for qualifying ....,,256

Was the result people

marching in the street or demonstrating in front of the Supreme Court?
No, the response was primarily in the form of a few letters to the editor
and erudite criticism by some of us legal scholars. 257
255. In 1969, Professor Leonard Kriegel wrote that a person with a disability "does not
even possess the sense of being actively hated or feared by society, for society is merely made
somewhat uncomfortable by his presence.

It treats him as if he were an errant, rather ugly, little

schoolboy." Leonard Kriegel, Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some Reflections on the Cripple as Negro,
38 Am. Scholar 412, 413 (1969).
256. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).

257.

Within the parameters of its role of reviewing and evaluating federal policies

affecting people with disabilities, and reporting on the implementation and effectiveness of the
ADA, the National Council on Disabilities has been an outspoken and consistent critic of the
Williams decision. In a 2002 "policy brief," the NCD wrote:
The Court's position that the definition of disability is to be construed narrowly

ignores and contradicts clear indications in the statute and its legislative history that
the ADA was to provide a "comprehensive" prohibition of discrimination based on
disability, and legislative, judicial, and administrative commentary regarding the
breadth of the definition of disability. It also flies in the face of an established legal
tradition of construing civil rights legislation broadly. Congress knowingly chose a
definition that to that time had been interpreted broadly in regulations and the courts;
it was entitled to expect the definition to continue to receive a generous reading. The
Court's harsh and restrictive approach to defining disability-an approach that

places difficult, technical, and sometimes insurmountable evidentiary burdens on
persons who have experienced discrimination-was unwarranted and highly
unfortunate.
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Sadly, the Williams decision and the other ADA decisions addressed in
the NCD RIGHTING THE ADA report 258 were not the only instances in
which the Supreme Court has treated the cause of civil rights for people
with disabilities with a certain lack of respect during the last decade. The
questioning of the very constitutionality of some parts of the ADA, in
such cases as Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett,259 is an issue that may (but hopefully will not) have to be dealt
with in the future, and is discussed in the next subsection. But it is
noteworthy that in Garrett the Supreme Court ruled that discrimination
on the basis of disability is to be subjected to the lowest possible level of
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.26 ° In addition, the Court
made a sweeping statement, albeit in dicta, that the Equal Protection

National Council on Disability, Broad or Narrow Construction of the ADA, Paper No. 4 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Policy Brief Series: Righting the ADA (December 16, 2002)
available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2002/broadnarrowconstruction.htm.
See
also National Council on Disability, RIGHTING THE ADA, 70-72 (2004) ("In many ways, the most
important, far-reaching, and damaging of the Court's rulings on the definition of disability is its
announcement that the ADA's definition of disability should be interpreted narrowly to create a
demanding standard for eligibility for the Act's protection."); John R. Vaughn, Chairman, National
Council on Disability, Testimony Presented to the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions during the Hearing on "Restoring Congressional Intent and Protections Under
the
Americans
with
Disabilities
Act"
(November
15,
2007),
available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/testimony/2007/restoring9I 1-15-07.htm.
258. See the discussion at supra notes 76-77, 86-88, 103-108, and accompanying text.
259. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
260. The Court treated its decision in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432 (1985), which involved a group home for individuals with mental retardation, as having settled
the issue that disability is neither a suspect or quasi-suspect classification under the Equal Protection
Clause. Accordingly, state discrimination on the basis of disability challenged as violating equal
protection would merit only "rational-basis review" - the lowest level of equal protection analysis.
Under this standard, a state will not be held to have violated the Equal Protection Clause if there is a
rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.
The Court declared further that a state does not need to articulate its reasoning when making a
particular decision that results in disparate treatment. Instead, the party bringing an equal protection
challenge has the burden of showing that there is no reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification.
The GarrettCourt's reading of Cleburne exceeded the actual ruling in that case in several
ways. The Cleburnecase dealt with a classification based on mental retardation. The Court did not
reason that all disability classifications call for rational basis analysis and thus mental retardation
does; it ruled that the classification mental retardation does not necessarily require higher level
scrutiny. Such a ruling is quite different from determining whether exclusionary barriers barring
people with disabilities from state employment opportunities might warrant elevated equal
protection scrutiny.In addition, in Cleburne the Court did not actually apply the highly unfavorable
scrutiny described in the Garrettdecision. The Cleburne Court actually struck down the challenged
discrimination because it was based on "negative attitudes," "fear," and "irrational prejudice," 473
U.S. at 448, 450, and certainly did not require the plaintiffs to prove that there was no reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the challenged classification.
Commentators have described the beefed-up version of supposed rational basis analysis applied in
Cleburne as "rational basis with teeth" or "rational basis with bite." See, e.g., Timothy J. Cahill &
Betsy Malloy, Overcoming the Obstacles Of Garrett: An "As Applied" Saving Constructionfor the
ADA 's Title I, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 133, 150 n.105 (2004) ("rational with teeth"); Raffi S.
Baroutjian, Note, The Advent of the Multifactor,Sliding-Scale Standardof Equal Protection Review:
Out with the Traditional Three-Tier Method of Analysis, in with Romer v. Evans, 30 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 1277, 1310-1311, 1314 (1997) ("rational basis with bite"); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note,
RationalBasis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 780 n. 9, 794
(1987) ("rational basis with bite"); Hannah Whitney McMurry Schrock, Note, An Emerging Civil
Rights Movement: Immigrant Populations in Need of Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 34 N. KY. L. REv. 749, 767 (2007) ("rational basis with teeth"); David 0. Stewart,
Supreme Court Report: A Growing Equal Protection Clause?, 71 A.B.A. J., 108, 112-114 (1985)
("rational basis with teeth," quoting Prof. Victor Rosenblum). Neither the "teeth" nor the "bite"
were present in the GarrettCourt's purported application of the Cleburne standard.
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Clause permits states to "quite hardheadedly-and perhaps
hardheartedly-hold to job-qualification requirements which do not
make allowance for the disabled. 2 61 This not only is highly provocative,
inflammatory language, but it represents a regression from previous
expressions by the Supreme Court of the importance of barrier removal,
reasonable accommodations, and elimination of discriminatory
qualification requirements in realizing equality for people with
disabilities.26 2
Another disappointing example of either a lack of understanding or
indifference to nuances of language by the Supreme Court in the
disability rights realm occurred in the case of U.S. Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, when the Court labeled reasonable accommodations a
"preference" afforded to people with disabilities. 2 63 U.S. Airways
claimed that a reasonable accommodation that conflicted with terms of a
seniority system constituted a workplace "preference," that grants
employees with disabilities treatment that other workers could not
receive.264 And the airline argued that the ADA seeks only "equal"
treatment for those with disabilities, and does not require an employer to
grant preferential treatment.265 The Court rejected the substance of U.S.
Airways' argument, but adopted its phrasing and acknowledged its
261. 531 U.S. at 367-368.
262. In Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), the Supreme Court indicated that under
Section 504 a covered entity (in that case the state of Tennessee) was obliged to provide people with
disabilities "meaningful access" to benefits the entity provides, and that "to assure meaningful
access, reasonable accommodations in the... program or benefit may have to be made." Id. at 301.
The Court also recognized a need for "the elimination of existing obstacles against the
handicapped," and the "elimination of physical barriers to access." Id. at 300 n.20, 307. In its
opinion, the Court quoted approvingly the statement of Senator Hubert Humphrey that among the
types of discrimination being prohibited was the "discriminatory effect of job qualification...
procedures .. " Id. at 297. The Court would later recognize, in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535
U.S. 391, 397 (2002), that reasonable accommodations "sometimes prove necessary to achieve the
Act's basic equal opportunity goal. The Act requires preferences in the form of 'reasonable
accommodations' that are needed for those with disabilities to obtain the same workplace
opportunities that those without disabilities automatically enjoy." The Court ruled that the
reasonable accommodation obligation can require an employer to make exceptions to disabilityneutral practices and rules, and elaborated as follows:
Were that not so, the "reasonable accommodation" provision could not accomplish
its intended objective. Neutral office assignment rules would automatically prevent
the accommodation of an employee whose disability-imposed limitations require
him to work on the ground floor. Neutral "break-from- work" rules would
automatically prevent the accommodation of an individual who needs additional
breaks from work, perhaps to permit medical visits. Neutral furniture budget rules
would automatically prevent the accommodation of an individual who needs a
different kind of chair or desk. Many employers will have neutral rules governing
the kinds of actions most needed to reasonably accommodate a worker with a
disability.
Id. at 397-398.
As far back as 1979, the Court had recognized that qualification standards that screen out
people because of their disabilities could be called into question if they are not necessary for
participation, and that there are situations "where a refusal to modify an existing program might
become unreasonable and discriminatory" or where "an insistence on continuing past requirements
and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped persons of the opportunity to
participate .. " Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407, 412 (1979).
263. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397-398 (2002).
264. Id. at 397.
265. Id.
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reasoning had some "linguistic logic":
While linguistically logical, this argument fails to recognize
what the Act specifies, namely, that preferences will
sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act's basic equal
opportunity goal. The Act requires preferences in the form of
"reasonable accommodations" that are needed for those with
disabilities to obtain the same workplace opportunities that
those without disabilities automatically enjoy. By definition
any special "accommodation" requires the employer to treat
an employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially.
And the fact that the difference in treatment violates an
employer's disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the
accommodation beyond the Act's potential reach.266
Accordingly, the Court ruled that "[t]he simple fact that an
accommodation would provide a 'preference'-in the sense that it would
permit the worker with a disability to violate a rule that others must
obey-cannot, in and of itself,267 automatically show that the
accommodation is not 'reasonable. ,,
The Court's holding on the need for reasonable accommodation to
attain the ADA's "equal opportunity goal" appears enlightened. Its
and
as "special"
designation of reasonable accommodation
"preferential," on the other hand, is inartful, misguided, and damaging.
It fosters the misconception that the ADA gives people with disabilities
some type of advantage over people without disabilities. As NCD has
explained in one of its reports:
Properly understood, reasonable accommodations are
adjustments or modifications intended to level the playing
field for a person who would otherwise be denied an equal
opportunity. In proposing the idea of an ADA in 1986, the
Council identified reasonable accommodation as "[a] key
element of eliminating discrimination" on the basis of
disability, and described it as "the process of matching the
particular abilities and limitations of each disabled individual
with the essential requirements of a particular activity and
trying to modify the activity as necessary to permit the
individual with a disability to participate." The Council also
against people with
observed that "[d]iscrimination
disabilities has literally been built into the physical
environment, and eliminating such discrimination requires
planning and action to remove barriers that exclude disabled
people . 26 8

266. Id. at 397.
267. Id. at 398.

268. Supreme Court Decisions Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act, subpart
ll(J)(1), at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2OO2/supremecourtada.htm, quoting the
National Council on Disability, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE, app., at A-15 & A-37 (1986). The NCD
went on to declare:
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In short, reasonable accommodation is not "preferential"; it is
"remedial"-a necessary antidote to barriers and hindrances inherent in
workplaces, facilities, practices, and procedures that were developed in
ignorance or disregard of the possibility of participation by those having
physical or mental impairments.
In its use of "special" and "preferential" labels for reasonable
accommodations, the Court in Barnes exhibited a lack of awareness of an
earlier, similar faux pas by the Court. In dicta in its decision in
Southeastern Community College v. Davis 69 in 1979, the Court had at
various points mischaracterized reasonable accommodation as an
"affirmative action" obligation and suggested that it might exceed the
nondiscrimination requirement imposed by Section 504.27o Subsequently,
in its opinion in Alexander v. Choate,27' the Court found it necessary to
recant the misphrasing and conceptual cloudiness in its opinion in Davis:
Our use of the term "affirmative action" in this context has been severely
criticized for failing to appreciate the difference between affirmative action
and reasonable accommodation; the former is said to refer to a remedial
policy for the victims of past discrimination, while the latter relates to the
elimination of existing obstacles against the handicapped.272
The Court added that "[r]egardless of the aptness of our choice of words in
Davis," it endorsed a legal mandate for "those changes that would be
reasonable accommodations. 273 The Court noted with approval that "[t]he
regulations implementing Section 504 are consistent with the view that
reasonable adjustments in the nature of the benefit offered must at times be

The ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement built upon a clear analytical
foundation described in detail in ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL

ABILITIES, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights' 1983 report on disability
discrimination. Central to the reasonable accommodation concept is recognition that
the impact of physical and mental impairments largely "is as much inherent in the
social context as in the impairment," and that while it is frequently assumed that
there is only one way of doing things-tailored to the needs and abilities of those
without disabilities-in fact, "programs, activities, and facilities may actually be
organized in a variety of ways" that "can be changed in response to the abilities and
characteristics of the person involved."

ACCOMMODATING THE SPECI RUM, supra

note 11, at 89, 90. To the degree that a particular job situation is slanted against a
person with certain impairments, identical treatment of that person in relation to
other employees or applicants would not provide real equality of opportunity. As the
Commission on Civil Rights observed: "When decision-makers forget that social
context almost always are structured for [people without disabilities], they are apt to
view anything beyond ... identical treatment as special, unequal treatment
necessitated by the [disability]." Id. at 99. This is precisely the verbal trap
suggested by the Court's "special" and "preferential" phrasing in the Barnett
opinion.
1d. For additional verification that reasonable accommodation is not "special" treatment, and a
description of types of "accommodations" employers routinely make for employees without
disabilities, see Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability,
42 Villanova L. Rev. 409, 529-533 (1997).
269. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
270. d.at 411.
271. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
272. 469 U.S. at 300 n.20.
273. 1d.
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made to assure meaningful access., 274 A similar recantation of its
"preference" language in Barnett would be appropriate.
A most outrageous example of High Court insensitivity toward
disability rights issues occurred just two weeks before the tenBroek
Symposium, during oral argument in Indiana v. Edwards, a case
addressing the issue of whether a defendant diagnosed with a mental
illness and possible brain damage was competent to represent himself in
his criminal defense. Justice Anthony Kennedy, apparently with a view
toward getting a laugh, quipped that "[t]here are all kinds of nuts who
could get 90 percent on the bar exam. 275 In the context, it is clear that
Justice Kennedy used the term "nuts" to refer to people with mental
illness.2 76 What would happen if a Supreme Court Justice made a
derogatory joke involving a pejorative term in regard to African
Americans, or Latinos, or people of Japanese or Irish ancestry, or
Buddhists, or Jews, or some other minority group, during oral argument?
One would expect it would provoke quite a public outcry, but there has
so far been little commentary in the mainstream media, and some of what
there has been is not condemnatory but revels in the view of lawyers as
not mentally sound.2 77

The upshot of these examples of disrespect and heedlessness of
disability rights principles, insights, and sensibilities is that the courts do
not consider disability rights advocates as a force to be reckoned with.
This suggests a need for more concerted action by the disability
community in reaction to unfavorable judicial rulings and derogatory
public statements. Perhaps more importantly, it indicates a need for the
disability rights movement to become a more significant participant in
the judicial selection process and judicial education. We need judges
who are better informed and tuned into disability rights issues and
philosophy, and we need to take active and sustained steps to achieve
such a judiciary.
The emphasis on judicial decisions, as befits a legal symposium
and articles to be published in a law review, does not mean, however,
that we do not also have serious axes to grind with the Legislative and
Executive branches of the U.S. Government. For example, in another
article in this symposium, Professor Michael Stein has provided an
extensive, informative discussion of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities that the United States has not been
willing to sign. I had the opportunity to participate in an earlier effort to
develop an international agreement to eliminate discrimination on the
basis of disability-the Organization of American States (OAS) "Inter274. Id. at301 n.21.
275. Indiana v. Edwards, No. 07-208, Oral Argument, United States Supreme Court
Official Transcript (Mar. 26, 2008) 2008 WL 791973, *53.
276. Nor is Justice Kennedy alone in his inconsiderate use of the crass term to refer to
mental limitations. Justice Antonin Scalia was quoted as explaining to a New York audience in
2005 why he was not willing to overturn large numbers of existing precedents even though he
disagreed with their approach because, he said, "I am an originalist, but I am not a nut." Quoted in
Jeffrey Toobin, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT (Doubleday, 2007).
277. See, e.g., Craig Napier, Commentary: Need information? Find a lawyer who's
"nuts, " Daily Record and the Kansas City Daily News-Press, Mar. 31, 2008, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qn4l 81/is_2008033 I/ain24975774.
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American Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination by Reason of Disability" that sought to prohibit disability
discrimination throughout the western hemisphere. Along with Dr.
Yerker Andersson, a member of NCD, in 1998 I participated as part of
the U.S. delegation to a "Meeting of Experts to Examine the Draft InterAmerican Convention." At the meeting, we "experts" grappled with a
number of thorny issues, particularly in regard to the definitions of
disability and discrimination on the basis of disability, and we made
concrete suggestions for alternative language. Although the experts
appeared close to consensus on many of the important issues, the
political representatives of the member governments were unable to
agree, and a replacement version of the convention was not adopted at
that time. The draft convention remained stalled until April 30, 1999,
when the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs of OAS adopted a
revised version-in my opinion, somewhat watered down and less
specific. On June 7, 1999, the General Assembly of the OAS, meeting in
Guatemala City, Guatemala, adopted the revised Convention. By its
terms, the convention entered into force when it was ratified by at least
six countries, but is only legally binding on countries that have
themselves ratified it. Despite encouragement by NCD and others that
Congress ratify the convention, it has yet to do so.
Whatever
imperfections the documents may have, how can the United States not
join other nations in landmark commitments to eliminating
discrimination on the basis of disability in the Americas or in the world?
In the case of the U.N. Convention, U.S. officials have explained, as the
rationale for not signing, that the Convention is weaker than American
law.278 Ironically, in working on the OAS Convention I witnessed U.S.
Government representatives repeatedly object to any provisions that they
deemed to go further than U.S. laws. Either way, the non-signing status
to these Conventions of our country is an embarrassment, and a lapse by
both the Executive and Legislative Branches that we should not tolerate
without vigorous indignation and remonstration.
Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act was enacted in 1973 with the
intent of making the Federal Government a leader in employing workers
with disabilities. 279 Since 1978, the pledge that the Federal Government
shall be a "model employer" of persons with disabilities has been
reflected in federal regulations.2 80 Currently, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(a)
278.

Patrick Worship, U.N. Convention for Disabled to Take Effect May 3, Reuters, April

4, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN03333101.
279. 124 Cong. Rec. 30,347 (1978) (comments of Sen. Cranston); S.Rep. No. 318, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2122. See, also, Rehabilitation of
the Handicapped Programs 1976: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1502 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (Congress enacted Section 501 "to
require that the Federal Government itself act as the model employer of the handicapped and take
affirmative action to hire and promote the disabled."), quoted in Linn, Uncle Sam Doesn't Want You:
Entering the Federal Stronghold of Employment Discrimination against Handicapped Individuals,
27 DE PAUL L. REv. 1047, 1060 (1978); Cong. Rec. S15591 (Sept. 20, 1978) (remarks of Senator
Cranston) ("The legislative history of section 501 illustrates that with respect to the employment of
handicapped individuals, Congress expected the Federal Government should be a leader.").
280. 43 Fed. Reg. 12293-12296 (Mar 24, 1978), codified at 5 C.F.R. § 713.703 (1978)
("The Federal Government shall become a model employer of handicapped individuals."); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1613.703 (1982) (same); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(b) (1992) (same).
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(2008) provides as follows: "Model employer. The Federal Government
shall be a model employer of individuals with disabilities. Agencies
shall give full consideration to the hiring, placement, and advancement of
qualified individuals with disabilities." To pursue these objectives,
Section 501 requires each "department, agency, and instrumentality" in
the executive branch to develop "an affirmative action program plan for
the hiring, placement, and advancement of individuals with disabilities,"
to be updated and reviewed annually, that "provides sufficient

assurances, procedures and commitments to provide adequate hiring,
placement,

and

disabilities., 2 8'

advancement

opportunities

for

individuals

with

In addition, federal agencies have been given special

appointing authorities to facilitate the hiring of employees with certain
kinds of disabilities. 282 During his presidency, President Clinton initiated

several initiatives aimed at promoting federal employment opportunities
for people with disabilities.2 83

In August 2004, the U.S. Office of

Personnel (OPM) issued a Model Federal Agency Plan for the
Employment of People with Disabilities that identifies "best practices"

that federal agencies have used to increase the hiring and advancement of
people with disabilities.2 84

As a part of its responsibility to monitor federal agency compliance
with Section 501, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) collects and compiles data regarding agencies' hiring and
advancement of workers with disabilities. At the time of hiring, federal

agencies provide employees the opportunity (not required) to selfdisclose that they have a disability, on a Standard Form 256 (SF-256) 285;
the numbers of people who so identify are reported to the EEOC. In
1979, EEOC officially designated certain disabilities as "targeted
281. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b).
282. See "Schedule A" appointing authorities: 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(u) (for hiring people
with mental retardation, severe physical disabilities, or psychiatric disabilities; after 2 years of
satisfactory service, appointees may qualify for conversion to permanent status.); 5 C.F.R. §
213.3102(11) (for hiring readers, interpreters, and personal assistants for employees with severe
disabilities). See, also 5 C.F.R. § 315.604 (for hiring disabled veterans enrolled in a Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) training program; upon successful completion of the program, the trainee may
be appointed non-competitively under a status quo appointment that may be converted to permanent
status at any time); 5 C.F.R. §§ 316.302(b)(4) & 316.402(b)(4) (for hiring disabled veterans with
compensable service-connected disability of 30% or more; veterans appointed under these
authorities for more than 60 days may be converted to permanent status).
283. See Executive Order 13078 (March 13, 1998), 63 Fed. Reg. 13111 (March 18, 1998)
(established National Task Force on Employment of Adults with Disabilities charged, inter alia, with
reviewing and making recommendations regarding personnel practices of federal agencies, in order
"[t]o ensure that the Federal Government is a model employer of adults with disabilities"); Executive
Order 13163 (July 26, 2000), 65 Fed. Reg. 46563 (July 28, 2000) (to promote the hiring of 100,000
people with disabilities at all levels and occupations of the federal government by requiring federal
agencies to use available hiring authorities, expand their outreach efforts, and increase their efforts to
accommodate people with disabilities); Executive Order 13164 (July 26, 2000), 65 Fed. Reg. 46565
(July 28, 2000) (to promote model federal workplace that provides reasonable accommodations for
individuals with disabilities in application process for federal employment, in performing essential
functions of position, and with respect to enjoyment of benefits and privileges of employment equal
to those enjoyed by employees without disabilities, by providing employees, supervisors, and
managers, with an easy-to-understand, step-by-step explanation of the reasonable accommodation
process).
284. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Federal Employment of People with
Disabilities: Model FederalAgency Planfor the Employment of People with Disabilities,found at
https://www.opm.gov/disability/hrpro-8-04.asp.
285. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.601(o.
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disabilities" in its Management Directive 703 issued on December 6,
1979, which in 2003 was superseded by Management Directive 715.286
MD 715 defines "targeted disabilities" as "Disabilities that the federal
government, as a matter of policy, has identified for special emphasis in
affirmative action programs. They are: 1) deaffiess; 2) blindness; 3)
missing extremities; 4) partial paralysis; 5) complete paralysis; 6)
convulsive disorders; 7) mental retardation; 8) mental illness; and 9)
distortion of limb and/or spine. 287
In January 2008, the EEOC issued a report on the performance of
federal agencies regarding the participation of workers with disabilities
in their workforces-Improving the ParticipationRate of People with
Targeted Disabilities in the Federal Work Force.288 The findings were
highly disturbing. Among them were the following facts:
The percentage of federal employees with targeted disabilities
has fallen every year since 1994.
In 2006, the participation rate of persons with targeted
disabilities fell to 0.94% of the federal government's total
work force, the lowest participation rate in 20 years.
Between 1997 and 2006, the actual numbers of employees
with targeted disabilities in the federal workforce declined by
14.75%, despite the fact that the workforce as a whole grew
by 5.48%.289

Since 1979, EEOC has estimated the availability of persons with
targeted disabilities of working age and able to work as 5.95 percent of
the workforce-age population, based upon U.S. Department of Labor
Employment Standards figures, and had recommended this percentage as
a conservative objective for federal government agencies. 290 As of 1982,
the actual percentage of workers with targeted disabilities was only
.82%.291 For the next 10 years, this rate grew, albeit at a glacially slow
286. EEOC, Management Directive 715 (October 1, 2003).
287. Id., App. A-Definitions. The EEOC has explained that "[c]riteria used to select the
nine disabilities that make up the group of targeted disabilities included the severity of the disability,
the feasibility of recruitment, and the availability of work force data for individuals with targeted
disabilities." EEOC, Improving the ParticipationRate of People with Targeted Disabilitiesin the
Federal
Work
Force
(January
2008)
at
I.C,
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/report/pwtd.html.
288. EEOC, Improving the ParticipationRate of People with Targeted Disabilities in the
Federal Work Force (January 2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/report/pwtd.html.

289. Id., Executive Summary.
290. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, MD-71310/87, App. B at B-I to B-2 (1987); Task Force on
Employment of Adults with Disabilities, Re-charting the Course: If Not Now, When? (1999),
available at http://www.dol.gov/oasam/library/ptfrepts/l1999rpt/1999rpt.txt.
291. EEOC, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF MINORITIES, WOMEN, & PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING 1990 (1992),
summarized in David Braddock & Lynn Bachelder, THE GLASS CEILING AND PERSONS WITH

DISABILITIES (Glass Ceiling Commission, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 1994) at 62, available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edulcgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l 11 5&context=key-workplace;
Pan Suk Kim, An Analysis Of The Employment Of Persons With Disabilities In The Korean
Government: A Comparative Study With The American Federal Government, PUBLIC PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT,
Spring
2006,
at
Table
I,
available
at
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average rate of .04% per year; in 1992, EEOC noted that at that rate of
increase it would take more than 21 years before people with targeted
disabilities would comprise 2% of the federal work force.292 But even
the snail's pace of increase could not be maintained. The percentage of
federal employees with targeted disabilities peaked at 1.24 in 1993 and
1994, and has been going downhill ever since. 93 In 2005, the rate fell
below 1% for the first time since 1984.294
When the EEOC issued Management Directive 715 in 2003, it
dropped the 5.95% objective for government employment of workers
with targeted disabilities.295 In December 2006, EEOC Commissioner
Christine Griffin announced in a speech that she had a much more

modest goal-to see the rate of federal employment of persons with
targeted disabilities get to 2% by 2010.296 This is approximately onethird of the goal EEOC had endorsed almost 30 years ago.297

In June 2006, at the urging of Commissioner Griffin, EEOC
initiated what it called the LEAD (Leadership for the Employment of
Americans with Disabilities) initiative to addresses the declining number
of employees with targeted disabilities in the federal workforce; LEAD

focuses on outreach to senior leaders at federal agencies to enhance their
awareness of both the employment challenges faced by persons with

targeted disabilities and policies and practices that can reverse the
decline of such people in the federal work force population. 298 And yet,

given recent performance, even the trifling 2% objective seems out of
reach. As the EEOC observed in the January 2008 report,

http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejoumals/article/ 60542364_6.html;
EEOC
Commissioner
Christine Griffin, Perspectives Conference: Keynote Address, December 6, 2006 ("[R]ight now
people with severe disabilities make up less than 1% of the federal workforce. We are exactly where
we were in 1984!"), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/initiatives/lead/speeches/12-06.html.
292. EEOC, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF MINORITIES, WOMEN, & PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING 1990 (1992),
summarized in David Braddock & Lynn Bachelder, THE GLASS CEILING AND PERSONS WITH

DISABILITIES (Glass Ceiling Commission, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 1994) at 62, available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l 115&context-key-workplace.
293. EEOC, Improving the ParticipationRate of People with Targeted Disabilitiesin the
Federal Work Force, Executive Summary & Table 1 (January 2008), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/report/pwtd.html.
294. Id., Table 1.
295. EEOC, Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive 715, October 1, 2003
(superseding EEO Management Directives 712 (dated March 29, 1983), and 713 and 714 (both dated
October 6, 1987)), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/eeomd715.html.
296. EEOC Commissioner Christine Griffin, Perspectives Conference: Keynote Address,
December 6, 2006 ("1 want to see the federal government get to 2% by 2010. Two percent in three
years-a
modest
goal
with
tremendous
impact."),
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/initiatives/lead/speeches/12-06.html.
297. Commissioner Griffin remarked further that "[t]wenty years, or 37 if you count the
time from the signing of the Rehabilitation Act, is plenty of time for us to become the model
employer we're supposed to be for all Americans." Id.
298. EEOC, Improving the ParticipationRate of People with Targeted Disabilities in the
Federal Work Force at I(D); Stephen Barr, A Troublesome Decline in Disability Hiring, THE
WASHINGTON POST, January 17, 2008 at D04. According to LEAD's website, its aims include
reversing the trend of decreasing participation in federal employment; increasing awareness of
federal hiring officials about the declining numbers of people with disabilities in federal employment
and about how to use special hiring authorities to bring people with disabilities on board; educating
applicants with disabilities about how to apply using the special hiring authorities available; and
providing information and resources regarding recruitment, hiring, and providing reasonable
accommodations. http:l/www.eeoc.gov/initiafives/leadl.

2008]

Restoring the ADA and Beyond

Between FY 1997 and FY 2006, the permanent work force
increased in five of the ten years. The participation rate of
PWTD [person with targeted disabilities] during that same
ten year period nonetheless decreased every year. Moreover,
in the five years when the size of the permanent work force
decreased between FY 1997 and FY 2006, the participation
rate for PWTD had a disproportionately higher decrease. For
example, from FY 2002 to FY 2003, the permanent work
force declined by 1.27%, but PWTD declined by twice as
much at 2.59%. Overall, the federal government is losing
more PWTD than it is hiring each year.299
It turns out that most federal agencies are not even bothering to set
measurable objectives regarding increasing the numbers of workers with
targeted disabilities in their workforces. The 2008 EEOC report cited
figures from 2005 indicating "that despite the declining participation rate
of PWTD in the federal government, only 15.82% of agencies
established a numerical goal for increasing the employment of PWTD in
their work force. 3 °° Some 41.1% of the agencies reported that they
established non-numerical objectives, which turns out to be a euphemism
30
for an agency saying "it will hire PWTD within the next few years." '
The remaining 43% did not bother with making even that feeble
pledge.30 2 The performance of federal agencies in employing workers
with targeted disabilities is abysmal, and the lack of agencies'
commitment to doing any better is appalling.
These shocking problems have not escaped comment, both within
and without the disability community. They have received some
newspaper coverage, albeit not much.30 3 In its 2008 Progress Report, the
National Council on Disability dutifully acknowledged the problem of
declining federal disability employment rates and expressed it concern;
the report contained the following observations:
Among the many statistics on the employment of
people with disabilities, few are as surprising as those of
federal employment. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) is among those that have noted and
299. EEOC, Improving the ParticipationRate of People with Targeted Disabilities in the
FederalWork Force at I I.A.

300. Id. at II.B.
301. Id. at 1l.B & n.9.
302. Id. at II.B.

303.

Stephen Barr of the Washington Post has written some significant articles. See, e.g.,

Stephen Barr, A Troublesome Decline in Disability Hiring, THE WASHINGTON POST, January 17,
2008 at D04; Stephen Barr, EEOC Moves to Stem Decline in Disabled Workforce, THE
WASHINGTON POST, October 6, 2006, at D04. Within the federal government, a most refreshing
frankness about the problem appeared in an article in the Department of State's STATE MAGAZINE,

which included the following observations: "One of the most notable statistics across the federal
government is the low percentage of persons with "targeted disabilities" in the workforce....
According to the EEOC, only approximately 1 percent of federal employees are persons with
targeted disabilities (PWTD). Some agencies have PTWD populations greater than 2 percent. At
state, the number is less than .5 percent and declining." David J. King III, Q&A: Helps and
Hindrances to Workforce Diversity, STATE MAGAZINE, January 2007, p. 33, available at

wwv.state.gov/documents/organization/79237.pdf.
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addressed sharp declines, so much so that by 2005 the
percentage of federal employees with significant disabilities,
which had peaked in 1994, had slid back to 1984 levels....
Since enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 it
has been understood as a matter of law, and NCD believes as
a matter of consensus, that the Federal Government should be
a leader in the employment of people with disabilities. Hence,
when the overall national decline in employment for
Americans with disabilities is confirmed and compounded by
a perhaps even more precipitous decline in the public sector,
this becomes a matter of great concern. 3 4
Unfortunately, NCD was not particularly critical of the EEOC nor other
federal agencies, and the Council's suggestions for addressing the
problems it raises are largely for more information-gathering, study, and
consultation, instead of a call for urgent, robust, concrete corrective
action. NCD's recommendation regarding this issue was the following:
NCD recommends that the EEOC undertake a comprehensive
examination of the issues raised by the disheartening federal
employment data on people with disabilities and submit a
report to the President, Congress, and the public, setting forth
major causes and proposed solutions to steadily raise levels
of employment and monitor upward mobility.30 5
Others within the disability community have blown the whistle on the
poor performance of federal agencies in hiring and retaining employees
with disabilities; 30 6 too often, however, such commentary is
compromised to some degree by patient, conciliatory, and sanguine
overtones. 30 7 The performance of the federal government-the purported
"model employer of persons with disabilities"-is outrageous; where are
the expressions of outrage?
On January 28, 2008, the Office of Legislative Affairs of the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) sent a letter to the Chair and Ranking
Minority Member of each of the congressional committees with
jurisdiction over the ADA Restoration Act bills.30 8 In the letter, the DOJ
declared that "we strongly oppose the proposed legislation," and took the
position that the only corrective legislation that the Department would
304. NCD, National Disability Policy: A Progress Report (January 15, 2008), p. 136.
305. Id. at 139, Recommendation 7.3.
306. See, e.g., Andrew Imparato, Federal Government Falls Short as Employer, Again,
American Association of People with Disabilities, February 08, 2008 ("We need agency heads to set
goals and to be held accountable for achieving those goals, and we need to secure commitments
during this election season so that this problem doesn't continue to get worse."), available at
http://communities.justicetalking.org/blogs/dayl 3/archive/2008/02/08/federal-govemment-fallsshort-as-employer-again.aspx.
307. See id. ("EEOC is to be commended for continuing to highlight this ongoing problem
that is not getting enough attention from agency heads, the White House, Congress, or the
media. Commissioner Christine Griffin is spearheading a federal effort to increase employment
outcomes for people with disabilities in the federal government, and we need to add our voices to
this important effort.").
308. See http://www.aapd-dc.org/News/adainthe/080227doj.htm.
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endorse would address the single issue of mitigating measures. In my
opinion, the DOJ position as expressed in the letter is uninformed,
surprisingly inconsistent with stances the Department had taken in the
past, un-nuanced, and harsh. It has not, however, provoked a storm of
exasperated protest from the disability community. I can only hope that
the DOJ position will be made an issue in the upcoming presidential
election campaign.
On June 19, 2008, the Office of the Mayor of the District of
Columbia issued a news release announcing that "[t]he National Capital
Region Transportation Planning Board (TPB) approved funding to bring
wheelchair accessible taxicabs to the District of Columbia for the first
time., 30 9 This development is obviously a positive and admirable one,
and the Administration of DC Mayor Adrian Fenty deserves some credit
for helping to bring it about. The problem, however, is that it is only
occurring in 2008, 18 years after the ADA was enacted, and over 40
years since Professor tenBroek announced that people with disabilities
have "a legal right to be abroad in the land., 310° How is it possible that
until now there have not been any accessible taxis in our nation's
capitol? How has the absence of them not been a source of national
disgrace, social activism, and strident hue and cry? How have our
country's lawmakers and leaders of government allowed such a travesty
to continue? And why hasn't the disability rights movement held the
officials' feet to the fire until they corrected this failing?
The foregoing suggests the need for more vigorous, forceful
involvement in response to unfavorable actions by the courts, the
Congress, the President, and government officials and agencies. We
need to let transgressors know that they have erred and that there will be
consequences. Likewise, the disability rights movement needs to be a
more visible and active participant in the processes by which officials are
elected or appointed; we need to make sure that our interests and issues
are "on the table" when political deals are cut and potential candidates
are evaluated for fitness for office.
Some national disability
organizations have spoken up and tried to exercise influence in these
forums; they are to be commended. But they are too few and often not
sufficiently influential to sway negotiations and elections; we can do
better and help to make the disability community a more major player in
national politics.
In making a perhaps grandiose plea for a more "Forceful,
Responsive, Effectual, Potent Disability Rights Movement"-the heading
I chose for this subsection-I do not mean to imply that I have the
expertise to give advice as to how this should be accomplished; there are
many community organizers, street activists, deal brokers, long-range
309. Government of the District of Columbia, Executive Office of the Mayor, News
Release-Accessible Taxicabs Will Be Available to Wheelchair Users for the First Time: Three
Companies Receiving Funding to Provide 21 Wheelchair Accessible Taxis in DC, June 19, 2008,
available at http://www.dc.gov/mayor/news/release.asp?id=1314&mon=200806; see also Michael
Birnbaum, Accessible Taxicabs Will Roll: Federal Funds Back Purchase of 21 Vans for D.C. Fleets,
Washington Post, June 19, 2008, B04, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/06/18/AR2008061802943.html?nav-rss metro/dc.
310. tenBroek, supranote 29.
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strategists, tacticians, potential philosopher-kings, and many others in the
disability community who know much better than I how to pursue such
objectives. Nor am I trying to indicate any particular role that any person
or organization should play; if my 35 years of experience in the disability
rights field has taught me anything, it is that the progress of a disability
agenda depends upon a wide array of activists, from those who take to
the streets for demonstrations, acts of civil disobedience, and
consciousness-raising; to those who work quietly to achieve change
"within the system"; to those who file and try lawsuits; to those who
write bills and articles; to those who form and sustain organizations and
coalitions; to those who walk the halls of Congress to lobby for
legislative changes; to those who reach out to form alliances with people
with different disabilities or who are members of other communities; and
to those who pursue a wide range of other constructive activities. I am
not seeking to encourage disability activism to become more "nasty";
perhaps somewhat more intolerant of continuing injustice and affronts,
yes, but not in an unnecessarily hostile or inflammatory manner. We
ought to confront and persuade, but seek not to offend, alienate, or insult.
Essential to my vision of the future of disability law, which I am
seeking to sketch in this article, is the hope that we can progress toward
that mystical objective we often speak of-empowerment. We need to
empower not only each individual who has been held back or discounted
because of physical or mental impairment, but also the disability rights
community as a whole. We lack, and we need to make, a concerted,
creative, energetic effort to obtain the key missing ingredient of a
successful disability movement-clout.
B.

311

ADA Constitutionality

This subsection addresses a possible problem that I sincerely hope
will not become a serious impediment, but that has raised its ugly head
sufficiently that I believe I cannot avoid discussing it as part of the future
disability rights agenda-the question of whether the Supreme Court
might consider parts of the ADA as exceeding the constitutional
authority of Congress, under newly restrictive standards that the Court
has been enunciating.
As I alluded at the beginning of this article,31 2 when the ADA was
being considered and enacted, it would never have occurred to me (or
anyone?) that there could be any doubt about the constitutional authority
of Congress to enact it. The "Purpose" section of the ADA, that I
drafted, declared a congressional intent to invoke the sweep of
311. Much of the material in this subsection is derived from a portion of a report I wrote
for the National Council on Disability-Supreme Court Decisions Interpreting the Americans with

at
II(F),
subpart
Act,
Disabilities
In addition, the
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2002/supremecourt-ada.htm.
discussion of the sources of constitutional authority recited in the Purposes section of the ADA is
based upon a similar discussion in my treatise on disability and employment law. Robert L. Burgdorf
Jr., DIsABrLrY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) 1995) at

50-53.
312. See supra note 4.
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congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment and to regulate commerce ....
These are the two principal
fonts of congressional power that had been asserted to authorize previous
federal nondiscrimination laws, and the cases upholding their breadth were
staples of any Constitution Law course at the time, including those that I
taught.314
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress power to
31 5
enact "appropriate legislation" to enforce the Amendment's provisions.
Section 5 had been interpreted as an expansive grant of authority that
provides to Congress "the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary
and Proper Clause," 31 6 and for which a similar test, derived from
McCulloch v. Maryland,3 17 was applied-whether a statute "may be
regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, whether it
is, plainly adapted to that end' and whether it is not prohibited by but is
consistent with, the letter and spirit of the [C]onstitution." 31 8 The Supreme
Court had indicated that congressional authority to regulate under Section 5
did not depend on whether the judiciary would find a denial of equal
protection in the absence of legislation, but that the judgment of whether a
particular measure is an appropriate way of implementing Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees was constitutionally delegated to Congress: "It is
not for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is
enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might
'
resolve the conflict as it did."319
In EEOC V Wyoming, 320 the Court had stated that, to uphold a
statute as an exercise of Section 5 authority, the Court must "be able to
discern some legislative purpose or factual predicate that supports the
exercise of that power. ,32 The Court upheld the Age Discrimination Act
of 1967 as an exercise of the interstate commerce power but added dicta
describing the appropriate standards for analyzing Section 5 authority that
had been proffered as an alternative source of authority for the provisions at
issue.322 The Court clarified: "That does not mean, however, that Congress
need anywhere recite the words 'section 5' or 'Fourteenth Amendment' or
'equal protection,' ... for '[t]he... constitutionality of action taken by
Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to

313. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(b)(4).
314. See, e.g., Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upheld Title II of Civil

Rights Act of 1964 as applied to motel as valid exercise of commerce authority); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 370 U.S. 294 (1964) (upheld Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to restaurant as

valid exercise of commerce authority); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (upheld Age
Discrimination in Employment Act as applied to state and local governments as valid exercise of

commerce authority).
315. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5.

316. Id. at art. I, § 8,cl. 18.
317. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819).
318. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,650 (1966) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819)) (upholding section of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as valid exercise of

congressional authority under § 5 of Fourteenth Amendment). See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding other provisions of Voting Rights Act of 1965).
319. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at653.
320. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
321. Id. at243n.18.
322. Id.
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exercise.',323
Title II of the ADA expressly regulates the activities of state and
local governments; 324 such activity constitutes state action and thus seemed
to fall squarely within the broad scope of congressional authority to enact
legislation appropriate to implement the equal protection guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But the power that Congress wields under the
Fourteenth Amendment was thought to be considerably more extensive;
one renowned constitutional commentator had written:
Congress, in the field of state activities and except as
confined by the Bill of Rights, has the power to enact any law
which may be viewed as a measure for correction of any
condition which Congress might believe involves a denial of
equality or other fourteenth amendment rights.325
He added that "the Court has long been committed both to the presumption
that facts exist which sustain congressional legislation and also to deference
326
to congressional judgment about questions of degree and proportion."
In addition to Section 5, Congress explicitly based the authority it
exercised in the ADA on another source of constitutional authority-its
power to regulate interstate commerce. The Constitution gives Congress
power to "regulate commerce... among the several States."3 27 This
provision had come to be recognized as an expansive source of
congressional authority, particularly regarding laws that prohibit various
types of discrimination.3 28 Court decisions interpreting Congress's power
under the Interstate Commerce Clause reflected enormous expansion of that
329
authority and increasing relaxation of the prerequisites for exercising it.
At the time the ADA was enacted, the test the courts applied to determine
whether a particular legislative provision was a valid exercise of commerce
authority was one established in 1981 in Hodel v. Indiana,33 0 where the
Court declared: "A Court may invalidate legislation enacted under the
Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a
congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate
323. Id. at243-44 n.18 (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948)).
324. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(b)(4).
325. Archibald Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
HARV. L. REV. 91, 107 (1966).

326. Id. at 107. See also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Analysis
and Implicationsof a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 496-501

(1991) (suggesting that, in addition to power to regulate activities that constitute state action, § 5 of
Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted as also providing Congress with authority to regulate some
private enterprises that constitute public uses to guarantee equal rights of citizens by prohibiting
discrimination in places open to public).
327. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 3.
328. See, e.g., Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upheld Title I1 of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as applied to motel as valid exercise of commerce authority); Katzenbach v.
MeClung, 370 U.S. 294 (1964) (upheld Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to restaurant as
valid exercise of commerce authority); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (upheld Age
Discrimination in Employment Act as applied to state and local governments as valid exercise of
commerce authority).
329. Id.
330. 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (provisions of Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
protecting "prime farmland" upheld as valid exercise of Commerce Clause authority despite fact that only
.006% of prime farmland protected).
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commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory
means selected and the asserted ends."33'
Each of the pertinent ADA provisions regulates only activities that
are (1) "in an industry that affects commerce, 332 (2) "whose operations
affect commerce, ' 333 or (3) engaged in by an entity that is covered "if the
operations of such entity affect commerce., 3 34 By definition, therefore, the
requirements of Titles I and III of the ADA apply only to activities that
affect commerce. In addition, the ADA findings and committee reports
appeared to provide a solid factual basis for concluding that discrimination
based on disability has a negative impact on commerce. In particular, the
ADA committee reports noted the testimony and Harris Poll results
indicating that discrimination was a major reason for a large majority of
people with disabilities not going to restaurants, grocery stores, movies,
theaters, or sports events 335 and described the drastic economic effects of
discrimination in employment. 336 Such evidence was readily available
under the ADA without even beginning to cull the voluminous testimony
received during congressional hearings, which was a method the Court
resorted to in upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
If there were not a clear indication of the effects on commerce in the
wording of the ADA, the question would become whether the
congressional findings and legislative history of the ADA would establish
the necessary connection between the regulated activities and the effect on
interstate commerce. In reviewing the constitutional validity of provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court had declared that
"formal findings.., are not necessary" and had been willing to look for
evidence of a connection between the regulated activities and an effect on
commerce in testimony received by Congress when it was considering the
legislation.338
The ADA findings, the testimony of witnesses, and other evidence
regarding the economic effects of discrimination against people with
disabilities appeared to exceed greatly the levels held sufficient to establish
a sufficient "nexus" with commerce in previous cases.339 In one of the first
cases to address the issue, the court in Pinnock v. InternationalHouse of
Pancakes Franchisee340 upheld the constitutionality of the ADA against a
variety of challenges and ruled that "[c]ongressional enactment of title III of

331. Id.at323-24.
332. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(A) (definition of employer covered by Title 1). This wording was
patterned on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
333. Id. at § 12181(2) (definition of"commercial facilities").
334. Id. at § 12181(7) (definition of "public accommodation" regulated in Title Ill). The
quoted wording was based on the definition of a public accommodation in Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Id. at § 2000a(b).
335. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6, 10-11 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 34-35 (1990).
336. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 9-10, 16-18 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32-34, 4347 (1990). See also 136 CONG. REc. E1913-14 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
337. Katzenbach v. McClung, 370 U.S. 294, 299 (1964); Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241,252 (1964).
338. Katzenbach, 370 U.S. at 299; Accord Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252.
339. See especially S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6, 9-18 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at
28-47 (1990).
340. 844 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
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the ADA was well within Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce
under the Commerce Clause. 34 1

Well after the enactment of the ADA, however, the Supreme Court
instituted a drastic change in the legal standards governing the legislative
authority of Congress and eventually began to measure the ADA by these
ex post facto standards. In Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett,342 the Supreme Court ruled that suits by employees
of a state to recover monetary damages from the state for violations of
Title I of ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. This result was
influenced in part by the Court's decision the previous year in Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 343 in which it had ruled that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act did not validly abrogate states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits by private individuals. En
route to its decision in Garrett, the Court indicated that, in evaluating
congressional authority to enact ADA provisions as part of its power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court would require that
legislation reaching beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantees must exhibit "congruence and proportionality" between the
constitutional injury being addressed and the means adopted to address
it.344

In considering the constitutional injury addressed by ADA, the
Court indicated that it would apply "rational-basis review"-the lowest
level of equal protection analysis-to state discrimination on the basis of
disability challenged as violating equal protection.345 In applying such
standards to Title I of ADA and as it applies to state employment, the
Court found that the evidence Congress assembled of unconstitutional
state discrimination in employment was inadequate, and that Congress
had not imposed a remedy that is congruent and proportional to the
targeted constitutional violation.
Disability rights activists and scholars were quick to point out the
limited scope of the Garrettruling. On the day that the Court announced
its decision, ADA Watch noted in a Press Release that the ruling does
not: (a) prevent individual suits against a state employer for injunctive
relief; (b) bar suits initiated by the Federal Government for monetary
damages; (c) bar suits for money damages against private employers or
local governments; and (d) apply to Title II of ADA.346 Some of these
limitations are based upon footnote 9 in the Opinion in which the Court
clarified that its ruling did not mean that persons with disabilities have no
federal recourse against discrimination. 347 The Court noted that states
are still subject to Title I standards, and those standards can be enforced
by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private
individuals in actions for injunctive relief. In addition, state laws
341. Id. at 579.
342. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
343. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
344. Garrett, at 531 U.S. 365, quoting City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
345. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
346. ADA Watch, Press Release: Civil Rights Advocates Respond to Supreme Court
Decision, February 21, 2001, http://www.raggededgemagazine.com/dr/garrettadawatchresp.htm.
347. 351 U.S. at 374.
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protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment may
provide additional avenues of redress.
Subsequently, in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. W.
Va. Dep 't of Health and Human Res., 348 the Court reiterated longstanding principles that "[o]nly States and state officers acting in their
official capacity are immune from suits for damages in federal court,"
and that "[p]laintiffs may bring suit for damages against all others,
including municipalities and other political subdivisions of a State." In
another footnote (number 1) at the beginning of its opinion in Garrett,
the Court stressed that it was not addressing whether Title II, "which has
somewhat different remedial provisions from Title I," is appropriate
legislation under Section 5.349 Of course, one can only speculate the
extent to which some of the analysis the Court applied to Title I in
Garrett may nonetheless affect the analysis of Eleventh Amendment
immunity under Title II in future court challenges. The direct impact of
the Court's ruling in Garrett is fairly easy to describe, but its longer-term
implications are much harder to determine. It is not unreasonable to fear
that the analytical standards applied to Title I in Garrett will be applied
to bar private suits for monetary damages against states under Title II as
well. The Garrett decision might be but one step on a broader effort by
the Court to restrict congressional authority and to expand the rights of
states that may have serious repercussions for the Commerce Clause
authority also expressly invoked by the Congress in enacting ADA, and
perhaps even to the Spending Clause authority that provides the
constitutional underpinning of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. On the other hand, such threats may be purely speculative,
alarmist, and unlikely. The Garrett decision certainly gives mixed
signals, and has been the subject of much discourse and debate.350
While recognizing limitations on the direct scope of the Garrett
decision, NCD described the decision, shortly after it was announced, as
"another obstacle in the path of people with disabilities," and has
expressed its deep concern that the Garrett decision could initiate a
"slippery slope" that would lead to further restriction of rights
established under ADA.35' More recently, the Council recommended
enactment of a new provision that would make state waivers of immunity
from suits under Titles I or II of the ADA a precondition to the receipt of
"federal financial assistance" under any federal program. 352 This
approach is an attempt to provide the ADA with a Spending Power
foundation and to sidestep Eleventh Amendment problems. One
348. 532 U.S. 598,609n.10(2001).
349. 531 U.S. at 360 n.1.
350. See, e.g., Jaclyn F. Okin, Has the Supreme Court Gone Too Far?: An Analysis of the
University of Alabama v. Garrettand its Impact on People with Disabilities,9 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 663 (2001); Mark A. Johnson, Note, Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett:A FlawedStandard Yields A PredictableResult, 60 MD. L. REV. 393 (2001).
351. NCD, News Release: National Council on Disability Deeply Troubled by U.S.
Supreme Court Decision Limiting Scope ofAmericans with DisabilitiesAct (Feb. 21, 2001).
352. NCD, NATIONAL DISABILITY POLICY: A PROGRESS REPORT (January 15, 2008),
2.1,
p.
59
Recommendation
Chapter
2,
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/Revised-NationalDisabilityPolicy-ProgressReport
.html# 17.
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continues to hope that the existing constitutional foundations will be
found sufficient to sustain our principal civil rights law.
C.

Scientific and TechnologicalAdvances

For most adults, and particularly for those of us born before the
last half of the 20th Century, the pace of scientific and technological
change today is breathtaking. We cannot say we were not warned; way
back in 1970, Alvin Toffler predicted that by the beginning of the 21st
Century "millions of ordinary, psychologically normal people will face
an abrupt collision with the future. Citizens of the world's richest and
most technologically advanced nations, many of them will find it
increasingly painful to keep up with the incessant demand for change
that characterizes our time. 353 The disorientation resulting from "the
greatly accelerated rate of change in society" Toffler called "future
shock. 354 As individuals living in 2008, most of us, other than a few
entrenched Luddites, have arrived at some state of accommodation or
coexistence with technological and scientific progress, whether it be
enthusiastic appreciation, begrudging toleration, or something in
between. For the disability rights movement, however, the relentless and
accelerating advances bring ever-changing challenges, benefits, and
risks, that call for vigilant attention and scrutiny. My technological and
scientific prowess is mediocre at best, so I will not pretend to be
anywhere near the cutting edge in my knowledge and understanding of
complicated technical matters. What I hope to do in this subsection is to
throw out some potential dilemmas, issues, and opportunities that seem
likely to confront us in the future within the limits of my admittedly
confined vision of the technological and scientific future.
1.

Communications and Information Technology

The technologies used in information and communication
products are advancing at an ever increasing rate. Devices
are getting smaller, lighter, cheaper, and more capable.
Electronics are being incorporated into practically everything,
making a wide variety of products programmable, and thus
more flexible. Computing power is increasing exponentially.
What requires a supercomputer one year can be done on a
child's game player 15 years later.355
The quoted language, from the beginning of the NCD's influential
December 2006 report on the impact of information and technology
advances on disability policy, OVER

THE

HORIZON, illustrates the

353. Alvin Toffler, FUTURE SHOCK 9 (Bantam ed. 1971).
354. Id.
at 11.
355. National Council on Disability, OVER THE HORIZON: POTENTIAL IMPACT OF
EMERGING TRENDS IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY ON DISABILITY POLICY

AND PRACTICE (2006) at I.
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dizzying acceleration of changes in such technology.
The report
mentions four technology trends that will have a particular impact on
information and communication technology-increasing computation
power with decreasing cost and size; new interface possibilities;
availability of connectivity and network services nearly everywhere and
in wearable form; and the development of virtual places, providers, and
products.356 Such trends can make communication and information
technology more accessible, less costly, and more effective for users with
disabilities. They represent a two-edged sword, however, because they
may generate significant disadvantages as well.
As NCD has
summarized:
Many of the same technological advances that show great
promise of improved accessibility, however, also have the
potential to create new barriers for people with disabilities.
The following are some emerging technology trends that are
causing accessibility problems.
Devices will continue to get more complex to operate
before they get simpler. This is already a problem for
mainstream users, but even more of a problem for
individuals with cognitive disabilities and people who
have cognitive decline due to aging.
Increased use of digital controls (e.g., push buttons
used in combination with displays, touch screens, etc.)
is creating problems for individuals with blindness,
cognitive and other disabilities.
The shrinking size of products is creating problems for
people with physical and visual disabilities.
The trend toward closed systems, for digital rights
management or security reasons, is preventing
individuals from adapting devices to make them

356. The report uses somewhat more technical and detailed language in describing these
trends:
Increasing computational power, combined with decreasing size and costs;
New interface research in areas such as virtual projected interfaces, speech input and
output, direct brain interfaces, multi modal interfaces, and artificial intelligent agents
that can act as mediators;

Ubiquitous connectivity and network services, including the ability to be in constant
connection with people or services that can provide assistance or augment a person's
abilities-all with technologies that soon will be wearable or incorporated directly
into clothing; and
Creation of virtual places, service providers, and products that can enable a person to
shop, explore, learn, travel, socialize, and work in "cyber space."
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accessible, or from attaching assistive technology so
they can access the devices.
Increasing use of automated self-service devices,
especially in unattended locations, is posing problems
for some, and absolute barriers for others.
The decrease of face-to-face interaction, and increase
in e-business, e-government, e-learning, e-shopping,
etc., is resulting in a growing portion of our everyday
world and services becoming inaccessible to those who
are unable
to access these Internet-based places and
35 7
services.

The pace of change in communication and information technology
engenders a variety of difficulties in the ongoing interaction between
mainstream and assistive technologies, including problems keeping
federal policy current with evolving technology and making an on-going
"business case" for accessible technology.358 Shifts in focus from
traditional telephone networks to internet technologies, and from analog
to digital communication technology are examples of technological
developments that may outstrip policy established in existing laws and
regulations. Questions about ADA coverage of websites, discussed
previously in subsection III.H.3 supra, is another example.
The NCD report examines an array of action items to address
disability policy issues raised by advances in communication and
information technology:
1)
Maximizing the effectiveness of assistive technologies
and lowering their cost.
2)
Maximizing
the accessibility
of mainstream
information and communication technology products, so that
people with disabilities and seniors can use standard
products.
3)
Ensuring access to the Internet and other virtual
environments as to physical places of public accommodation.
4)
Addressing new barriers to the accessibility of digital
media caused by digital rights management, including when
visual and audio rights are sold separately.
5)
Basing all policy regarding information and
communication technology accessibility on consideration of
the business case.
6)

Creating accessibility laws and regulations that are not

357. Id.
at 2-3.
358. Id. at 3-4.
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technology specific, but are based on the functions of a
device; that provide clear guidance as to what is sufficient to
meet the standard; that have requirements indexed to
technologies, as they evolve, using baselines; and that, to the
extent possible, are harmonized with laws and regulations of
other countries for products that are sold internationally.
7)
Ensuring the availability and use by the public of up-todate information about
accessible mainstream technology and
359
assistive technology.
The body of the OVER THE HORIZON report contains extensive,
detailed, and at times quite technical discussion of the significance of
these action items, and of various means and approaches for pursuing
them. Among those aspects of the report that have a more legal flavor,
the report discusses the need for the "broad application and enforcement
of existing accessibility standards, such as Section 255 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Section 508 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. "36o
Section 255361 applies to manufacturers of
telecommunications equipment and to providers of telecommunications
services, and requires them to ensure that such equipment and services
are accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, so long as
doing so is "readily achievable., 362 "Readily achievable," a term derived
from the ADA, means "easily accomplishable, without much difficulty
or expense. ' ' 6 If making a product or service accessible is not readily
achievable, manufacturers or service providers must make their products
or services compatible with adaptive equipment commonly used by
people with disabilities, if that is readily achievable.3 6 Guidelines for
accessibility of telecommunications equipment are issued by the federal
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access
Board), and the requirements of Section 255 are enforced by the Federal
Communications Commission.36 5
As amended in 1998,366 section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 requires all federal agencies to make their electronic and
information technology accessible to people with disabilities. 367 It
applies to agencies whenever they develop, procure, maintain, or use any
type of electronic or information technology; 368 it is not limited to
assistive technologies used by people with disabilities. Covered agencies
must ensure that Federal employees and members of the public with
disabilities have access to and use of information and data, comparable to

359. Id. at 5-6.
360. Id. at 39.

361. 47 U.S.C. § 255.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. §§ 255(b) & (c).
Id. § 255(a)(2).
Id. § 255(d).
Id. §§ 255(e) & (f).
Pub. L. No. 105-220, August 7, 1998, 112 Stat 936.
29 U.S.C. § 794d.
Id. § 794d(a)(1)(A).
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that provided to employees and members of the public without
disabilities, to the extent that doing so does not pose an "undue
burden." 369 When development, procurement, maintenance, or use of
electronic and information technology would impose an undue burden,
the federal agency is required to provide individuals with disabilities the
pertinent information and data by an alternative means of access that
allows the individual to use the information and data.37 ° Section 508
directs the Access Board to develop access standards for this technology
that become part of federal procurement regulations. 371
The IT
Accessibility & Workforce Division of the U.S. General Services
Administration's Office of Governmentwide Policy, which is responsible
for educating federal employees and building the infrastructure necessary
to support Section 508 implementation, operates an official government
Section 508 website-http://www.section508.gov/-where government
employees and the public can find information and resources for
understanding and complying with the requirements of Section 508.372

Additional discussion of the matters discussed in the OVER THE
HORIZON report is beyond the scope of this article, but the report is a
very useful source of information for those interested in emerging and
upcoming issues related to advances in communication and information
technology and its impact on use of such technology by people with
disabilities. At the same time that it issued OVER THE HORIZON, NCD
released another report-THE NEED FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION PROHIBITING TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION
SERVICES DISCRIMINATION 373 -in which it explored the need for

additional legislative and regulatory measures to guarantee equal access
by people with disabilities to evolving high speed broadband, wireless,
and Internet-based technologies. Major topics discussed are federal
disability safeguards, state laws, competitive marketplace failures,
principles of universal service and universal design, emerging
communications technologies, and video programming.374
NCD
presented numerous specific recommendations for legislation and
regulatory changes in the following categories: Communications
Technologies, Video Programming, Universal Service, the Americans
375
with Disabilities Act, and Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act.

369. Id.
370. Id. §794d(a)(1)(B).
371. Id. §§ 794d(a)(2)(A) & (a)(3).
372. See http://www.section508.gov/.
373. National Council on Disability, The Need for Federal Legislation and Regulation
Prohibiting Telecommunications and Information Services Discrimination (2006), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2006/pdf/discrimination.pdf.
374. Id. §§ I-VI.
375. Id. § VII. In regard to the "Universal Service" category, AT&T took a positive step
in March 2008 by publishing its approach to universal design in the interest of encouraging
application communications developers and handset manufactures to address the needs of customers
with disabilities when designing services and products. See AT&T, News Release-AT&T Unveils
Universal Design Approach to Help Developers Meet the Wireless Needs of Customers with
Disabilities:Wireless LeaderAims to Influence Industry- Wide Change and Innovation in the Design
of Wireless Products and Applications, March 13, 2008, available at http://www.att.com/gen/pressroom?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=25327; the text of the document laying out AT&T's
approach is at http://developer.att.com/devcentral/Orphan Docs/Universal Design.pdf.
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2.

Medical and Genetic Developments

If stunning advances have been made in regard to communications and
information technology, developments in medical and genetic spheres,
some already achieved and others apparently just around the comer, are
downright astounding. Medical treatments involving replacements of
joints or vital organs; or reattachment of severed limbs, digits, or even
male sexual organs have become almost routine. Great progress has
been made in identifying portions of the brain associated with particular
functions and processes, enabling new treatments, including finely
targeted surgeries and pharmaceutical treatments. Technology referred
to as "brain pacemakers" involves implantation of a device in the brain
that sends electric signals into the tissue; it has been used to address
conditions that are known to involve malfunctions within the brain, such
as epilepsy, Parkinson's disease, clinical depression, and others.376
While "[i]t used to be considered dogma that a nerve, once injured, could
never be repaired, ''377 ongoing research is considering a wide variety of
methods that hold promise for accomplishing or facilitating the
regeneration, repair, or replacement of nerves; these include stem cell
manipulation, hormone treatments, nerve repair glues, and even silk from
specially engineered silk worms that can be used to bridge the gap across
severed nerves.37 8 Such approaches offer the hope of future treatments
for such nerve-related conditions as retinal damage, multiple sclerosis,
spinal cord injuries, and even problems with nerves in the brain.
New medications continue to proliferate, although marketing
forces and high prescription drug prices sometimes skew their
Surgical, radiation, and
availability to those who need them.
chemotherapy techniques continue to be refined at a rapid pace. HIV
infection and many forms of cancer are no longer the automatic death
sentences they once seemed to be, and treatments for additional diseases
are likely, if not just around the comer, at least on the horizon. Searches
for additional curative drugs and vaccines continue and many of these
376. See, e.g., Rob Stein, The Potentialof "Brain Pacemakers": Implanted Devices May
Alter Treatment of Many Disorders,THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 6, 2004, A.01; Duke University,
How Brain Pacemakers Erase Diseased Messages, SCIENCEDAILY, May 31, 2007, available at
http://www.sciencedaily.com /releases/2007/05/070530122217.htm. But see Carla Williams, Brain
Device May Trigger Impulsiveness: Brain Implant That Stops Tremors of Parkinson 's Disease May

available at
25,
2007,
Oct.
News,
ABC
Impulse-Control Signal,
Block
http://www.abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=3777610.
377. American Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, Stem Cells Found in
Adults May Repair Nerves, ASBMB TODAY, vol. 3, issue 1, April 2004, at 22.
378. See, e.g., id.; University of Calgary, Pregnancy Hormone Key To Repairing Nerve
Cell Damage, SCIENCEDAILY February 21, 2007, available at http://www.sciencedaily.com
22
/releases/2007/02/070 1071152.htm; Molecules That Guide Nerve Growth May Help Repair
available at
1997,
April
25,
GUIDE,
Spinal Nerves, DOCTOR'S
Damaged
http://www.pslgroup.com/dg/24942.htm; Composition and methodfor repairingnerve damage and
enhancingfunctional recovery of nerve, Abstract, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Application #
20060083734, Apr. 20, 2006, available at http://www.freshpatents.com/Composition-and-methodfor-repairing-nerve-damage-and-enhancing-functional-recovery-of-nervedt20060420ptan20060083734.php (fibrin glue composition for repairing nerve damage or enhancing
functional recovery of a damaged nerve); Silk Could Help RepairNerves, BBC News, July 12, 2006,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/5172422.stm.
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efforts can be expected to bear fruit sooner or later. Stem cell research
shows considerable promise in potentially providing a renewable source
of replacement cells to treat diseases and other medical conditions.
Nanotechnology is adding to the array of medical possibilities; the
development of tiny devices, including miniature machines, motors,
robots, computers, and even factories, and engineered nanoparticles and
constructed molecules-of a size that make a pinhead gargantuan in
contrast-make it possible to insert such devices and substances in the
body to attack cancers or disease cells, to serve as markers for diagnostic
tests, to deliver medications precisely where needed, to manufacture
missing chemicals or hormones, to open blockages, to reproduce or
repair damaged tissues, to stimulate beneficial cell proliferations,379and to
serve untold other curative, therapeutic, and diagnostic functions.
Very dramatic advances are occurring in the field of genetics. The
mapping of the human genome has accelerated research to identify genes
or groups of genes that cause or are linked to congenital conditions or to
particular diseases, disorders, malformations, or syndromes, or to a
proclivity or predisposition to develop such a condition.38 ° On April 24,
2008, Senator Edward made the following statement on the floor of the
Senate:
Mapping the human genome has provided extraordinary
insights for modem medicine, and it has opened the door to
immense new opportunities to prevent, diagnosis, treat, and
cure disease. Its discovery may well affect the 21st century
as profoundly as the invention of the computer or the splitting
of the atom affected the 20th century.381
According to the Genetics and Public Policy Center, genetic tests are
currently available for over 1,000 diseases, and several hundred more are

379. As with any innovative technology, nanotechnology may bring with it some
undesirable consequences. For example, one study involving mice sounded safety alarm bells when
it documented that "nanotubes," developed for use in a broad array of consumer products, have a
cancer-causing effect similar to the effects of asbestos. See Rick Weiss, Effects of Nanotubes May
Lead to Cancer, Study Says, WASHINGTON POST, May 21, 2008, A2.
380. In a 2002 position paper, the National Council on Disability wrote:
Recent years have brought dramatic scientific advances in the study of human
genetics. Scientists have mapped out DNA sequences in the human body and have
identified many genes that cause disease. Consequently, they have been able to use
genetic testing to identify individuals who may be susceptible to many diseases that
are genetically linked. Tests now exist that are able to detect genetic predispositions
for many diseases and illnesses, such as Huntington's disease, breast cancer, cystic
fibrosis, Alzheimer's disease, colon cancer, and Parkinson's disease. The number of
conditions that may be detected by genetic tests is rapidly growing. While these
genetic advances hold tremendous potential for early identification, prevention and
treatment of disease, they also create opportunities for discrimination against
individuals based on their genetic information, even where individuals have no
symptoms of disease.
National Council on Disability, Position Paper on Genetic Discrimination Legislation (2002),
Introduction,
available
at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2002/geneticdiscrimination-positionpaper.htm.
381. 154 CONG. REC. S3363 daily ed. Apr. 24, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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being developed.3 82 The identification of genes that cause or are linked
to medical conditions opened the door to possible approaches for
achieving genetic corrections, substitutions, and screening. Genetic
screening permits early identification, prevention, and treatment of many
diseases. Would-be parents can assess the likelihood, based upon their
genetic makeup, of passing on problematic genetic conditions to their
offspring, and make informed decisions about whether or not to have
children. Genetic testing has also had an unwelcome side effect of
enabling employers and insurance companies to discriminate against
people with a genetic predisposition to conditions deemed undesirable-a
problem that hopefully has been substantially ameliorated by the recent
enactment of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008,
which prohibits group health plans and health insurers from denying
coverage or charging higher premiums based solely on genetic
predisposition toward a disease, and prohibits employers from using
genetic information
in making hiring, firing, job placement, or promotion
383
decisions.
Apart from genetic screening, other uses of genetic technology and
information have raised astounding, sometimes disquieting possibilities.
I was surprised toward the beginning of the current decade when I
learned that researchers had inserted a gene from a flounder into tomato
plants to make them more tolerant to lower temperatures.384 But
subsequent uses of genetic engineering techniques have made that
experiment seem rather quaint. Radical experimental manipulations of
human genetic material, such as reproductive cloning and the creation of
hybrid and chimera embryos, appear now to be within the range of
scientific capability. British scientists recently reported that they had
produced human-animal hybrid embryos by inserting human DNA into a
hollowed-out cow egg.385 In 2001, news reports indicated that a U.S.
medical institute had pioneered a fertility treatment that, beginning in
1997, had produced the births of "the first genetically altered babies"; the
technique involved injecting the genetic contents of a donor egg from a
fertile woman into an infertile woman's egg along with her mate's
sperm. 386 May 2008 news stories, however, reported the creation of the
"first genetically engineered human embryo" when researchers at Cornell
382. Genetics and Public Policy Center, U.S. Public Opinion on Uses of Genetic
24,
2007),
available
at
Information
and
Genetic
Discrimination
(Apr.
http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/GfNAPublicOpinionGeneticInformationDiscrimination.pdf
383. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (May 21, 2008).
384. CBS News, What Have They Done To Our Food?, (Aug. 9, 2001) ("The U.S.
Department of Agriculture approved a field test to grow the tomatoes with the experimental gene
'based on one identified in the winter flounder.' The idea: The gene that keeps flounders from
freezing in cold water would also keep the tomato fresh in freezing weather. The tomatoes were
sold."),
available
at
grown
but
never
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/02/28/6011/printable275254.shtml.
385. Alok Jha, First British Human-Animal Hybrid Embryos Created by Scientists, THE
at
April
2,
2008,
UK
News
section,
p.
4,
available
GUARDIAN,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2008/apr/02/medicalresearch.ethicsofscience.
386. David Whitehouse, Genetically Altered Babies Born, BBC News Online, May 4,
2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/l312708.stm; CNN.com, World's First
available
at
Genetically
Altered
Babies
Born,
May
5,
2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001frECH/science/05/05/US.genes.
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University inserted a fluorescent protein into a human embryo; as the
embryo cells divided, all the cells glowed.387 In January 2008, a
California biotech firm published an article in which it claimed to have
cloned the first embryos from adult human DNA, by replacing the
nuclear genetic material in unfertilized human eggs with DNA from adult
skin cells, a claim that was met with some skepticism due to a prior
claim of human cloning having turned out to be fraudulent.388
As scientists engaged in genetic engineering become more expert
at the transfer, replacement, or splicing of genes, it is foreseeable that
scientists will learn how to turn off, remove, or replace problematic
genes; or to turn on or insert helpful genetic material. Genetic
engineering can also be used outside the human body to produce
medically helpful substances. The first genetically engineered medicine
was synthetic insulin, produced by genetically altered bacteria to which
genetic material containing directions for insulin-making had been
inserted; the resulting synthetic "human" insulin, a product called
Humulin, was approved by the United States Food and Drug
Administration in 1982.389
The rapidly accelerating proliferation of medical and genetic
advances is undeniable. Critical questions arise as to how these advances
will affect people with disabilities, and how the disability rights will
movement promote policies for the management and control of these
advances to ensure maximum availability of their advantages and
maximum avoidance of their harmful and dangerous effects. Even some
of the most promising and apparently benevolent advances may have
more complicated aspect. Consider techniques for avoiding and "fixing"
impairing conditions. Within the foreseeable future, it is likely that
science will provide a stunning variety of methods for repairing,
ameliorating, and "curing" physical and mental impairments. It will be
possible to repair severed spinal cords and undo damage to nerves; to
destroy tumors or induce them to abate; to regulate levels of insulin and
other internal body chemicals effectively and easily; to correct genebased disorders by genetic manipulation or replacement; to repair or 39°
to
replace almost any body part; to rectify malfunctioning sense organs;
387.
YORK

Andrew Pollack, Engineering by Scientists on Embryo Stirs Criticism, THE NEW
TIMES,

May

13,

2008,

available

at

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/science/13embryo.html?ref=science;
Malcolm
Ritter,
Genetically Modified Human Embryo Stirs Criticism, Associated Press, May 12, 2008, available at
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5jayE9Ru 1pu lb3RQuKGszU6409QD90KBJH0O.
388. Rick Weiss, Mature Human Embryos Created From Adult Skin Cells, THE
WASHINGTON POST, January 18, 2008, at AO1; Arthur Caplan, Human Embryos Cloned: What Does
It Mean?, MSNIC, Jan. 17, 2008, available at http://www.msnbc.rnsn.com/id/22706947; Chris
Williams, US Biotech Firm in New Human Cloning Claim, THE REGISTER, January 18, 2008,
available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/01/18/uscloning-claim/.
389. Lawrence K. Altman, A New Insulin Given Approval For Use In US., THE NEW
YORK

TIMES,

October

30,

1982,

available

at

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res=9800E4D8133BF933A05753C IA9649
48260;
Britannica Online
Encyclopedia,
synthetic human protein, available at
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topicll 312876/synthetic-human-protein.
390. An individual with Usher syndrome, which causes deafness and blindness, provided
the following description of the status of research aimed at restoring vision:
[I]nvestment in retinal degenerative diseases (retinitis pigmentosa, Usher syndrome,
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to eliminate chemically based mental conditions, reverse the genetic
causes of others, and fix malfunctioning brain cells, tissue, connections,
and systems; to send nanotechnological machines and materials into the
body to identify malfunctions, deliver medicines, remove obstructions,
perform repairs, manufacture substances, and so on; to scan body parts or
the entire body easily to diagnose the sources of problems (a la Star
Trek); and to attach prostheses directly to nerves so that they can be
controlled in the same manner as our natural joints and muscles. In utero
diagnostic techniques already make it possible to identify a variety of
disorders and abnormalities during pregnancy; as genetic screening
procedures become ever more refined and sophisticated, parents will
have considerably more information about the characteristics and
impairments of their developing fetuses. Smallpox was eradicated
almost 30 years ago; it is likely that pharmacological advances, genetic
manipulation, and nanotechnology will produce many additional
vaccines and other medical substances to prevent disability-causing
diseases.
The positive side of many of these developments and innovations is selfevident. Curing cancer; reversing paralysis; eliminating tuberculosis,
leprosy, and malaria; and correcting the organic causes of many mental
health conditions, for example, would seem to be achievements that
nearly everyone would applaud enthusiastically. The elimination of
polio, now found in only 4 countries in the world, is well within reach;
why would anyone lament its final eradication? Some day soon we will
hopefully have the same success with vaccines for such conditions as
HIV, lupus, influenza, perhaps even cancer. The possibility of avoiding,
curing, or reversing most disabling conditions is, however, not totally
without downside or controversy; some of its implications raise grave
and thorny issues for the disability rights movement in the already
emerging future. Many people with disabilities recognize that there are
positive aspects to having a disability; in "Tell Them I'm a Mermaid," a
musical about women with physical disabilities, a quadriplegic character
observes of having a disability, "If everyone could do it, and come out
able-bodied, I'd really recommend it.", 39 1 But given the choice, most

macular degeneration, and glaucoma among others) is paying off-there are a few
treatments in FDA-approved Phase I and 11 trials, and a dozen more treatment
strategies are poised to make the leap from animal models into human trials. Other
researchers are close to unlocking the secret of protein structures and processes
within the photoreceptor cells in the retina-the very cells that make us see-and
whose slow deaths lead to progressive blindness in millions of Americans.
These are 21st century, Age of Biology cutting-edge stuff: gene therapy,
stem cell research, nanotechnology. Tiny little capsules inside the eyeball delivering
life-saving proteins to photoreceptor cells. Subretinal injections of embryonic stem
cells into the retinal pigment epithelium layer. Flooding the photoreceptor layer
with sixty trillion "fixed" DNA so these photoreceptors adopt the correct genes for
normal function.
There are sight-saving technologies being tested on humans right now. Real treatments and cures
are not far off. Adam Stone, The End of Deaf-Blindness, DEAFDC.COM BLOG, Mar. 3, 2008,
available at http://www.deafdc.com/blog/adam-stone/2008-03-03/the-end-of-deaf-blindness/.
391. Quoted in John Corry, TV: Singing Of Disabilities of 7 Women, The New York
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would choose to "come out able-bodied," i.e., without their disabilities, if
they could. Not everyone feels that way, however. Are people entitled
not to ameliorate their level of disability, not to cure their curable
disabilities, or not to avoid getting avoidable ones? What about not
preventing, not mitigating, or not correcting disabling conditions in one's
children? Such issues have already arisen, particularly in regard to
deafness.
In the fall of 2002, a county prosecutor and a court-appointed
advocate in a child neglect/custody case asked a family court in
Michigan to order cochlear implants for two deaf children of a deaf
mother on the theory that her failure to approve their having implants
constituted child neglect. 392 For some time, cochlear implants have been
a hot-button issue within the deaf community.393 In the words of one
article, "To most people, cochlear implants sound like a medical
miracle-a device the size of a candy corn that can correct the inability
to hear. But many in the Deaf community see the technology as a
cultural threat, yet another example of the hearing world's inability to
really listen., 394 Actually the notion that such implants can "correct the
inability to hear" is an overstatement, and the procedure entails some
risks as well as potential benefits.395 But the primary objection to the
procedure, particularly to its being pressed on or even imposed on
people, is more central; it stems from a reluctance to being coerced to
become not deaf. I. King Jordan, former president of Gallaudet
University, has said of people who are deaf that "we hold in common this
resentment of efforts to fix US. ' ' 396 In the Michigan neglect case, the

judge ultimately ruled that the court did not have jurisdiction under the
state's child neglect laws to order implants for the two deaf children
whose parents opposed it, because she found that cochlear implants are
at
5,
1983,
available
Times,
December
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9505E5D71 E39F936A35751CI A965948260.
392. In re Kyron and Christian Robinson, Case No.: 01-0702-00 NA, Kent County
(Michigan) Circuit Court, Family Division (unreported decision), October 4, 2002; discussed in
American Association of People with Disabilities, Press Release-Grand Rapids Cochlear Implant
AAPD
NEWS,
available
at
http://www.aapdCase,
dc.orgfNews/frompres/michcochlearimplantcase.html; Jenny Desai, Falling on Deaf Ears, SCIENCE
1-4,
available
at
http://www.science&
SPIRIT,
January
2005,
pp.
spirit.org/article detail.php?article id=467&pager-3; Cal Montgomery, Mom Can Refuse Sons'
Cochlear Implants, Says

Court, RAGGED

EDGE

MAGAZINE,

Oct. 4,

2002,

available at

Newsflash,
The
Grand Rapids
http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/dm/10_02.shtml#446;
Case:Deciding What Is in "The Best Interests" of Deaf Children-and Whose Decision Should It
available
at
Be?,
COCHLEAR
WAR,
October
4,
2002,
http://www.cochlearwar.com/newsflash/003a.html.
393. See, e.g., Carol Padden and Tom Humphries, INSIDE DEAF CULTURE, ch. 1, 166-70
(Harvard 2005) (discussing problems of cochlear implant surgery from Deaf culture perspective);
Maya Sabatello, Disability, Cultural Minorities,and InternationalLaw: Reconsidering the Case of
the Deaf Community, 26 WHITTIER L. REv. 1025 (2005); Amy Elizabeth Brusky, Making Decisions
for Deaf Children Regarding CochlearImplants: The Legal Ramifications of Recognizing Deafness
as a Culture Rather than a Disability, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 235 (1995).
394. Jenny Desai, Fallingon Deaf Ears, SCIENCE & SPIRIT, January 2005, p. 1, available
at http://www.science-spirit.org/article-detail.php?articleid=467&pager=3.
395. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 103
MICH L REV.217, 220-21, 240-42 (2004); Jane E. Brody, For Some Who Lost Hearing,Implants
Help, THE NEW YORK TIMES D7 (Oct 3, 2006).
396. 1.King Jordan, The GallaudetExperience: Deafness and Disability, 120 PUB. MOD.
LANG.ASSOC. 625, 626 (2005).
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elective surgery, and that the children's hearing loss did not pose a
medical emergency. 397 But the issue of forcing parents to have their
children's hearing impairments reduced, whether it be by cochlear
implants, hearing aids, or treatments or technologies developed in the
future, is one that may persist and have to be addressed by the disability
advocacy movement.
The rights of parents have begun to come into conflict with
societal pressures to avoid deafness in children in another context-that
of embryo screening. In May 2007, the UK's Secretary of State for
Health presented the Parliament the government's draft of a Human
Tissues and Embryos bill that overhauled UK law on embryo research
and assisted reproduction; it included a provision requiring that, in
choosing reproductive cells, selecting a woman from whom an embryo is
to be taken, and in deciding between embryos to be placed in a woman,
persons and embryos not known to have a genetic abnormality with a
significant risk of causing a disability, serious illness, or other serious
medical condition must be preferred over those known to have such an
abnormality.398
Describing the rationale for this provision, the
Explanatory Notes accompanying the draft bill mentioned that "[t]here
have been reported cases, outside the UK, involving the positive
selection of deaf donors in order deliberately to result in a deaf child.
The new section... would prevent this." 399 Some deaf advocates
opposed the provision, arguing that deaf parents should have the option
of choosing to have a child who is deaf if they so choose.40 0
As this article was going to press, the legislation, renamed the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill," was still pending in
Parliament, with a slightly differing wording of the preference for
persons and embryos not having abnormalities entailing a risk of "a
serious physical or mental disability.

' 40 1

Perhaps because of the 2007

version's Explanatory Notes focus on deafness, much of the continuing
debate, both pro and con, has centered on this condition,40 2 but some in
397. See authorities cited supra note 369.
398. Department of Health, Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill (May 2007), Part 2, at
11-12,
sec.
21(4),
available
at
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/PublicationsPublicationsLegislation/DH-074718

399. Id. at 100, Explanatory Notes, para. 66.
400.
SUNDAY

See, e.g., Sarah-Kate Templeton, Deaf Demand Right to Designer Deaf Children,
TIMES,

December

23,

2007,

available

at

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/health/article3087367.ece.
401. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, House of Lords, Bill 70 07-08, Part 1, sec.
14(4) ("(9) Persons or embryos that are known to have a gene, chromosome or mitochondrion
abnormality involving a significant risk that a person with the abnormality will have or develop (a) a serious physical or mental disability,
(b) a serious illness, or
(c) any other serious medical condition,
must not be preferred to those that are not known to have such an abnormality."), available
at http://www.publications.parliamentuk/pa/cm20078/cmbills/070/2008070.pdf. For a summary of

the
bill
and
its
status, see
http://services.parliament.ukbills/200708/humanfertilisationandembryology.html.
402. See, e.g., Malaika Bova, No to "Deaf' Embryos: New Fertility Bill Would Make It
Illegalfor DeafBritons to Choose "Deaf' Embryos, March 17, 2008, (quoting chairman of British
Deaf Association linking preference for certain physical characteristics to "eugenic bias"), available
at http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Story?id=4464873&page=l; RNID [Royal National Institute for
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the disability community have noted its broader implications for
embryonic conditions linked to other disabling conditions.
One
commentator with a disability has suggested an inconsistency between
disability nondiscrimination initiatives and the pending legislation:
"Whilst the Disability Discrimination Act says that we disabled folk
should have equal rights and status, the HFE bill is effectively negating
those rights by saying that we should seek to avoid the likes of us being
here in the first place., 40 3 An editorial in DISABILITY Now magazine
noted that the result of the legislative provision will be that "when
embryos are being selected for IVF, if there is a choice between those
carrying the possibility of inherited impairment and those with no such
possibility, the ones carrying no risk will always, automatically and
incontrovertibly be preferred., 40 4 "What it represents in practice,"
according to the publication, "is nothing short of eugenics, or at least the
thin end of a eugenics wedge. It's clearly a move to engineer out
congenital impairment. What it also represents is the abolition of
choice. 4 °5 Some disability organizations, however, have focused more
on the research possibilities for people with disabilities that would be
enabled or limited by the UK legislation, rather than on its implications
for parental choices and avoidance of births of people with certain
disabilities 4. 06
The aim of this discussion of embryonic selection related to
disability is not to suggest how to resolve the issues, nor even to identify
all of their dimensions and implications. The objective is simply to
recognize the emergence of questions surrounding the possibility of such
selection as very significant ones that the disability rights movement is
going to have to grapple with increasingly in the not-too-distant future.
And it affords a peek at the broader implications of advances that raise
the possibility of eliminating or "curing" some disabilities. While many
people with various types of disabilities would jump at the chance to
have their impairments removed or remedied, and to avoid saddling their
children with such conditions, the examples arising from the "deaf
culture" perspective make it clear that not all people with disabilities see
things that way. We have yet to explore in any systematic way which
Deaf and Hard of Hearing People], Briefing on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill,
December 2007 ("we do support selection of hearing embryos for implantation after [preimplantation
genetic
diagnosis."),
available
at
http://www.mid.org.uk/VirtualContent/95457/briefingonthe humanfertilisationand-embryolog
y-.bill dec_.2007.pdf; RNID, RNID Comment on IVF Embryo Debate-11 January 2008 (Jan. 15,
2008) (quoting RNID chief executive Jackie Ballard: "Decisions about which embryo to implant are
for parents and their clinicians, but RNID does not support the selection of a deaf embryo for IVF
implantation
where
a
hearing
embryo
is
available."),
available
at
http://www.mid.org.uk/mediacentre/press/2008/ivf embryodebate.htm.
403. Rebecca Atkinson, We Can Screen Abnormalities Out Before Birth, But Should We?,
BBC-Ouch!
[disability
website],
January
28,
2008,
available
at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ouch/closeup/designing-babies.shtml.
404. Editorial, As Complex as Life and Death, DISABILITY Now, April 2008, available at
http://archive.disabilitynow.org.uk/search/z08_O4_Ap/omplex.shtml.
405. Id.
406. See, e.g., Muscular Dystrophy Campaign, MDC Statement on the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Bill, March 14, 2008 (advocating amendments to permit development of new
therapies for neuromuscular conditions through stem cell research), available at
http://www.muscular-dystrophy.org/news/mdc_statement__I.html.
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other conditions considered disabilities may give rise to similar
reluctance to being "fixed." Some persons with autism, particularly
those falling in the Asperger syndrome spectrum, have been vocal in
their desire not to be considered ill or defective or in need of healing or
cure. An early autism-rights pioneer wrote the following:
It is not possible to separate the autism from the person.
Therefore, when parents say, "I wish my child did not have
autism," what they're really saying is, "I wish the autistic
child I have did not exist and I had a different (non-autistic)
child instead." Read that again. This is what we hear when
you mourn over our existence. This is what we hear when
you pray for a cure. This is what we know, when you tell us
of your fondest hopes and dreams for us: that your greatest
wish is that one day we will cease to407be, and strangers you can
love will move in behind our faces.
More recently, an activist with Asperger's has challenged, on his website
for those with Asperger's and autism, the "myth" that people with autism
want to be cured: "Most autistics, in fact, do not want to be cured
because they've already accepted autism as part of their personality,
Some people with autism display
identity, and lifestyle. 40 8
extraordinary skills in certain areas, such as the "savant" abilities of the
character Dustin Hoffman played in the movie "Rain Man." A man with
Asperger syndrome wrote an extensive essay describing "Traits,
Diagnosis, and Social Aspects" of the syndrome, in which he noted that
"[t]here are both negative and positive sides to having the sociological
disorder known as Asperger Syndrome," and suggested that "[a]n
interesting and positive trait that people with Asperger Syndrome have is
that they develop unique interests and become highly intelligent
especially in their main area of interest., 40 9 Because of such positive
aspects, many people with Asperger's live satisfying lives and would not
choose to give up the advantages for the disadvantages if they had the
choice.41 °
Mourn for
Us
(1993),
available at
407.
Jim
Sinclair,
Don't
http://web.syr.edu/%7Ejisincla/dontmoum.htm; originally published in OUR VOICE, the newsletter
of Autism Network International, vol. 1, no. 3, 1993; quoted in Andrew Solomon, The Autism Rights
May
25,
2008,
available
at
Movement,
NEW
YORKER
MAGAZINE,
http://nymag.com/news/features/47225/. In an earlier essay, Jim Sinclair had written of his autism,
"my personhood is intact. My selfhood is undamaged. I find great value and meaning in my life,
and I have no wish to be cured of being myself. If you would help me, don't try to change me to fit
your world." Jim Sinclair, Bridging the Gaps: An Inside-Out View of Autism (Or, Do You Know
What I Don't Know?), available at http://web.syr.edu/%7Ejisincla/bridging.htm; previously
published in HIGH-FUNCTIONING INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISM, edited by Eric Schopler and Gary B.

Mesibov (Plenum Press, New York, 1992).
408. Alex Plank, Ten Myths about Autism-Debunked, posted on Sunday, February 24,
2008, at http://www.wrongplanet.net/article36I .html.
409. Andrew Watts, Traits, Diagnosis, and Social Aspects of Asperger Syndrome (1999),
available at http://srl2.tripod.com/andrew/asperger.htm. Watts went on to ascribe to Asperger's his
"rather high IQ," his academic success, and his particular expertise and extensive knowledge in his
areas of particular interest, including languages, science fiction, and the study of squirrels. Id.
410. Recently, an activist with Asperger's observed that, while people with diagnoses of
autism and Asperger's may have problems with social interaction, "[W]e are not incapable of it and
can succeed and thrive on our own terms when supported, accepted, and included for who we are."
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While deafness and autism have been the focus of the lion's share
of discussions of people wishing not to have their conditions eliminated
or "cured," some individuals with various other kinds of impairments
have voiced similar sentiments. Examples include individuals with such
conditions as vision impairments, 4 11 bipolar disease, 4 12 and Down
syndrome,4 13 and people who use wheelchairs.4 14 An article about
attorney and author, Harriet McBryde Johnson, one of the giants of
disability advocacy, whose degenerative neuromuscular disease caused
her to use a wheelchair, noted that "Johnson doesn't want to be cured.
While she needs help to bathe and get dressed, she said she can't imagine
living any other way and thinks it would be weird and lonely to do these
things alone," and quoted her as declaring that "[m]ost people see
disability as a tragedy or a misfortune-something to be scared of. It can
be those things, but not necessarily. It is much more complicated and
interesting than that. . .. "Our lives are as rich and full as any
other .... ,,415
The examples discussed are not necessarily representative of the
views of most people having the specific conditions. They do serve to
illustrate, however, that there can be no automatic assumption that each
individual with a disability would welcome the chance to become
Andrew Solomon, The Autism Rights Movement, NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, May 25, 2008 (quoting
Ari Ne'eman), available at http://nymag.com/news/features/47225/.
411. For a thoughtful examination of the questions raised by new genetic therapy that
might reverse her progressive sight loss, see Rebecca Atkinson, Do I Want My Sight Back?, THE
GUARDIAN,
July
17,
2007,
available
at
http://lifeandhealth.guardian.co.uk/health/story/0,,2128104,00.html. Cf. Adam Stone, The End of
Deaf-Blindness, DEAFDC.COM BLOG, Mar. 3, 2008 ("Unlike the majority of Deaf people who refuse
any treatments for their deafness, I have a hunch that most people with Usher are definitely going to
take advantage of sight-saving and sight-restoring treatments as soon as they become available."),
available at http://www.deafdc.com/blog/adam-stone/2008-03-03/the-end-of-deaf-blindness/.
412. See, e.g., Jeremiah Horrigan, To Those Who Are Bipolar, It Isn't a Disease-It's a
Gift, TIMES HERALD-RECORD, June 05, 2005 (describing the perspective of a man with bipolar
condition as follows: "He has a treatable disease. There's a vast pharmacopeia of treatments
available to him. He can be cured. But [he] doesn't want to be cured, at least not in the all-ornothing way science holds out for him. He feels he has a gift. A dangerous gift, to be sure, one that
needs
what
he
calls
cultivation
and
care."),
available
at
http://archive.recordonline.com/archive/2005/06/O5/jhpolorw.htm.
413. A book dictated by two young men with Down syndrome provided a dramatic
description of conflicting viewpoints about having the condition, as follows: "Mitchell: 'I wish I
didn't have Down syndrome because I would be a regular person, a regular mainstream normal
person.... I feel that ... having Down syndrome, there's more to it than I expected. It was very
difficult but... I was able to handle it very well.' Jason: 'I'm glad to have Down syndrome. I
think it's a good thing to have for all people that are born with it. I don't think it's a handicap. It's a
disability for what you're learning because you're learning slowly. It's not that bad."' Jason
Kingsley & Mitchell Levitz, COUNT US IN (1994), ch. 4, p. 26. Studies indicate that some 7 to 10%
of expectant parents informed that their embryo has Down syndrome choose to give birth. Amy
Harmon, Prenatal Test Puts Down Syndrome in Hard Focus, NEW YORK TIMES, May 9, 2007,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/us/09down.html?-r=l &pagewanted-print&oref=slogin;
C.
Mansfield, S. Hopfer, & T.M.Marteau, Termination Rates After Prenatal Diagnosis Of Down
Syndrome, Spina Bifida, Anencephaly, and Turner and Klinefelter Syndromes: A Systematic
LiteratureReview, PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS, vol. 19, no. 9 (Sept. 1999) at 808.
414.
See, e.g., Michelle Wright, Smashing Stereotypes of Disabled People,
GREATREPORTER.COM, January 12, 2005 (quoting wheelchair user's declaration "I don't want to be
cured, I want to be accepted."), available at http:llgreatreporter.com/mambocontent/view1326/14/.
415. K.J. Lang, Speaker Says Disability is Not a Tragedy, LA CROSSE TRIBUNE, April 14,
2008, available at http://www.lacrossetribune.comlarticlesl2008l04/14/news/zO4speakerl4.txt.
Sadly, Harriet MeBryde Johnson died on June 4, 2008.
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nondisabled. Comprehension of this fact underscores the importance for
the disability community of supporting individual preferences and selfdetermination, and resisting coercion and societal pressure. Recognition
that "society has frequently made it clear that it believes [people with
disabilities] would be better off dead, or better that they had not been
born" and of "[t]he pressures upon people with disabilities to choose to
end their lives, and the insidious appropriation by others of the right to
make that choice for them" has led the National Council on Disability to
oppose legalization of assisted suicide at the current stage of societal
development.4' 6 The disability rights community has long embraced as a
key aspect of full participation for people with disabilities the right of
self-determination--of exercising full freedom of choice, 4 17 and this right
certainly applies to the very basic right of deciding whether or not to
retain one's disability, if such a choice is available.418 With the
likelihood increasing over time that such a choice will become a realistic
option, it is reasonable to expect that people with disabilities will be
subjected to growing pressure to exercise it to relieve society of what
many might think of as the "problems" associated with disability. The
disability rights community is going to need to get on top of these
developments and try to ensure that any such choice is made freely,
based on adequate information, without coercion or duress.
While decisions whether or not to cure, eliminate, or ameliorate a
disabling, or potentially disabling condition, are, like other matters of
416. National Council on Disability, Assisted Suicide: A DisabilityPerspective, March 24,
1997, available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/1997/suicide.htm; reissued June 9,
2005, http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2005/pdf/assisted-suicide.pdf.
417. See, e.g., Center for Independent Living, Independent Living: The Right to Choose, in
DISABLED PEOPLE AS SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS 248 (Eisenberg, Griggins, & Duval, eds., 1982) ("full
freedom of choice"); ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 11, at 83-84 (1983) ("self-choice,"
"right to self-determination," and "exercising full freedom of choice"); Gini Laurie, Independent Living
Programs,22 REHABILITATION GAZETTE 9-11 (1979) ("deciding one's own pattern of life-schedules,
food, entertainment, vices, virtues, leisure, and friends. It is freedom to take risks and freedom to make
mistakes"), quoted in ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 11, at 83; Gerben Dejong,
Independent Living: From Social Movement to Analytic Paradigm, 60 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. &

REHABILITATION 435-46 (1979) ("[T]he mark of one's humanity is the right to choose for good or evil.")
(quoted in ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 11, at 85); Joseph P. Shapiro, No PITY: PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CiVI RIGHTS MOVEMENT at 51-52 (1993) ("the control a disabled
person ha[s] over his life") (discussing insights of independent living pioneer Ed Roberts).
418. The discussion of expected medical and technological advances in the subsection
should not obscure the fact that the timetable for the real-life application of many such advances is
uncertain, and many such "curative" procedures will arrive too late to make a difference for many of
us. Indeed, some disability advocates have bridled at the futility of people waiting around for a
"cure" that may never come instead of learning to live with one's impairments. This was one of the
bases of criticism of the campaign for a cure for spinal cord injuries by the late actor Christopher
Reeve, and particularly of his 2000 Super Bowl ad which contained a computer-simulated portrayal
of Reeves getting out of his wheelchair and walking. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Restoration,
Reality and Christopher Reeve, TIME MAGAZINE, Feb. 14, 2000 ("The false optimism Reeve is
peddling is not just psychologically harmful, cruelly raising hopes. The harm is practical too. The
newly paralyzed young might end up emulating Reeve, spending hours on end preparing their bodies
to be ready to walk the day the miracle cure comes.... These kids should instead be spending those
hours reading, studying and preparing themselves for the opportunities in the new world that high
technology has for the first time in history made possible for the disabled. They can have jobs and
lives and careers. But they'll need to work very hard at it. And they'll need to start with precisely
the psychological acceptance of reality that Reeve is so determined to undermine."), available at
Regarding the negative
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,996064-2,00.html.
consequences of the "cure" perspective, see generally, Mary Johnson, MAKE THEM Go AWAY:
CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER REED & THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS, particularly at

128-133 (2003).
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medical decision-making, generally considered to be questions of
personal choice for legally competent individuals who have reached the
age of majority, 4 19 questions of legal authority for such decision-making
become a bit more complicated when the person making the decision is
not the person who has or is at risk of having the condition, but is instead
a parent in the position of making the decision for a child. Federal law
authorizes grants to states and creates eligibility requirements, inter alia,
to "prevent the withholding of medically indicated treatment from
In the absence of a
disabled infants with life-threatening conditions. ,,420eneoa
life-threatening emergency, the law has traditionally required parental
consent before medical procedures can be performed on a child,421 and
accordingly generally honors parental refusals to consent to non-life-ordeath treatments. Under their parenspatriaepower, states may override
personal
and parental
decision-making
authority in certain
circumstances, as, for example, through laws requiring certain
vaccinations 422 and prohibiting child labor. 423 The Supreme Court has
recognized the authority of states to interfere with parental discretion
when the exercise of such discretion may adversely affect the health of a
minor.424
While recognizing "broad parental authority over minor
children," the Court has declared that "a state is not without
constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children
when their physical or mental health is jeopardized,, 425 and that parents'
decision-making authority over their children may be contested or
overridden "if it appears that the parental decision will jeopardize the
health and safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social
burdens. 4 26
Many state statutes include deprivation of medical
treatment as a form of child neglect.427
419. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 157 (2008) ("[E]very
individual of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body and to control the course of his medical treatment. This right to determine may be set aside
only in narrow circumstances, including those in which the patient presents a danger to himself or
other members of society or engages in dangerous or potentially destructive conduct within an
institution.") (footnotes omitted).
420. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(iii).
421. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 160 (2008) ("[T]he
law requires the consent of a parent to a surgical procedure on a child. However, a physician is not
required to obtain consent before treating a child if an emergency exists and threatens the life of the
child.") (footnotes omitted).
422. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (upholding constitutionality of a
state law requiring smallpox vaccinations; the Court declared that "[t]here are manifold restraints to
which every person is necessarily subject for the common good").
423. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
424. Id. at 159-60 ("Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not
follow that they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they
have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.").
425. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 603 (1979).
426. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
427. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-103(1)(u)(i)(D) (2008) (defining a neglected child
as a minor whose guardian "fails or refuses to provide proper or necessary subsistence, education, or
medical care, including surgery or psychiatric services ... or any other care necessary for health,
safety, morals, or well-being"); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012(f)(i)(A) (McKinney [2008?]) (defining
"neglected child" as one whose "condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming
impaired" because of a parent's failure "to exercise a minimum degree of care ... in supplying the
child with adequate . .. medical, dental, optometrical, or surgical care"); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.01(43)
(2007) ("'Neglect' occurs when a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of, necessary
food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment .... ").
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As options for correcting, eliminating, and lessening the effects of
disabling conditions become more available, the question arises whether
a parent's refusal to authorize such a procedure will come to be
considered child neglect. The choice of the deaf mother in Michigan not
to authorize cochlear implants was held, as discussed above, to be a
matter of parental choice, since it was elective surgery and there was no
428
serious medical emergency. Will courts apply such a hands-off policy
in other circumstances for corrective procedures that have become
routine, and for which the consequences of non-treatment may be
dramatic?
Embryonic selection and genetic modification raise similar and
other questions. Countervailing concerns come into play and open up
various policy directions for the future. On the one hand, an important

strand of American law, arising out of such issues as miscegenation,
sterilization, abortion, and contraceptive choices, holds that Americans

have

a right to make

reproductive

decisions

free

from

state

429

interference.
This perspective has led some scholars to propose that
courts recognize the right to select the DNA of one's offspring as a legal
and constitutional right.43 ° On the other hand, society has, or may think
it has, numerous reasons for wanting to avoid avoidable disabilities. The
Human Fertilisation and Embryology legislation in the UK, discussed
above, would make it illegal to choose an embryo with a substantial risk

of having a disability when another embryo is available. Will such a
rationale take hold in the United States? The author of one law review
article observed: "The birth of a child with genetic disability used to be
regarded as an acceptable risk of reproduction. Today, any diagnosable
departure from genetic normality is increasingly viewed as the fault of
doctors who failed to offer genetic testing, or of parents who refused

428. In various situations, courts have overridden parental medical decision-making in the
interest of the child's health and well-being. For a survey and discussion of the case law, see John
Alan Cohan, Judicial Enforcement of Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Patients, 39 Creighton L.
Rev. 849, 860-872 (2006).
429. See Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the
Egalitarian Ethos, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 574-575 (2007).
430. Id., citing Ronald Dworkin, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 148, 158 (1994) (suggesting the Supreme Court
presupposed principle of procreative autonomy in denying the state the specific power to criminalize
contraception); John A. Robertson, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 38-39 (1994); John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families,and ProcreativeLiberty: The
Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 1040 (1986) (predicting that
procreative liberty with minimal regulation will legally prevail); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a
ConstitutionalRight to Clone?, 53 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 987 (2002). (conceding that restrictions
on cloning should survive constitutional scrutiny, but arguing that many of the rationales for banning
cloning are based on ignorance and myth); Joshua Kleinfeld, Tort Law and In Vitro Fertilization:
The Needfor Legal Recognition of "ProcreativeInjury, 115 YALE L.J. 237, 237 (2005) (arguing that
tort law should recognize and protect parents' procreative interests); Michael Malinowski, Choosing
the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics Past-Presentand Future?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 125
(2003) (suggesting that laws governing human reproduction should not unduly burden the
procreative liberty of prospective parents); John Harris, Rights and Reproductive Choice, in THE
FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION: ETHICS, CHOICE, AND REGULATION 5, 34 (John Harris & Soren
Holm eds., 1998); Rosamund Rhodes, Ethical Issues in Selecting Embryos, 943 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. Sci. 360, 367 (2001) (arguing that parents should be free to choose the sex of an embryo to
implant); John Harris, Clones, Genes and Human Rights, in THE GENETIC REVOLUTION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 88-94 (Justine Burley ed., 1999 (arguing that parents should be free to clone
existing people to produce new children).
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such tests, or who proceeded with the pregnancy after receiving negative
results. 43' In some states, the birth of a child with a genetic disorder can
give rise to a suit against a physician, referred to as a "wrongful life"
action, if an error in prenatal testing resulted in the parents not being
informed about the disorder.432 With the increasing use and acceptance
of pre-natal testing, the pressures on parents not to give birth to a child
whom they know will have a disability can only increase,433 and it is
surely not far-fetched to think that knowingly giving birth to a child with
a disability could become a basis for child neglect charges or wrongful
birth actions against parents on behalf of the child with a disability. In
any event, these kinds of possibilities are ones that the disability rights
community is going to have to prepare to take positions on and debate.
An obvious result both of pressures on parents and whatever legal
constraints may emerge on producing embryos or giving birth to babies
with disabilities is that the number of children born with some kinds of
disabilities can be expected to decrease dramatically. On top of that, as
more preventive, curative, restorative, and ameliorating techniques are
developed, the numbers of people continuing to live with some
disabilities will surely be reduced. Whether the numbers of people with
disabilities who currently would die but will in the future be kept alive,
will compensate for some portion of the reduction in disabilities can only
be a matter of conjecture. Through the many types of medical and
genetic advances discussed in this subsection, however, it seems
inevitable that the incidence of some disabling conditions will be
drastically cut. We need to begin to think about the implications for
services, programs, and facilities of diminutions of targeted clientele.
Another concern related to use of medical procedures and
technology is the extent to which the options of parents to impose severe
measures on their children with disabilities ought to be restricted or
regulated. American courts have set limits on the ability of parents to
subject their children to some drastic, irreversible medical procedures,
such as sexual sterilization.4 34 Sometimes, however, parents of children
with disabilities authorize other types of medical treatment for children
with disabilities that most would consider outrageous or draconian if
431. Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineeringand the Egalitarian
Ethos, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 606 (2007).
432. See, e.g., Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Assoc., 108 Ohio St.3d
494, 844 N.E.2d 1160, 2006 Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984); and Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 98 Wash. 2d
460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
433. "If prenatal testing becomes commonplace, and society does little to welcome or
accommodate children with disabilities, then a couple who undergoes carrier screening is apt to be
stigmatized for failing to act on the results, and thus feel compelled to terminate a pregnancy they
would otherwise wish to continue. One American woman whose fetus was found to have a genetic
mutation remarks: "I felt that others would be shocked to learn that we had produced an abnormal
baby, that we would be outcasts." Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering
and the EgalitarianEthos, 33 Am.J.L. & MED. 567, 606-607 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
434. See, e.g., Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 366 (D. Conn. 1978) (parents do not
have authority to give consent for sterilization of their children with disabilities); A. L. v. G. R. H.,
325 N.E.2d 501, 502 (Ind. App. 1975) (common law does not invest mother of child with
"borderline" I.Q. with authority to consent to his sterilization), cert.
denied 425 U.S. 936 (1976); In
re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (absent statutory or judicial authorization,
parents or guardians cannot consent to the sterilization of their children or wards).
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applied to a child without a disability.
A widely publicized,
controversial incident involved the removal of the uterus and breast buds
of a 6-year-old girl with brain damage, and the administration of highdose hormone treatments to close growth plates and stop her growth at 4
feet 5 inches in height and 75 pounds in weight; the procedures were
completed at a Seattle hospital at the request and with the consent of the
girl's parents who referred to her as a "pillow angel., 435 The doctors
involved wrote up the details of the case and the treatment regimen they
administered that they acknowledged was "unconventional, and bound to
be controversial" in an article published in the Archives of Pediatrics &
Adolescent Medicine, in October 2006.436
Controversial it definitely was. A follow-up news report on the
case noted a variety of criticisms: disability rights advocate Arlene
Mayerson of the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund was
quoted as declaring, "Benevolence and good intentions have been among
the biggest enemies of disabled people over the course of history. Many
things done under a theory of benevolence were later seen as
wrongheaded violations of human rights"; medical authorities pointed
out that the doctors had administered an experimental treatment in the
case and that there was no way to know the effect of high-dosage
estrogen on such a young girl; others noted that "for brain-damaged
children, development can come very slowly-so deciding when she's
only six to change a child's body irreversibly can amount to a medical
form of identity theft. Turning people into permanent children denies
them whatever subtle therapeutic benefit comes from being seen as
adults"; Julia Epstein, a disability activist and mother of a disabled child,
commented that "they refer to her as the pillow angel. I know that's
meant to be sweet term, but it's terminally infantilizing"; many
commentators pointed out that instead of radical medical interventions,
what is needed are much better supports, services, and management
options to assist parents in the care of their children with disabilities.437
As it turned out, the treatment was not only "unconventional" and
"controversial," it was illegal. An investigative report issued by the
Washington Protection and Advocacy System in May 2007 found that
the procedure that had been employed, particularly the removal of the
girl's uterus, violated Washington state law. 43 8 The group's executive
director issued a statement in which he declared, "Washington law
specifically prohibits the sterilization of minors with developmental
435.
See Nancy Gibbs, Pillow Angel Ethics, TIME, Jan. 07, 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1574851,00.html; Nancy Gibbs, Pillow Angel
Ethics,
Part
2,
TIME,
Jan.
09,
2007,
available
at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1575325,00.html; Amy Burkholder, Disabled Girl's

Parents Defend

Growth-Stunting

Treatment,

CNN,

March

12,

2008,

available at

http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALT1Iconditions/03/12/pillow.angel/index.html.
436. Daniel F. Gunther & Douglas S. Diekema, Attenuating Growth in Children with
Profound Developmental Disability: A New Approach to an Old Dilemma, ARCH. PEDIATR. &
ADOLESC. MED., vol.160, 1013-1017 (2006).
437. Nancy Gibbs, Pillow Angel Ethics, Part 2, TIME, Jan. 09, 2007, available at

http://www.time.comltime/nationlarticle/0,8599,1575325,00.html.
438.

See, Amy Burkholder, Report: "Pillow Angel" Surgery Broke Law, TIME, May 8,

2007, available at http:/www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/O5/08/ashley.rulingindex.html.
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disabilities without zealous advocacy on their behalf and court
approval. 4 39 The hospital involved acknowledged its error in not
seeking a court order before proceeding with the treatment, committed
itself not to perform any other sterilization procedures, and also pledged
for other procedures involved in its "growth
to seek court approval
' 440
attenuation therapy.
Major lessons of the "pillow angel" case are that children with
disabilities are not the property or playthings of parents, subject to
whatever kinds of medical procedures the parents may desire, and that
appropriate standards and procedures must be put in place to make sure
that parental discretion does not stray beyond an acceptable range. Key
ingredients of the protections that ought to apply in situations where
drastic medical procedures are being considered are those identified in
the Washington investigative group's report-zealous advocacy on
behalf of the child and a requirement of advance court approval.
Procedural protections are sometimes considered cumbersome, but, in
the absence of real medical emergencies, they are our legal system's
proven way to ensure that the best interests of the child are served and
that objective, impartial decision-making is applied to determine whether
extreme medical measures should be permitted. The disability rights
community must advocate for laws and practices that provide such
protections for children with disabilities. Another insight to be gained
from the case is the need for a comprehensive and effective array of
supportive services to assist parents in caring for and nurturing children
with disabilities. Many disability organizations have advocated for
people with disabilities to live at home rather than being forced into
institutional facilities and nursing homes, and yet, all too often,
inadequate support is available to allow families to succeed in providing
a home environment that meets the needs of a child with a severe
disability as well as the needs of other family members. It has become a
clich6 in our society that "it takes a village to raise a child"; it is likewise
true that most families need help to successfully take care of and raise a
child with a severe disability. Recognizing, as our laws do, that
"disability is a natural part of the human experience,' 441 parents of
children with disabilities should not be left alone, like Gary Cooper in
the movie "High Noon," to grapple with the problem all alone while all
others take cover, mumbling "Thank God it's not me." A high priority
of the disability rights community must be to make the problems of
parents of children with severe disabilities the problem of the whole
society instead of the sole burden of the few.
The issues, of which only a smattering have been discussed here,
raised for the future of disability rights by the mind-boggling advances
that have been, are being, and will in the future be made in medicine and
genetics are numerous, complex, and often controversial. It is critical
that the disability rights movement grapples and comes to grips with
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 3001(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 15001(a)(1); 20 U.S.C. §
1400(c)(1).

2008]

Restoring the ADA and Beyond

such issues, and helps to shape the future of the law in this area, so we
may reap, for people with physical and mental impairments, the great
benefits and avoid the potential pitfalls associated with such advances.
3.

Mechanical and Other Technologies

In addition to advances in communications and information
technology, and in medical and genetic developments, the future will
certainly feature innovations in other kinds of devices, machines, and
systems. We can expect better ways of generating and transmitting
power; better batteries and other ways of storing energy; more and better
voice controls, eye controls, and other ultra-high tech control
mechanisms (brain controls?); homes, offices, theaters, and vehicles that
look after, pamper, and make life easy for their users; robots to do things
that people can't or don't want to do; and a hard-to-imagine assortment
of new appliances, gadgets and gizmos (Whatever happened to those
flying cars we were led to expect by now?). Much of this new
technology can be expected to have a major impact on the lives of
Americans with disabilities. Using technology to make things easier will
often mean easier for people with disabilities among others. But as in the
discussion of communications and information technology, supra, unless
the needs of those with physical and mental impairments are considered
in the design and manufacture of these novel doohickeys and
contraptions, the innovations may prove not helpful or even
disadvantageous for those having such impairments. Talking cars or
refrigerators, for example, may be totally useless for a person who
cannot hear them. An otherwise helpful little robot may be bad news if it
moves around silently and creates a dangerous obstacle for a person who
is unable to see it.4 42 It is conceivable that a fully supplied, selfsufficient, and self-contained house of the future may prove to be a
counter-indicated hiding place or virtual prison for a person with
agoraphobia, depression, or social phobia.443
442. And it may be that the very use and application of technology may be problematic for
some people. A few commentators have suggested that certain individuals have an aversion to
technology or computers, referred to by such terms as, respectively, "technophobia" and
"cyberphobia," that can rise to the level of a pathological mental condition. See, e.g., MARK J.
BROSNAN, TECHNOPHOBIA: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1998);
M.J. Brosnan & S.J. Thorpe, An Evaluation of Two Clinically-Derived Treatments for
Technophobia, COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 1080-1095 (2006); S.J.
Thorpe & M.J. Brosnan, Does computer anxiety reach levels which conform to DSM IV criteriafor
specific phobia?, COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR, vol. 23, no.3, pp. 1258-1272 (2007); Shelley
Widhalm, Man Vs. Machine: Advancing Technology Feeds Fears About Control, THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, July 15, 2004 ("Technophobia, a generalized fear of technology, is not
recognized in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders. The DSM, used by psychiatrists and psychologists, describes phobias as a type of
anxiety. The response is one of terror, dread or panic when the feared object, situation or activity is
encountered, the association says.").
443. See, e.g., John McManamy, The Sopranos: Depression, Isolation, and the Mafia
Cure, BIPOLARCONNECT.COM, May 08, 2007 ("Keep in mind that isolating is perhaps the most
dangerous thing one can do in a state of severe depression. Isolation and depression literally feed off
of one another, creating a dangerous and potentially deadly downward spiral."), available at
http://www.healthcentral.com/bipolar/c/15/9317/sopranos-mafia-cure/; Allan Schwartz, Depression
Can Be Hazardous to Your Health, PSYCHCENTRAL, August 30, 2006 ("This sets up a vicious cycle
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An illuminating example of the advantages, disadvantages, and
complexities associated with the impact of new and emerging technology
on people with disabilities is provided by the two-wheeled, selfbalancing electric vehicle unveiled in December 2001 that goes by the
name of the Segway® Personal Transporter (PT).444 A combination of
microprocessors and gyroscopic sensors help to maintain the PT's
vertical orientation as it moves, stops, or encounters changes in the slope
of the terrain it travels over. Described by the company as a "twowheeled, self-balancing, electric transportation device,"4 45 it is
manufactured by Segway Inc. of New Hampshire.
According to the Segway website, the device was an outgrowth of
a project developed with the needs of wheelchair users in mind. 4 6 Once
the PT was created, however, the company did not seek to promote it for
customers with disabilities; a spokesperson for Segway was quoted as
saying that sales to people with disabilities is "sort of like an unsought
market for us at this point-a market we did not seek to retain or build,
but it has come about on its own., 447 Segway's seeming indifference to
marketing to those with disabilities is in fact based upon legal
constraints.4 48 Nonetheless, the "unsought market"-customers with
disabilities-has proven to be significant. An owner of a Segway
dealership in California has indicated that a third of its Segways sales are
to people who need mobility assistance.44 9 Quite a few persons with
various disabilities, particularly those that affect walking more than
standing, have found the PT to function very well as a mobility device. 450
in which isolation feeds depression, leading to anger and resulting in further isolation.... The
sluggishness experienced in depression robs people of the desire to go out and enjoy social events.
The
tendency
is
to
want
to
remain
at
home."),
available
at
http://psychcentral.com/lib/2006/depression-can-be-hazardous-to-your-health?pp=0.
444. See, http://www.segway.com/about-segway/segway-milestones.php.
445. http://www.segway.com/about-segway/index.php.
446. http://www.segway.com/about-segway/who-we-are.php ("One day Dean Kamen saw
a young man in a wheelchair struggling to get over a curb. He thought about it, and realized that the
problem wasn't ineffective wheelchairs, it was that the world was built for people who could
balance. So he and his team created the Independence IBOT'M Mobility System, a self-balancing
mobility device that enables users to climb stairs and negotiate sand, rocks, and curbs.").
447. Rachel Metz, Disabled Embrace Segway, N.Y. TIMES, October 14, 2004 (quoting
Segway
spokeswoman
Carla
Vallone),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/l 0/14/technology/circuits/14segw.html.
448. When Dean Kamen, the inventor of the Segway PT, and his associates came up with
the self-balancing technology used in the Segway, they were working on a project funded by the
Johnson & Johnson company to develop the iBOT, a wheelchair that can go up stairs. Johnson &
Johnson purchased the medical rights to the technology, and got FDA approval for the iBOT as a
medical device, while Segway reserved rights for other commercial uses of the technology. Because
Segway has not gone through the difficult approval process for certification of the PT as a medical
device, it considers itself to be impeded legally from marketing directly to the demographic of
people with disabilities. See id.; John Heilemann, Reinventing the Wheel, TIME, Dec. 02, 2001,
available at http://www.time.com/timelbusiness/article/0,8599,186660,00.html; Selena SimmonsDuffin, Leaning Forward: The Segway's Emerging Role, THE STANFORD DAILY, May 1, 2008,
availableat http://daily.stanford.edu/article/2008/5/l/leaningForwardTheSegwaysEmergingRole.
449. See, e.g., Selena Simmons-Duffin, Leaning Forward: The Segway's Emerging Role,
THE STANFORD DAILY, May 1, 2008 (quoting Steven Steinberg, one of the owners of Segway of
Oakland),
available
at
http://daily.stanford.edu/article/2008/5/l/leaningForwardTheSegwaysEmergingRole.
450. See, e.g., Selena Simmons-Duffin, Leaning Forward: The Segway's Emerging Role,
THE
STANFORD
DAILY,
May
I,
2008,
available
at
http://daily.stanford.edu/arficle/2008/5/lleaningForwardTheSegwaysEmergingRole;
Rachel Metz,
Disabled Embrace Segway, N.Y. TIMES, October 14, 2004 (quoting Segway spokeswoman Carla
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Promoting the use of Segway PTs by people with disabilities was one of
the objectives that led to the founding of an organization named
Disability Rights Advocates for Technology, or DRAFT, that seeks to
"represent[] people with disabilities who refuse to be defined by their
disability and whose passionate enthusiasm for participating in life's
activities is supported by Universal Design and new and emerging
technologies. 4 5'
Through one of DRAFT's programs called
"Segs4Vets," it raises money to provide Segways to U.S. military
veterans with disabilities.4 52 Another organization, ES Riders, donates
PTs to kids with disabilities.453 A group called "Road AccessDisability Alliance" operates a website at which it provides information,
including tips, links to articles and essays, and state-by-state and
disability-by-disability lists, in support of Segway use by people with
mobility impairments.454
The popularity of PTs for persons with mobility impairments has
prompted several federal government agencies, including the U.S.
General Services Administration (GSA),455 the Department of
Transportation,4 56 and the National Park Service 457 to adopt policies
regarding their use. In the Federal Register of June 17, 2008, the DOJ
published notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRMs) regarding some
Vallone), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2O04/10/14/technology/circuits/14segw.html; Scott
Powers, DisabledAdvocates Push Disney World, Seaworld to Allow Segways: Disney and Seaworld
Orlando Cite Visitor-Safety Concerns, ORLANDO SENTINEL, October 13, 2007, available at
http://www.aapd.com/News/transportation/071015os.htm.
451. http://www.draft.org/draft3/.
452.
See, e.g., http://www.draft.org/draft3/Segs4Vets/tabid/85/Default.aspx;
Selena
Simmons-Duffin, Leaning Forward: The Segway's Emerging Role, THE STANFORD DAILY, May 1,
2008,
available
at
http://daily.stanford.edu/article/2008/5/l/leaningForwardTheSegwaysEmergingRole; Rachel Metz,
Disabled Embrace Segway, N.Y. TIMES, October 14, 2004 (quoting Segway spokeswoman Carla
Vallone), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/14/technology/circuits/14segw.html; Scott
Powers, Disabled Advocates Push Disney World, Seaworld to Allow Segways" Disney and Seaworld
Orlando Cite Visitor-Safety Concerns, ORLANDO SENTINEL, October 13, 2007, available at
http://www.aapd.com/News/transportation/071015os.htm.
453.
See, e.g., ES Riders
Donates Segways to
Kids, available at
http://www.segwaytoday.net/SegwayToday/Home.html; Carolyn Dube, Lending Their Hands to "A
Fabulous Organization," Three Bedford Residents Named to Easter Seals Board, Bedford Journal,
Dec.
27,
2007,
available
at
http://www.cabinet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071227/MILFORDO 1/328712748/1/Milford0l.
454. http://www.digitalthreads.com/segway/.
455. General Services Administration, Notice of Interim Policy, Use of Segways® and
Similar Devices by Individuals with a Mobility Impairment in GSA-Controlled Federal Facilities, 73
Fed. Reg. 1223 (January 7, 2008) (permitting individuals with mobility impairments to use Segways
and similar devices in federal buildings under GSA jurisdiction), available at
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/E7-25592.htm; see also, GSA BULLETIN FMR 2008-B3
(December
17,
2007)
(same),
available
at
http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/ogp/SegwayFRNoticeFinal 121107.doc.
456. Department Of Transportation, Disability Law Guidance, Use of "Segways'"on
Transportation Vehicles (Sept. 1, 2005) (transportation providers must permit Segways on a bus or
train, when it is being used as a mobility device by a person with a mobility-related disability),
available at http://www.fta.dot.gov/civilrights/ada/civil-rights-3893.html.
457. Memorandum D24(2420) from Daniel N. Wenk, Director, National Park Service, to
Regional and Associate Directors, Use of Segways by Person with Disabilities in the National Park
System (May 24, 2007) (use of Segways and similar devices by individuals with mobility disabilities
is generally permitted in National Parks, but park superintendents may determine where such devices
would not be appropriate; strong consideration should be given to permitting such mobility devices
in areas where motorized wheelchairs are allowed).
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proposed amendments to its ADA Title 1I (state and local government
entities) regulation 458 and its Title III (public accommodations and
commercial facilities) regulation. 45 9 Among other issues, the NPRMs
discuss proposals relating to power-driven mobility devices other than
wheelchairs and mobility scooters; these alternatives include,
particularly, Segways. In parallel sections and often identical language
of the Title II and Title III NPRMs, the DOJ is seeking public comment
about use by individuals with disabilities of "devices that are not
designed primarily for use by individuals with disabilities, such as
electronic personal assistive mobility devices (EPAMDs)., 4 6' The DOJ
indicates that the "only available model" of an EPAMD it currently
knows of is the Segway, but adds that the Department is aware that
"individuals with mobility disabilities have utilized riding lawn mowers,
golf cars, large wheelchairs with rubber tracks, gasoline-powered, twowheeled scooters, and other devices for locomotion in pedestrian
areas." 461 The DOJ articulated one of its specific concerns as follows:
The fact that the device is not designed primarily for use by
or marketed primarily to individuals with disabilities, nor
used primarily by persons with disabilities, complicates the
question of whether individuals with disabilities should be
allowed to operate them in areas and facilities where other
powered devices are not allowed.4 62
The DOJ announced that it
intends to address these issues and proposes to adopt a policy
that sets the parameters for when these devices must be
accommodated. Toward that end, the Department proposes
new definitions of the terms "wheelchair"-which includes
manually and power-driven wheelchairs and mobility
scooters-and "other power-driven
mobility device" and
463
accompanying regulatory text.
Under the proposed rules, "wheelchair" would be defined as "a device
designed solely for use by an individual with a mobility impairment for
the primary purpose of locomotion in typical indoor and outdoor
pedestrian areas. A wheelchair may be manually operated or powerdriven. ' , 464 The term "other power-driven mobility device" would mean
458. Department of Justice, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Nondiscrimination on the
Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,465 (June 17, 2008)
(hereinafter
"Title
11
NPRM"),
available
at
http://www.ada.gov/NPRM2008/t2NPRM-federalreg.htm.
459. Department Of Justice, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Nondiscriminationon the
Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,508
(June
17,
2008)
(hereinafter
"Title
III NPRM"),
available
at
http://www.ada.gov/NPRM2008/t3NPRM-federalreg.htm.
460. Title II NPRM, supra, at 73 Fed. Reg. 34,473 and Title llI
NPRM, supra, at 73 Fed.
Reg. 34,518.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Title II NPRM at 73 Fed. Reg. 34,474 and Title Ill NPRM at 73 Fed. Reg. 34,518.
464. Proposed new provision of 28 C.F.R. § 35.104, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,504; proposed new
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the following:
any of a large range of devices powered by batteries, fuel, or
other engines-whether or not designed solely for use by
individuals with mobility impairments-that are used by
individuals with mobility impairments for the purpose of
locomotion, including golf cars, bicycles, electronic personal
assistance mobility devices (EPAMDs), or any mobility aid
designed to operate in areas without defined pedestrian
routes.465
In light of the DOJ's belief that "clarification on what the ADA
requires is necessary at this juncture," 4 66 the proposed regulatory text of
the NPRMs sets out some rules regarding the use of mobility devices,
including wheelchairs, scooters, manually powered mobility aids, and
"other power-driven mobility devices"-the category that includes
Segway PTs. 467 Regarding the latter, the proposed regulatory text would
require state and local government entities and public accommodations
to "make reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, and
procedures to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices by
individuals with disabilities, unless the public accommodation can
demonstrate that the use of the device is not reasonable or that its use
,,468 Entities subject to Title II
will result in a fundamental alteration ...
or Title III are further directed to "establish policies to permit the use of
other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with disabilities
when it is reasonable" to permit an individual with a disability to
participate in a service, program, or activity of a public entity, or to
access the goods, services, facilities, or accommodations of a public
The proposed provisions state that what is
accommodation.469
"reasonable" in relation to specific venues is to be determined based on:
(1) The dimensions, weight, and operating speed of the
mobility device in relation to a wheelchair;
(2) The risk of potential harm to others by the operation of
the mobility device;
(3) The risk of harm to the environment or natural or
cultural resources or conflict with Federal land management
laws and regulations; and

provision of 28 C.F.R. § 36.104, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,553.

465. Proposed new provision of 28 C.F.R. § 35.104, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,503; proposed new
provision of 28 C.F.R. § 36.104, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,552.

466. Title II NPRM, at 73 Fed. Reg. 34,481 (commentary on § 35.137), and Title III
NPRM, at 73 Fed. Reg. 34,540 (commentary on § 36.311).
467. Title II NPRM, at 73 Fed. Reg. 34,504 (28 C.F.R. § 35.137), and Title III NPRM, at
73 Fed. Reg. 34,556 (28 C.F.R. § 36.311).
468. Title 11 NPRM, at 73 Fed. Reg. 34,504 (28 C.F.R. § 35.137(b)), and Title III NPRM,
at 73 Fed. Reg. 34,556 (28 C.F.R. § 36.31 l(b)).
469. Title II NPRM, at 73 Fed. Reg. 34,504 (28 C.F.R. § 35.137(c)), and Title IIINPRM,

at 73 Fed. Reg. 34,556 (28 C.F.R. § 36.311 (c)).
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(4) The ability of the [public entity/public accommodation]
to stow the mobility device when not in use, if requested by
the user.4 70
The factors listed in the NPRMs for determining when the use of
Segways (and other kinds of "other power-driven mobility devices") by
persons with mobility impairments is reasonable make clear that the DOJ
does not consider such use to be appropriate in all circumstances. In
some of its commentary on the proposed rules, the Department notes that
not everyone is gung-ho about Segway use in pedestrian areas by people
with disabilities, and that includes even some people with disabilities:
"While some individuals with disabilities support the use of unique
mobility devices, other individuals with disabilities are concerned about
their personal safety when others are using such devices., 471 The DOJ
commented further that "[t]hose who question the use of EPAMDs in
pedestrian areas argue that the speed, size, and operating features of the
devices make them too dangerous to operate alongside pedestrians and
wheelchair users., 472 In 2002, the American Council of the Blind took a
position in opposition to the proliferating use of Segways: "In the end,
the Segway may well have a good use and place in our environment, but
it is clear.., that insufficient attention is being paid to pedestrian safety
and injuries and deaths are not the price we should be paying for
innovation."473 The organization passed a resolution opposing operation
of Segways on sidewalks, based on the following findings:
Such a device, being battery powered, generates very little
noise;
Both the speed of the device and its innate quietness raise
serious pedestrian safety concerns, especially for people with
visual impairments;
These concerns have caused some pedestrian advocacy
groups to strenuously oppose legislation permitting operation
of the Segway on sidewalks; and
Although Segway is exploring methods to increase the noise
made by the Segway and474
to reduce its speed, major safety
exist.
to
continue
concerns
Such concerns have led San Francisco and La Mirada, California,
to ban the use of Segways on sidewalks, and Healdsburg, California, to

470. Id.
471. Title 11NPRM, at 73 Fed. Reg. 34,473-34,474, and Title Ill NPRM, at 73 Fed. Reg.
34,518.
472. Title II NPRM, at 73 Fed. Reg. 34,473, and Title Ill NPRM, at 73 Fed. Reg. 34,518.
473.
American Council of the Blind, Important Pedestrian Safety Alert!,
http://www.acb.org/pedestrian/segway02O806.html.
474.
American Council of The Blind, Resolution 2002-04, July 5, 2002,
http:llwww.acb.orglresolutionslres2002.html#RESOLUTION%202002-04.
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475
prohibit their use on four square blocks in the central downtown area.
While forty-two states and the District of Columbia have passed laws
authorizing use of Segways, six states (Colorado, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New York, North Dakota, and Wyoming) have no
legislation permitting the use of Segways, making such use de jure
illegal in those states.4 76 There is some question about the vigor of
enforcement against people who use Segways illegally, but enforcement
certainly does occur at least sporadically, as witness a New York man
who was stopped by police for operating his Segway in midtown
Manhattan in 2006, and given a citation carrying a $95 fine.477 In 2007,
New York Governor Eliot Spitzer vetoed a bill that would have
authorized the use of Segways on roads and highways outside of New
York City; he argued that the Segway "is not intended or recommended
for primary use on roads," and that such use would be unsafe.4 78 The
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), which
operates the D.C. Metro subway system, refused to allow a woman with
a disability to take her Segway aboard the Metrorail in 2003; after some
bad publicity, WMATA changed its policy and now allows registered
persons with disabilities who use Segways as a mobility device to use
them on the Metro.4 79
Apart from the policies of governmental entities, some private
businesses have taken anti-Segway stances.48 ° Several individuals with
disabilities have alleged that a company called Simon Property Group,
which owns nearly 300 shopping malls in 38 states, has prevented them
from using their Segways at malls owned by the group.481 In at least a

475. Caroline J. Rodier, Susan A. Shaheen, & Linda Novick, Improving Bay Area Rapid
Transit (BART) District Connectivity and Access with the Segway Human Transporter and Other
Low Speed Mobility Devices, Institute of Transportation Studies, California Partners for Advanced
Transit and Highways (PATH), University of California, Berkeley, at 35 (August 1, 2004), available
at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1630&context=its/path.
476. See Governors Highway Safety Association, Segway Laws, available at
http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/segway-laws.html. The website features a chart of all state
laws on Segway use on roadways and sidewalks.
477. Robert F. Moore, NYPD Segways into Future With Mod 2-Wheel Cruisers, NEW
YORK
DAILY
NEWS,
May
17th
2007,
available
at
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2007/05/i17/2007-0517_nypdsegwaysjinto future with mod_2wheel-l.html.
478. See Danny Hakim, Spitzer Says No to Segways on Roads, Among Other Actions on
Legislation,
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES,
August
16,
2007,
available
at
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/16/spitzer-says-no-to-segways-on-roads/.
479. See Metro Bans Disabled Woman's Segway: Transit Officials Cite Safety Concerns,
NBC4.com, May 9, 2003, available at http://www.nbc4.com/news/2193078/detail.html; Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Segways and other ABWCs on Metrorail, available at
http://www.wmata.com/metrorail/segways.cfm; Board of Directors of theWashington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority, Resolution to: Modify WMA TA Tariff to Adopt a Policy Regulating the Use
ofAutomatic Balancing Wheeled Conveyances, Accept D.C. CirculatorTransfers, and ProvideFree
Travel
for
Sheriffs,
adopted
July
21,
2005,
available
at
http://www.wmata.com/metrorail/awbc-policy.pdf.
480. See, e.g., Joe Kollin, Broward Condo Tries To Ban Segway Riders, South Florida
Sun-Sentinel.com,
May 14, 2008, available at sun-sentinel.com/business/realestate/sflflbcondocol0514sbmayl4,0,10704.column
481. See, e.g., Shasta Clark, Local Man Fighting Mall Over Right to Use Segway,
WATE.com, July 26, 2005, available at http://www.wate.com/Global/story.asp?s=3643674; Sarah
Antonacci, Springfield Mall Sued Over Segway Ban, ROCKFORD REGISTER STAR, Gatehouse News
Service, Oct. 9, 2007, available at http://www.rrstar.com/homepage/xl998364676; Michael Hooper,
Man Suing Mall Over Use of Segway, THE (TOPEKA) CAPITAL-JOURNAL, March 13, 2008, available
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couple of instances, these disputes have triggered the filing of suits in
federal courts charging that barring the use of Segways by individuals
with disabilities violates the ADA.4 82 In another incident involving a
Simon Property Group mall, a man with a disability who was using a
Segway was told that he had to leave the mall because but refused to do
so and continued shopping; thereafter, mall officials had a security guard
483
the incident, the
After th
follow him around and shadow his movements.
mall manager issued a statement declaring that "[w]hile we appreciate
the usefulness of the Segway Human Transporter, we simply cannot
compromise the overall safety of our shopping public at our mall. 484
Ironically, Simon Property Group makes extensive use of Segways for its
malls' security staffs.485 According to an item posted on the Segway
website in 2007, in the face of the federal court suit growing out the
incident at the White Oaks Mall in Springfield, Illinois, and the potential
of class-action litigation, the Simon Property Group "decided to reverse
their [sic] former no-Segway policy and allow disabled individuals to use
personal Segways to get around the mall property. 4 86 The lawsuits are
still pending, however.
The most widely publicized lawsuit regarding bans on Segway use
is Ault v. Walt Disney World Co. brought by three people with

disabilities-one with multiple sclerosis, another having Lou Gehrig's
disease (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis), and a third who lost his foot in an
accident-who brought an ADA action against Walt Disney World in
November 2007.487 In February 2004, Disney announced that it had
banned Segway PTs from its theme parks, including Disneyworld,
Disneyland, and California Adventure, stating the PTs had not been
approved by the FDA as medical devices. 488 Disney officials also
at http://www.cjonline.com/stories/031308/bus_256553515.shtml.
482. Wallace v. Simon Property Group, Inc., No. 3:2007cv03123 (C.D. I11.filed May 11,
2007), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-ilcdce/case-no-3:2007cv03123/case id41534/; McElroy v. Simon Property Group, Inc., No. 5:2008cv04041 (D. Kan. filed March 11,
2008), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-ksdce/case-no-5:2008cv04041/case-id65458/.
483. Local Mall Orders Security Guard to Follow Disabled Man on Segway, WATE.com,
October 13, 2005, availableat http://www.wate.com/Global/story.asp?S=3974699.
484. Id.
485. See Simon Property Group Increases Segway® PT Fleet for Security Patrols:
Company Now Has Over 225 Units Deployed At More Than 125 Shopping Malls, Reuters, May 12,
2008 ("Segway Inc. today announced that Simon Property Group has made a substantial purchase of
additional Segway Personal Transporters (PTs)"; Simon already has "the largest deployment by any
at
available
industry."),
center
shopping
the
in
company
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS 131422+12-May-2008+PRN20080512.
486. Segway Use for Disabled OK'd in Illinois Mall, SEGWAY TODAY, available at
http://www.segwaytoday.net/segwaytoday/News/Entries/2007/10/9_Segway-Use-for-DisabledOK
d inIllinoisMall.html.
487. Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., NO. 6:07-CVI785ORL-31KRS, 2008 WL 490581
(M.D. Fla. motion to dismiss granted Feb. 20, 2008), motion to dismiss amended complaint denied,
No. 6:07-cv-1785-Orl-31KRS, 2008 WL 2047930 (M.D.Fla. May 13, 2008). See also Scott Powers
and Jason Garcia, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Disney, Orlando Sentinel, February 21, 2008,
orlandosentinel.com/business/local/newsletter/orl-biznewsat
available
segway022108,0,4592460.story; Associated Press, Disney World Sued Over Segway Ban; Disabled
Plaintiffs Denied Use Two-Wheel Vehicles in Park, Lawsuit Says , MSNBC.com, Nov. 10, 2007,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21724833/.
488. See Associated Press, Anger at Disney over Segway Ban: Disabled Riders Feel Left
2004,
available at
9,
Feb.
MSNBC.com,
Kingdom,
Magic
the
Out
at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4217573; Scott Powers, Disabled Advocates Push Disney World,
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pointed to safety concerns if potentially untrained visitors ride Segways
on crowded walkways where there may be toddlers, elderly persons and
those with sight, hearing, mental, or mobility impairments; and they
expressed concerns about the speed of Segways, much faster than most
motorized wheelchairs, and that Segways may tumble over if the
batteries run out. 4 89 "Our concern has continued to be the safety of all
our guests and cast members," said a Disney spokesperson,4 90 who also
contended that "We're not turning people away. We're turning away a
particular form of transportation." 91 Interestingly, Disney operates a
schedule of guided Segway tours of Epcot, the Fort Wilderness
campground, and the California Adventure Park for a fee, and has many
of its employees use Segways in the parks.492
In the Ault v. Walt Disney World Co. case, the three named
plaintiffs claimed, on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated
persons, that Disney's ban on Segway use by customers at its resort
theme parks violates Title III of the ADA.493 In February 2008, the court
granted Disney's motion to dismiss the complaint in the Ault case on the
grounds that the plaintiffs, seeking injunctive relief, had not adequately
alleged definitive plans to visit Disney World in the future or of "injury
in fact" sufficient to provide grounds for such relief.494 The court gave
the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint.495 On May 13, 2008,
Seaworld to Allow Segways: Disney and Seaworld Orlando Cite Visitor-Safety Concerns, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, October 13, 2007, available at http://www.aapd.com/News/transportation/071015os.htm.

Sea World Orlando also bans PTs for safety reasons, indicating that its facility has winding, thin
paths and walkways of varying grades and construction, which may be problematic for Segways;

Orlando's other major theme park, Universal Orlando, does not have an explicit policy regarding
Segway use but apparently allows customers with disabilities to use them on a case-by-case basis.
Id.
489. See Scott Powers, Disabled Advocates Push Disney World, Seaworld to Allow
Segways: Disney and Seaworld Orlando Cite Visitor-Safety Concerns, ORLANDO SENTINEL, October
13, 2007, available at http://www.aapd.com/News/transportation/071015os.htm.
490. See id., quoting Disney World spokeswoman Kim Prunty.
491. See Associated Press, Disabled Groups Push Disney, Seaworld to Allow Segways,
U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 14, 2007 (quoting Disney World spokeswoman Kim Prunty), available at

http://www.usatoday.com/travel/destinations/2007-10-14-segwaysN.htm.
492. See Mark Goldhaber, New Epcot Segway Tour, Walt Disney World Park Update,
February 16, 2004, available at http://www.mouseplanet.com/articles.php?art=wd040216mg;
Around
The
World
At
Epcot,
Walt
Disney
World
Resort,
available
http://disneyworld.disney.go.com/wdw/parks/tourDetail?id=AroundtheWorldEpcotTourPage;
Cruzin'
Disney's
California
Adventure® Park,
Disneyland
Resort,
available

at
at

http://disneyland.disney.go.com/disneyland/en -US/parks/tours/detail?name=CruzinDisneysCalifomi
aAdventureParkTourPage; Scott Powers, Disabled Advocates Push Disney World, Seaworld to
Allow Segways: Disney and Seaworld Orlando Cite Visitor-Safety Concerns, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
October 13, 2007, available at http://www.aapd.com/News/transportation/071015os.htm; Associated
Press, Disabled Groups Push Disney, Seaworld to Allow Segways, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 14, 2007

(quoting
Disney
World
spokeswoman
Kim
Prunty),
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/destinations/2007-10-14-segways N.htm.
493. Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., NO. 6:07-CV1785ORL-31KRS, 2008 WL 490581 at
*1 (M.D. Fla. motion to dismiss granted Feb. 20, 2008), motion to dismiss amended complaint
denied, No. 6:07-cv-1785-Orl-31KRS, 2008 WL 2047930 at *1(M.D. Fla. May 13, 2008).
494. Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., NO. 6:07-CV1785ORL-31KRS, 2008 WL 490581 at
*2-*3 (M.D. Fla. motion to dismiss granted Feb. 20, 2008). See Scott Powers and Jason Garcia,
Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Disney, Orlando Sentinel, February 21, 2008, available at

http://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/local/newsletter/orl-biznewssegway02210 8 ,0,4 5 9 2 4 6 0.story; Selena Simmons-Duffin, Leaning Forward: The Segway's
Emerging Role,
THE
STANFORD
DAILY,
May
1,
2008,
available
at
http://daily.stanford.edu/article/2008/5/i/leaningForwardTheSegwaysEmergingRole.
495. Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., NO. 6:07-CV1785ORL-31KRS, 2008 WL 490581 at
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the court denied Disney's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended
complaint, finding that each of the named plaintiffs had alleged a specific
intent to visit the Parks in the future sufficient to establish standing to
sue, and that Disney's argument that the complaint failed to state a claim
under the ADA because it did not allege facts that would demonstrate
that the use of Segways is a reasonable and necessary accommodation
raised factual issues not properly raised in a motion to dismiss.4 96 On

May 28, 2008, Disney filed an answer to the complaint in which it
admitted that "due to safety and operational considerations it has a
general rule prohibiting guests from bringing Segways or any other twowheeled devices into The Magic Kingdom Park, Epcot, DisneyHollywood Studios and Disney's Animal Kingdom, and that this rule
applies to all guests"; and that "two-wheeled guest vehicles are not
permitted on its transportation systems within the Walt Disney World
Resort., 497 Otherwise, in its answer, Disney denied or alleged a lack of
sufficient information regarding most of the allegations in the complaint
and raised an array of affirmative defenses regarding the plaintiffs'
claims.
The example of Segways epitomizes the complexities that can
attend the emergence of new technology in relation to the needs of
people with disabilities. It is not nearly so simple as new technology is
automatically good and helpful. Here, the devices clearly serve as
beneficial mobility devices for people with certain kinds of impairments,
and yet some other people with disabilities believe that they may
endanger their physical well-being in some circumstances.
Many
businesses and governmental entities welcome and facilitate the devices,
but others restrict or even ban them.
Categorizations such as
"wheelchairs," "medical devices," "mobility devices," "vehicles,"
"transporters," "assistive devices," and others have made regulation of
the use of such devices for mobility of people with disabilities a thorny
terminological quagmire. The Medicare system, for example, has
struggled with an antiquated categorization of wheelchairs as "durable
medical devices" that are eligible for Medicare coverage only if they are
used solely in the home; as the National Council on Disability has noted,
"With the advent of powered wheelchairs, scooters, and manual
wheelchairs designed for sport or other purposes, and with the
emergence of new sources for supplying them (other than traditional
hospital or outpatient facility), Medicare has been confronted with new
challenges, which it has yet to resolve or deal with effectively. 4 98 In the
*3 (M.D. Fla. motion to dismiss granted Feb. 20, 2008).
496. Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., No. 6:07-cv-1785-Orl-31KRS, 2008 WL 2047930 at
*2 (M.D.Fla. motion to dismiss amended complaint denied May 13, 2008).
497. Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., No. 6:07-cv-1785-Orl-31KRS, Defendant's Answer
to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, 2008 WL 2242344, at pars. 14 & 15 (M.D. Fla. answerfiled
May 28, 2008).
498. National Council on Disability, National Disability Policy: A Progress Report,
January
15,
2008,
at
91,
available
at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroomlpublications/2008/pdflRevisedProgressReport.pdf. The NCD went
on to say that Medicare's rule "has led to pernicious results," and added: "NCD believes that CMS's
interpretation of the law in relation to powered mobility devices is not supportable. In light of the
widespread efforts in all spheres of life to foster community participation and full inclusion for
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end, the courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies are being called
upon to sort out the competing interests and devise workable equitable
standards regarding these devices. It is critical to these processes that the
disability community seek to arrive at as much consensus based on clear
and nuanced understanding of the issues as it can muster.
Another technological advance that has potentially harmful
consequences to people with certain disabilities is, perhaps surprisingly,
the development of more efficient, quieter automobiles. As far back as
1996, the Association for Education and Rehabilitation of the Blind and
Visually Impaired (AERBVI) expressed its concern about "an increasing
number of quiet vehicles on public rights of way," noting that "persons
who are blind rely on vehicular sounds to determine intersection
configuration, traffic control, and an appropriate heading and safe time to
cross streets"; the Association called for research to "determine
alternative technologies and techniques" for addressing this problem.4 99
In 2000, AERBVI supplemented its call for research on the quiet car
problem by urging the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration "to hold vehicle manufacturers accountable for meeting
minimum acoustic information standards determined to be necessary to
assure the life safety of pedestrians who are blind and visually
impaired." 500
In 2003, the National Federation of the Blind (NFB) expressed "its
deep concern that the safe and free travel of blind pedestrians and all
pedestrians may be significantly and increasingly impaired by quiet
vehicles, a problem that will grow as such vehicles become more
prevalent," and requested that the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration initiate research "to investigate the effect of quiet cars on
blind pedestrians and all pedestrians, with the aim of proposing safetybased solutions to the problem., 50 1 NFB sponsors a "Quiet Cars
webpage" where it provides articles, copies of resolutions, links, and
other information about the problems caused by quiet vehicles; while the
site acknowledges that "[w]e all benefit from a less noisy environment,"
and "applaud[s] the efforts of the automotive industry to control noise
pollution," it cautions that "[q]uiet vehicles are highly problematic for
blind pedestrians, who depend on the sound emitted by cars in order to
travel safely and independently. 50 2 NFB argues that "the industry must
take measures to insure the safety of blind and sighted pedestrians," and
expresses its belief that "vehicles can be designed to emit an inoffensive

people with disabilities, NCD further believes that CMS's restrictive approach in this area is

contrary to some of our most basic values." Id. at 92-93.
499. Association for Education and Rehabilitation of the Blind and Visually Impaired,
24,
1996,
available
at
Resolution
96-11,
July
http://quietcars.nfb.org/1996%20AER%20resolution%20quiet%20cars.htm.
500. Association for Education and Rehabilitation of the Blind and Visually Impaired,
Resolution 2000-06, July 19, 2000, available at http://aerbvi.org/downloads8/0/2000-

06%20minimum%20acoustic%20information%20standards.doc.
501. National Federation of the Blind, Resolution 2003-05, July 4, 2003, available at
http://www.nfb.org/Images/nfb/Publications/bm/bm3/bmO3O9/bm030910.htm.
502. National Federation of the Blind, Committee on Automobile and Pedestrian Safety,
Quiet Cars, http://quietcars.nfb.org/.
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sound that will give pedestrians the information they need. 5 °3
NFB has undertaken a lobbying campaign to support legislation to
address the "quiet vehicles" problem. On May 13, 2008, Maryland
enacted a "Maryland Quiet Vehicles and Pedestrian Safety Task Force"
law promoted by NFB; the statute establishes a task force to "study the
effects of vehicle sound on pedestrian safety, and technology available to
enhance safety of blind pedestrians" and to report its findings to the
Maryland General Assembly by December 31, 2008.504 An NFB official
was quoted as saying that the organization viewed the Maryland law as
"a good first step."50 5 Legislation being considered in New York,
Arizona, Hawaii, and Virginia would go further and impose minimum
sound levels to alert pedestrians with vision impairments that a hybrid
NFB and other
running on electric power is approaching. 0 6
organizations have also taken their concerns to the federal legislature; in
April 2008, legislation, titled the "Pedestrian Safety Enhancement Act of
2008," was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives that would
require the Secretary of Transportation to conduct a study to "determine
the minimum level of sound emitted from a motor vehicle that is
necessary to provide blind pedestrians with the information needed to
make safe travel judgments," and to "determine the most practical means
of assuring that blind and other pedestrians receive substantially similar
information [about approaching hybrid vehicles] to information such
pedestrians receive from sound emitted by vehicles that use internal
combustion engines."50 7 Within 90 days of completing the study, DOT
would be required to promulgate "a motor vehicle safety standard"-the
section heading refers to it as "a minimum sound requirement for motor
vehicles"-that will establish a method for alerting blind and other
pedestrians of the presence and operation of nearby motor
vehicles ...

The legislation has been referred to the House

Committee on Energy and Commerce, and to its Subcommittee on
Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection.50 9 On June 23, 2008, the
503. Id.
504. 2008 Md. Laws ch. 384 (Md. Senate Bill 276; Md. House Bill 1160). See Kai
Jackson, Md. House Passes Measure to Study Quiet Cars, WJZ/Associated Press, Mar 24, 2008,
available at http://wjz.com/local/cars.hybrid.quiet.2.683806.html; Anne Broache, Blind Advocates
Lobby for Noisier Hybrid Cars, CNET News.com, February 19, 2008, available at
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9874568-7.html.
505. Anne Broache, Blind Advocates Lobby for Noisier Hybrid Cars, CNET News.com,
February 19, 2008 (quoting Jim McCarthy, director of government affairs of NFB), available at
http://news.cnet.com/8301-107843-9874568-7.html.
506. See id.; David Shepardson, Quiet Hybrids May Be Danger to Visually Impaired:
Advocates Want Sound Requirementsfor Cars in Order to Prevent Injuries, DETROIT NEWS, June
at
2008,
available
20,

http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080620/AUTOO1/806200362.
507. H.R. 5734, 110th Cong. § 4 (2008). See, e.g., Associated Press, Congress to
Introduce Bill to Protect Blind People From Hybrid Cars, FOX News.com, April 08, 2008,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,348370,00.html; David Shepardson, Quiet
Hybrids May Be Danger to Visually Impaired: Advocates Want Sound Requirementsfor Cars in
June
20,
2008,
available at
Order
to
Prevent
Injuries,
DETROIT
NEWS,

http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dl/article?AID=/20080620/AUTOO1/806200362; Ken Thomas,
Advocates for Blind Seek Street Safety, Want Louder Hybrids, DAILY NEWS, June 23, 2008,
available at http://www.dailynews.com/ciL9678800.
508. H.R. 5734, 110th Cong. § 5 (2008).
509. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 10:HR05734:@@@L&summ2=m&.

20081

Restoring the ADA and Beyond

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 51held
a daylong hearing
0
issue.
car
quiet
the
discuss
to
DC,
Washington,
in
The American Council of the Blind (ACB) has been litigating a
different issue that would involve a change in the status quo but might or
might not involve much new technology-accessibility of U.S. currency.
Since 1983, ACB has been trying to convince U.S. Treasury officials 5to
11
make paper money easier for people with vision impairments to use.
Unlike other countries, the United States prints bills that are identical in
size, shape, and color regardless of denomination, 1 2 which makes being
able to read the printed images on the bills essential in distinguishing one
denomination of bill from another. From time to time, there has been
interest in the U.S. House of Representatives in altering paper currency
to make it easier for people with visual impairments to use,51 3 but none of
those initiatives precipitated any changes to U.S. currency. In 2002,
ACB and some individual named plaintiffs with vision impairments filed
suit in federal court against the Secretary of the Treasury, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that the failure of the
Department of the Treasury to design and issue paper currency that is
readily distinguishable to blind and visually impaired people violates
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 514 which prohibits discrimination
on the basis of disability in any program or activity conducted by a
federal executive agency.515 In 2004, the district court judge denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiffs had stated a valid
claim and that exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile.51 6
In 2006, the court again denied the Department of the Treasury's
renewed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, granted summary
judgment to ACB to the extent of ruling and declaring that "the Treasury
Department's failure to design, produce and issue paper currency that is
readily distinguishable to blind and visually impaired individuals violates
510. Associated Press, Hybrid Cars Too Quiet, Advocates for Blind Tell Highway Safety
Officials,
FOX
News,
June
23,
2008,
available
at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,370462,00.html; Ken Thomas, Advocates for Blind Seek
Street Safety, Want Louder Hybrids, DAILY NEWS, June 23, 2008, available at
http://www.dailynews.com/ci_9678800.
511. See Roger Parloff, New U.S. Bills: Blind Justice?, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Jan. 11,
2007,
available
at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2007/01/22/8397965/index.htm.
512. Debbi Wilgoren, Court Agrees That Paper Money DiscriminatesAgainst the Blind,

WASHINGTON POST, May 21, 2008, at A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/05/20/AR2008052001117_pf.html.

513. See, e.g., H.R. 6027, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 3656, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 2666,
98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 2160, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. Res. 122, 105th Cong. (1997). The
sponsorship and gist of these legislative initiatives is described in American Council of the Blind v.
Paulson, 463 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2006).
514. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
515. American Council of the Blind v. O'Neill, No. 1:02cv00864 (D.D.C. filed May 3,
2002), American Council of the Blind v. Snow, 311 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2004) (denying
defendants' motion to dismiss), American Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 463 F. Supp. 2d 51
(D.D.C. 2006) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment and partially granting ACB's
motion for summary judgment). See also Roger Parloff, New U.S. Bills: Blind Justice?, FORTUNE
MAGAZINE,
Jan.
11,
2007,
available
at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/01/22/8397965/index.htm.
516. American Council of the Blind v. Snow, 311 F. Supp. 2d 86, 88-91 (D.D.C. 2004).
The court did grant the defendants' motion to dismiss the Treasurer of the United States from the
action, ruling that he "has no hand in the design or production of the currency." Id. at 90-91.
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§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.,
In reaching this decision, the court stressed the importance of the
"meaningful access" component of disability nondiscrimination-a major
touchstone of disability rights law.
The notion that there are
circumstances in which the law should look beyond mere surface
equality to address de facto discrimination has antecedents in other areas
of civil rights law. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,518 for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court said of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for
employment or promotion may not provide equality of
opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to
the stork and the fox. On the contrary, Congress has now
required that the posture and condition of the job-seeker be
taken into account. It has to resort again to the fable,
provided that the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one
all seekers can use.519
Similarly, in Lau v. Nichols,520 the Court ruled that a school system's
failure to provide bilingual education to students whose primary language
was not English constituted discrimination prohibited by Title VI and
declared that
there is no equality of treatment merely by providing students
with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum;
for students who do not understand English are effectively
foreclosed from any meaningful education. We know that
those who do not understand English are certain to find their
classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible and in no
way meaningful.52 1
In regard to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability
established by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
Supreme Court, building upon the "meaningfulness" standard of prior
rulings, declared in its decision in Alexander v. Choate522 that the statute
requires that qualified individuals with disabilities "must be provided
with meaningful access to the benefit that the [covered entity] offers,"
and that "to assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the
[entity's] program or benefit may have to be made. 523 Subsequent to the
Alexander v. Choate ruling, the "meaningful access" standard has been
followed and applied by numerous courts in Section 504 and ADA
cases,524 heralded and elaborated on by disability rights commentators,52 5
517. American Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 463 F. Supp. 2d 51, 63 (D.D.C. 2006).
518. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
519. Id. at431.
520. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
521. Id. at566.
522. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
523. Id. at 301(emphasis added).

524. See, e.g., Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (Section 504
"prohibits actions that deny disabled individuals 'meaningful access'); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg,
331 F.3d 261, 291

(2d Cir. 2003) ("injunctive relief to remedy a violation of the ADA or
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endorsed in legislative history, 526 and codified in statutory and regulatory
policy provisions. 527 The brilliant, visionary disability rights activist Tim
Rehabilitation Act is appropriate if it provides the injured plaintiff with 'meaningful access' to the
programs or services to which the plaintiff is facially entitled"), cert. denied 541 U.S. 936 (2004);
Hunsaker v. Contra Costa County, 149 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1998) (Title 11of ADA requires
state to provide "meaningful access" to state services, programs, and activities for persons with
disabilities); Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 292 (2d Cir. 1990) (deaf parents entitled
under Section 504 to "meaningful access" to activities offered to parents by school district), Three
Rivers Center for Independent Living, Inc. v. Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburg, 382 F.3d
412, 427 (3d Cir. 2004) (Section 504 requires "federal fund grantees to offer 'meaningful access' to
programs they administer."); Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988) ("under the
standard of Alexander, the Board's restriction violates § 504 if it denies 'otherwise qualified'
handicapped individuals 'meaningful access'); Ability Center of Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385
F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 2004) (Title II of ADA requires that public entities not deprive individuals
with disabilities of "meaningful access" to benefits of services such entities provide); Randolph v.
Rogers, 170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999) ("the ADA and [Rehabilitation Act] require that otherwise
qualified individuals receive 'meaningful access' to programs and activities"); Lee v. City of Los
Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2001) (public entity's denial of "meaningful access" to its
services, programs, or activities by reason of disability gives rise to ADA claim); Bonner v. Lewis,
857 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Section 504 guarantees 'meaningful access' to programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance"); Chaffin v. Kansas State Fair Board, 348 F.3d 850,
857 (10th Cir. 2003) ("[W]e have held that the ADA requires public entitles to provide disabled
individuals 'meaningful access' to their programs and services"), quoting Patton v. TIC United
Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1246 (10th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850,
858 (8th Cir. 1999) (although deaf inmate could physically attend prison activities, he did not have
"meaningful access" without sign language interpreter); Theriault v. Flynn, 162 F.3d 46, 48 (1 st Cir.
1998) (characterizing ADA protection as "a guarantee of 'meaningful access' to government benefits
and programs.., which broadly means that public entities must take reasonable steps to ensure that
individuals with disabilities can take advantage of such public undertakings"); Marisol A. v.
Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (under ADA and Rehabilitation Act, "disabled
individual is entitled to meaningful access to the benefits and services provided by a public agency
or an agency receiving federal funds. Access alone, despite defendants' arguments to the contrary, is
insufficient."), motion to certify allowed 1996 WL 419887 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), motion denied 104 F.3d
524 (2d Cir. 1997), certiorari denied 520 U.S. 1211, order affirmed 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997);
Galusha v. New York State Dept. of Environmental Conservation, 27 F. Supp. 2d 117, 123
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) ("meaningful access" standard applicable to ADA claim challenging restrictions on
motorized vehicle use by individuals with disabilities in certain areas of state park).
525. See, e.g., Cary LaCheen, Using Title 1I of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct on
Behalf of Clients in TANF Programs,8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 50, 103, 104, 112, 121,
154, 166, 209-210 (2001); Robert Silverstein, Emerging Disability Policy Framework:A Guidepost
for Analyzing Public Policy, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1691, 1722-1725, 1749 (2000) ("meaningful
opportunity, "genuine, effective, and meaningful treatment," "genuine, effective, and meaningful
opportunity"). See also Note, The Oregon Health Care Proposal and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1296, 1300-1301, 1305-1306 (1993).
526. The Senate ADA report states unequivocally that "[ilt is the Committee's intent that
section 202 [the nondiscrimination requirement of Title 11]and other sections of the legislation be
interpreted consistent with Alexander v. Choate." S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 44 (1989) (citation
omitted). See also, H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 84 (1990) ("it is also the Committee's intent that
section 202 also be interpreted consistent with Alexander v. Choate) (citation omitted). See also,
e.g., S. Rep. No. 101-116 (1989) at 6 ("Discrimination also includes exclusion, or denial of benefits,
services, or other opportunities that are as effective and meaningful as those provided to others.");
135 Cong. Rec. S4986 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) ("Discrimination made
illegal under the ADA includes.., segregation, exclusion, or denial of benefits, services, or other
opportunities that are as effective and meaningful as those provided to others"); 136 Cong. Rec.
H2447 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Miller) ("full and meaningful equality");
Hearings on H.R. 2273 and S. 933 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous Materials
of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) (statement of Rep. Luken)
("[t]he premise of the bill is unassailable. Discrimination, whether produced by overt actions or
thoughtless attitudes, produces segregation, exclusion, impoverishment, and denial of equal and
meaningful opportunities"); 136 Cong. Rec. H2433 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Luken) ("[d]iscrimination... produces segregation, exclusion, impoverishment, and denial of equal
and meaningful opportunities").
527. In articulating the "meaningful access" standard, the Court in Alexander v. Choate
was construing and applying the single sentence nondiscrimination mandate of Section 504-which
provides that no qualified person with a disability "shall be ... denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination" under any covered program or activity. The ADA, in its Title II, applies
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Cook was a strong promoter of the Alexander v. Choate "meaningful
access," formulation (along with "integration" and aversion to the
"undue burdens" defense), and would be pleased to see the extent to
which the concept has become accepted as a key element of disability

nondiscrimination law.528
In the American Council of the Blind lawsuit regarding accessibility of
U.S. currency, the district court found that the parties' cross-motions for
summary judgment raised "two core issues": "(1) whether blind and
visually impaired plaintiffs have 'meaningful access' to U.S. currency,
and (2) if not, whether the acts necessary to achieve meaningful access

the Section 504 nondiscrimination mandate to all programs and activities of state and local
government entities, regardless of whether they do or do not receive federal financial assistance.
Manifestly, the "meaningful access" standard is applicable under Title II, a fact that is made clear in
the committee reports. See supra note 504. In lieu of articulating a broad general requirement of
providing meaningful access or opportunities, the statutory language, regulations, and regulatory
guidance under Section 504 and the ADA establish the several component standards by which it is to
be achieved. Thus, the Section 504 regulations, ADA Title II and III regulations, and statutory
provisions of Title III contain very similar provisions making it a prohibited act of discrimination on
the basis of disability to provide a person with a disability an opportunity to participate or to receive
benefits, services, or other things a covered entity provides that is (1) not equal to that afforded to
others, (2) not as effective as that provided to others, or (3) that is unnecessarily different from those
provided to others. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1) (HHS Section 504 regulation); 28 C.F.R. §
41.5 1(b)(1) (DOJ Section 504 coordination regulation); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) (DOJ ADA Title II
regulation); 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.202(b) & (c) (DOJ ADA Title IIl regulation); 42 U.S.C. §§
12182(b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii), & (B) (ADA Title Ill).
In regulatory guidance documents, federal agencies have been more likely to use the
Alexander v. Choate "meaningful access" or similar shorthand expressions. Policy Guidance
promulgated by the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health and Human Services
regarding the application of disability nondiscrimination requirements to the administration of the
TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) program is quite clear and explicit in this
connection. See Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, Prohibition
Against Discrimination on the Basis of Disability in the Administration of TANF (Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families),January 2001, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/prohibition.html.
In a part B of the Guidance headed "Legal Authority," a subsection titled "The Disability Policy
Framework" provides: "Two concepts central to Section 504 and Title II of the ADA are of
particular importance to administration of TANF programs in a manner that ensures equality of
opportunity for individuals with disabilities. These concepts are: (1)individualized treatment; and
(2) effective and meaningful opportunity." The Guidance elaborates that "individuals with
disabilities must be afforded the opportunity to benefit from TANF programs that is as effective as
the opportunity the TANF agency affords to individuals who do not have disabilities, and must also
be afforded "meaningful access" to TANF programs." Id. The General Services Administration
proclaims that "GSA is committed to providing meaningful access for individuals with
disabilities .... General Services Administration, Key to Accessing Federally Conducted
Programs
and
Activities
(FCPA)
Course,
available
at
http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:6MGOAaOmttgJ:www.gsa.gov/gsa/cmattachments/GSA_D
OCUMENT/The%2520Key%2520to%252OAccess%252OCourseR2Z-i-rOZ5RDZ-i34KpR.ppt+meaningful+access+regulations+disability&hl=en&ct-clnk&cd=58&gl=us.
See also
Oregon Dept. of Human Services, Non-Discrimination on the Basis of Disability for Programs,
Services and Activities, Policy No. DHS-010-005, Feb. 01, 2006 ("Title II of the ADA covers all
activities of state and local government, regardless of the government entity's size or whether it
receives federal funding. Title I1 requires that state and local governments give people with
disabilities meaningful opportunity to benefit from all of their programs, services and activities. This
requires that services provided to clients with disabilities must be as effective as those which are
provided
to
persons
without
disabilities."),
available
at
http://www.dhs.state.or.us/policy/admin/exec/010_005.htm.
528. See, e.g., Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to
Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 393, 396 n.23, 418, 424, 425, 426-429, 459, 466, 467 (1991)
("meaningful access," "effective and meaningful," "meaningful participation," "meaningful
equality," "meaningful, integrated participation," "effective and meaningful opportunity"); Timothy
M. Cook, Scope of the Right to Meaningful Access and the Defense of Undue Burdens Under
Disability Civil Rights Law, 20 LOy. L. REv. 1471 (1987).
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would impose an 'undue burden' on the government. '' 529 In considering
these issues, the court reviewed evidence regarding currency practices of
other countries and found that, of the countries that issue paper currency,
only the United States prints bills that are identical in size and color in all
their denominations; a large majority of the other issuers vary bills in
size according to denomination, and all the rest include at least some
features that help people with visual impairments. 530 The court noted
that "[m]ajor changes were made to U.S. currency in 1996 and 2004-for
the first time since 1929," and suggested that the Department of the
Treasury missed these opportunities "to introduce features into the
design [to] make U.S. banknotes more readily usable by visually disabled
people. 531
Against this background, and strongly influenced by the fact that
people with visual impairments are being forced to get help from sighted
persons, the district court judge ruled that the Department of the Treasury
was violating the "meaningful access" requirement:
There was a time when disabled people had no choice but to
ask for help-to rely on the "kindness of strangers." It was
thought to be their lot. Blind people had to ask strangers to
push elevator buttons for them. People in wheelchairs
needed Boy Scouts to help them over curbs and up stairs. We
have evolved, however, and Congress has made our evolution
official, by enacting the Rehabilitation Act, whose stated
purpose is "to empower individuals with disabilities to
maximize
employment,
economic
self-sufficiency,
independence, and inclusion and integration into society." 29
U.S.C. § 701(b) (emphasis added). It can no longer be
successfully argued that a blind person has "meaningful
access" to currency if she cannot accurately identify paper
money without assistance.532
As to the "undue burden" issue, the court recognized that "[a]ny
change to the design of U.S. currency would undoubtedly require a
substantial investment of labor, time, and money devoted to, among
other things, research, consultation, planning, the creation of new plates,
the purchase, installation, and operation of new equipment, and increased
maintenance and production costs. ' 533 Yet, in the judge's opinion, even
the government's own estimate of such costs would represent only a
small fraction of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing's annual
expenditures, and the burden could be even smaller if new access
features were incorporated into a larger redesign, such as those that took
place in 1996 or 2004. 534 Ultimately, the district court adjudged that
"[p]laintiffs have demonstrated that they lack meaningful access to U.S.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.

American Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 463 F. Supp. 2d 51, 58 (D.D.C. 2006).
Id.at 54.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 62.
Id.
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currency. They have put forth several potential accommodations that are
reasonable on their face. The government has not sustained its burden of
showing that any of them would be unduly burdensome to
implement., 535 Accordingly, the court concluded that "the Treasury
Department's failure to design and issue paper currency that is readily
distinguishable to blind and visually impaired individuals violates § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act," and granted plaintiffs' prayer for a declaratory
judgment.53 6 The judged declined, however, to grant injunctive relief at
that time, stating that she had "neither the expertise, nor, I believe, the
power, to choose among the feasible alternatives, approve any specific
design change, or otherwise to dictate to the Secretary of the Treasury
how he can come into compliance with the law." 537 Instead, the court
directed the clerk to schedule a status conference for the purpose of
discussing
a remedy and any additional proceedings that might be called
5 38
for.
Not all blind people were pleased by the court's decision in the
currency case. After the decision was announced, in December 2006, the
National Federation of the Blind (NFB) condemned the ruling as
"dangerously misguided"; NFB's president, Dr. Marc Maurer, issued a
statement in which he observed that "blind people transact business with
paper money every day" and do not need "feel-good gimmicks that
misinform the public about our capabilities. '539 A few months later, in
February 2007, Dr. Maurer published an extensive article in the Braille
Monitor in which he expanded upon his views about the lawsuit and
described NFB's lengthy history of opposing it.540 NFB and Dr. Maurer
had an additional chance to express their displeasure at the litigation in
May 2008, 54' when the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld the district judge's decision,542 despite NFB's
participation in the appeal on the side of the Department of the
Treasury.543
On appeal, the Secretary of the Treasury contended that "various
coping mechanisms" that enable people with visual impairments to use
U.S. currency, the availability of portable currency readers to identify
denominations, and credit cards as an alternative to cash, demonstrate
that there is no denial of "meaningful access" to currency.544
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Roger Parloff, New U.S. Bills: Blind Justice?, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Jan.
2007,
available
http:l/money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/01/22/8397965/index.htm.
540. Marc Maurer, Is the Failure to Produce Tactile Currency Really a Matter
Discrimination?,
Braille
Monitor,
February
2007,
available
http://www.nfb.orgllmages/nfb/Publications/bm/bmO71bmO7O2/bmO7O2O2.htm.
541.

11,
at
of
at

NFB, National Federationof the Blind Denounces Ruling on Accessible PaperMoney

Lawsuit, May 20, 2008, available at http://www.nfb.org/nfb/NewsBot.asp?MODE=VIEW&ID=325;
NFB, Paper Money Is in the News Again, May 27, 2008, available at
http://www.nfb.org/nfb/NewsBot.asp?MODE=VIEW&ID=329.
542. American Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
543. Id. at 1258.
544. Id. at 1259.
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Alternatively, even if there was a denial of meaningful access, he argued
that the district court had erred in regarding as acceptable options
particular identified accommodations that would entail added costs and
place burdens on the general public. 545 The Court of Appeals began its
analysis of the case with a recognition that "Congress expressly intended
the Rehabilitation Act to ensure that members of the disabled community
could live independently and fully participate in society, 546 and
subsequently observed that the centrality to the Act of empowering
people with disabilities "to engage in economic activity imbues the
accessibility of currency with special importance. The visually impaired
can hardly be 'empower[ed] ...

to maximize [their] employment,

economic self-sufficiency, independence, and inclusion and integration
into society,' if in everyday transactions they cannot use the paper
547
currency that they possess without the assistance of third persons."
The appellate court repeatedly stressed the unacceptability of having to
solicit such "assistance of third persons, '548 and concluded that "[s]uch
dependence is anathema to the stated purpose of the Rehabilitation Act,
and places the visually impaired at a distinct disadvantage in two-way
transactions involving paper currency because they can neither control
the actions of those with whom they deal nor independently discern
whether the paper currency they receive is correct., 549 The court rejected
the Secretary of the Treasury's contention that "the visually impaired
have not been denied meaningful access to U.S. paper currency in view
of the absence of evidence of their being frequently defrauded," calling it
"[a] somewhat astounding proposition on its face," that "implies that
criminal victimization is a necessary predicate for the disabled to invoke
the rights protected under section 504." 550 The court considered such a
precondition inconsistent with Section 504's objective of ensuring "that
qualified individuals receive services in a manner consistent with basic
human dignity," 551 and ruled that "the Rehabilitation Act's emphasis on
independent living and self-sufficiency ensures that, for the disabled, the
enjoyment of a public benefit is not contingent upon the cooperation of
third persons., 552 The Court of Appeals declined to try to "define
precisely the severity of the deprivation that a plaintiff must experience
in accessing a program, benefit, or service to demonstrate a denial of
meaningful access," but found that "[o]n this record, the Secretary is
hard-pressed to overcome the Council's showing that the visually
545. Id.
546. Id., citing 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1).
547. Id. at 1269, quoting 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1).

548. See id. ("Where the basic task of independently evaluating the worth of currency in
excess of 99 cents is difficult or impossible, the visually impaired are forever relegated to depend on
'the kindness of strangers' to shop for groceries, hire a taxi, or buy a newspaper or cup of coffee.");
id. ("The Secretary's argument is analogous to contending that merely because the mobility impaired
may be able either to rely on the assistance of strangers or to crawl on all fours in navigating
architectural obstacles, they are not denied meaningful access to public buildings.") (citations
omitted); id. at 1270 ("Instead they are compelled to rely on the honesty and carefulness of sighted

individuals who often are on the opposite side of a financial transaction.").
549. Id. at 1269-1270 (citations omitted).
550. Id. at 1270.
551.

Id.

552. Id. at 1269.
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impaired are denied meaningful access to U.S. paper currency, and his
attempts to do so are unpersuasive. '55 3
On the other major issue, that of undue burden, the Secretary of the
Treasury contended that the district court had "erred in holding
categorically that none of the plaintiffs' proposals to modify the currency
would impose an undue burden," and in having "improperly validated
the most expensive accommodation. 554 The appellate court viewed
these arguments as based on a misreading of the requisite burdens, as
Section 504 "requires only that the least burdensome accommodation not
be unduly burdensome. The Secretary has discretion to choose from a
range of accommodations, and his failure to demonstrate that all
accommodations found by the district court to be facially reasonable
would pose an undue burden presents no occasion for us to address any
particular accommodation. 555 The court also noted that the Secretary
was swimming against the current of other nation's that had made
accommodations in their currencies for people with visual impairments:
[b]ecause other currency systems accommodate the needs of
the visually impaired, the Secretary's burden in
demonstrating that implementing an accommodation would
be unduly burdensome is particularly heavy. The Secretary
has not explained why U.S. paper currency is so different or
the situation of the Bureau so unique that the costs associated
with identified accommodations would constitute an undue
burden.556
The Court of Appeals took notice of what it called the district court's
"fulsome analysis of the deficiencies in the financial aspects of the
Secretary's evidence" and found that it needed only to highlight some of
the district's court's findings, including that the cost estimates submitted
557
by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing "appear inflated.,
Accordingly, the court agreed with the district court that the Secretary
had not met his burden of proof on the undue burden issue.
Concluding that "the Council has demonstrated both the denial of
meaningful access and the availability of facially reasonable
accommodations that are feasible and efficacious, and that the Secretary
has not demonstrated that implementation of every such accommodation
would involve an undue burden," the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant
of partial summary judgment on the Secretary's liability under Section
504, and remanded the case for the district court to determine appropriate
injunctive relief.558 The Court of Appeals decision generated a
considerable amount of publicity, including some reports that mentioned
the NFB position in opposition.5 5
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.

Id.
Id. at 1271, quoting Appellant's Br. at 34 and citing Appellant's Br. at 36.
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1274.
See, e.g., Debbi Wilgoren, Court Agrees That Paper Money Discriminates Against
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Someday (Soon?)-Ten Additional To-Do List Items for Today and

Tomorrow
The preceding sections have suggested a number of significant
issues and developments that the disability rights movement will need to
address as the 21st Century proceeds. Certainly there are many more
that could be examined, but an in-depth discussion of many or even a
few more such issues would make this article even more unmanageably
lengthy than it has already become. At the same time, it seems
unsatisfactory not at least to mention some of the very important
additional matters that we need to keep on our radar screens, and to put
our energies into now and in coming months and years. Accordingly,
this section identifies, in very abridged form, some additional, significant
disability rights legal agenda items, with a minimum of, if any,
description and elaboration. Most of these are things that we, our
government, and our society could and ought to have made sure to
accomplish before now, and so they are already overdue, many of them
long past due. The biggest deficit of providing such a sample of
unresolved problems and to-date-unmet needs is that it is woefully
incomplete. Hopefully, a partial list of additional issues is better than
none at all, and may serve as a springboard for pulling together a list of
priority action items from the multitude of proposals, calls for action, and
lines of attack proffered by disability advocacy groups, consumer
organizations, and governmental entities. In preparing the sampling
present here, I have relied very heavily on the reports of the National
Council on Disability, which has played a prominent role in identifying
issues and crystallizing a disability agenda within the federal
government.56 °
1) Get the U.S. to ratify both the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the
Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of

the
Blind,
WASHINGTON
POST,
May
21,
2008,
A 17,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/20/AR2008052001117-pf.html;
Jessica Dickler, FederalAppeals Court Says Treasury DepartmentIs Violating the Law by Keeping
Dollars the Same Size and Feel, CNNMoney.com, May 20, 2008, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2008/05/20/news/moneyblind.
560. In particular, I have drawn from the NCD's 2008 Progress Report on disability policy:
National Council on Disability, National Disability Policy: A Progress Report, January 15, 2008,
available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/pdf/RevisedProgressReport.pdf. As I
reflect on the numerous in-depth policy documents developed by the NCD and other organizations
both within and without the government, I realize how simultaneously ambitious and inadequate is
the listing presented in this section. It is even more humbling to compare it to the monumental array
of position papers and reports that emerged from the White House Conference on Handicapped
Individuals back in 1977, including a Final Report to the President and the Congress presenting 815
formal recommendations addressing 287 issues. See White House Conference on Handicapped
Individuals, Summary Final Report (1978) (U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of
Human Development, Publication No. 22003).
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561

2)
Correct deficiencies with and inadequate enforcement
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.562

561. See, e.g., Michael Stein & Janet Lord, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 167 (2008); NCD,
National Disability Policy: A Progress Report (January 15, 2008), pp. 200-201 (discussing U.N.
Convention); supra note 261 and accompanying text; Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities,
Letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice regarding International Disability Rights Convention,
March 10, 2008, available at http://www.c-c-d.org/task-forces/Intl/CCD-Letter-on%201ntDisability-Convention.pdf. For an interesting summary and critical look at the U.N. Convention, see
Anna Lawson, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:New Era
or False Dawn?, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 563 (2007) (part of Symposium: The United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities).
562. In the NCD's 2000 report Back to School on Civil Rights, the Council reported that,
"Every state was out of compliance with IDEA requirements to some degree; in the sampling of
states studied, noncompliance persisted over many years." National Council on Disability, Back to
School
on
Civil
Rights
(2000)
at
7,
available
at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2000/pdf/backtoschool.pdf. Looking back at more than
two decades of federal monitoring and enforcement of compliance with Part B of IDEA, the NCD
found that "federal efforts to enforce the law over several Administrations have been inconsistent
and ineffective." Id. at i (Letter of Transmittal). The NCD found further that the Department of
Education had "made very limited use of its authority to impose enforcement sanctions such as
withholding of funds or making referrals to the Department of Justice, despite persistent failures to
ensure compliance in many states," with the result that "[n]otwithstanding federal monitoring reports
documenting widespread noncompliance, enforcement of the law is the burden of parents who too
often must invoke formal complaint procedures and due process hearings, including expensive and
time-consuming litigation, to obtain the appropriate services and supports to which their children are
entitled under the law." Id. at 7.
In 2008, the NCD issued a report on IDEA implementation and its interplay with the No
Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). NCD, The No Child Left Behind Act and the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: A Progress Report (January 28, 2008), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/pdf/NoChildLeftBehind-IDEAProgressReport.
pdf. The 2008 report presents a much rosier perspective of IDEA implementation, but appears to be
pretty much an uncritical, unbalanced, fawning tribute to the No Child Left Behind Act.
Symptomatic is a lengthy section of the report titled "Perspectives of Key Stakeholders," id. at 5593, which is supposed to provide "an assessment of how NCLB, after three more years of
implementation, has impacted students with disabilities," based "on interviews with disability policy,
education, and advocacy leaders, and with students with disabilities and their parents," id. at 55 (Part
II1). The section is chock full of quotations from interviewees, identified only as "Administrator,"
"Official," "Policymaker," "Researcher," "Special Educator," "State Official," and "Advocate." Not
a single quotation is from a person with a disability or a parent of a student with a disability. Not
surprisingly, the recommendations in the report do not rock any boats; they are light on substance
and very administrator-friendly (e.g., "I. Maintain high expectations for students with disabilities
and continue to disaggregate outcome data by subgroups. 2. Develop the capacity of teachers to
provide differentiated instruction and a more rigorous curriculum."). Id. at 95-97.
Many people with disabilities and parents of kids who receive or need special education
services know that all is not rosy in the IDEA/NCLB realm. It is apparent that the serious problems
identified in the NCD's Back to School on Civil Rights have not miraculously disappeared, despite
all the hype over the NCLB. If anything, the problem of the power imbalance between parents and
school officials has only worsened. Toward the beginning of this article I mentioned the distortion
that has occurred with the IEP process that was intended to give parents an equal standing with
teachers and school officials in designing an appropriate education program tailored to the special
education needs of individual children. See text accompanying n.5 supra. In the 2004 law that
amended IDEA, the so-called Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004
(Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647), in addition to many beneficial amendments, several changes
were made under the rubric of reducing paperwork. These included eliminating short-term
objectives and benchmarks from IEPs (other than for students taking alternate assessments),
establishing a 15-state paperwork reduction demonstration project, field-testing multi-year IEPs, and
reducing to once a year the number of times a procedural safeguards notice is given to parents
(instead of with each notification of an IEP meeting or a reevaluation). See, e.g., Robert Silverstein,
A User's Guide to the 2004 IDEA Reauthorization (P.L. 108-446 and the Conference Report),
Consortium for Citizens With Disabilities, January 2005, at 27-28, 33, available at http://www.c-cd.org/task-forcesleducation/ldeaUserGuide.pdf, Council for Exceptional Children, The New IDEA,
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3)
Take more concerted and vigorous action to eliminate
inappropriate and unnecessary institutionalization of people
with disabilities and to realize a comprehensive array of
community-based
humane, independent-living-informed,
services and residential alternatives, including such measures
as (a) developing and implementing a coherent national longterm services and supports public policy for people with
disabilities5 63 ; (b) making the most of the Olmstead v. L.C.
decision 564 by implementing and building on its integration
requirement to prohibit unnecessary segregation of people
receiving residential services from the states 565; (c) enforcing
the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA)
more vigorously and comprehensively, and enhancing its
legislative basis; 566 (d) expanding and generalizing the
"money follows the person" approach 567 from a
demonstration competitive grant program to a general
operating principle aimed at facilitating deinstitutionalization
and appropriate community placement of individuals with
disabilities; (e) getting a Medicaid-Community-Attendant568
Services-and-Supports-Act (MiCASSA)-type law enacted;
CEC's Summary of Significant Issues, November 2004, at 15-16, available at
http://www.cec.sped.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=AdvancedSearch&section=Policy.andAdvo
Children's
Defense
Fund,
cacyl &template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFilelD=723;
Summary: Improving Education for Homeless and Foster Children with Disabilities in the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, March 2005, available at
To a large
http://www.childrensdefense.org/site/DocServer/idea_2004_summary.pdfdoclD=558.
degree, these changes seem intended more at making life easier for school administrators by
reducing accountability and disclosure of information than at improving the lot of students with
special education needs and their parents. Student/parent empowerment was further diminished by
the ruling of the Supreme Court in Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) that the student and
parents bear the burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP. If the IDEA is
ever going to have the positive effects that were its objective, the IEP and due process hearing and
appeals safeguards need to be fixed to give students with disabilities and their parents rights and
status sufficient to allow them to hold their own in the process of determining appropriate and
effective educational programs, and federal enforcement of IDEA requirements must be expanded
and intensified.
563. See, NCD, The State of2lst Century Long-Term Services and Supports: Financing
and Systems Reform for Americans with Disabilities, December 15, 2005, at p. 1 (Letter of
available
at
14,
&
Transmittal)
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2005/longterm-services.htm; NCD, National Disability
available at
15,
2008),
pp. 10 5 -108,
Progress Report (January
Policy: A
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/pdf/RevisedProgressReport.pdf.
564. Olmstead v. L. C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
565. See, e.g., National Council on Disability, Olmstead: Reclaiming Institutionalized
2003,
available
at
Version),
August
19,
(Full-Length
On-Line
Lives
Steve Gold, OVR and
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/reclaimlives.htm;
Olmstead-Information Bulletin #39, STEVE GOLD'S TREASURED BITS OF INFORMATION, Sept. 19,

at
available
2002,
http://www.stevegoldada.com/stevegoldada/archive.php?mode=A&id=58;&sort-D.
566. NCD, National Disability Policy: A Progress Report (January 15, 2008), pp. 57-58,
available
at
2.10),
(Recommendation
61
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/pdf/RevisedProgressReport.pdf
567. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, § 6071, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 102-110
(Feb. 8, 2006), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a NOTE. See also NCD, National Disability Policy: A
Progress Report (January 15, 2008), pp. 86-87, 110-111, 116, 155-156, available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/pdf/RevisedProgressReport.pdf.
568. See bills proposing the "Community Choice Act of 2007": S.799, 110th Cong.
(2007); H.R.162, 110th Cong. (2007). See also 153 Cong. Rec. S2807 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2007)
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and (f) incorporating, as critical elements and preconditions
of preadmission eligibility screening for possible placement
of a person with a disability into a nursing facility,
Intermediate Care Facility, or a mental health institution, of
information and dialogue concerning health care services,
attendant care, and other services the person can be provided
56 9 effective assistance in
in the community, andpromptly.
providing
arranging such services
4)
Get sound Mental Health Parity legislation passed on a
permanent basis.57 °
5)
Take bold and substantial action to address the severely
low employment rates of people with disabilities, including
totally eliminating work disincentives in disability benefits
programs, and developing innovative incentive programs for
increasing the hiring and retention of workers with
disabilities.571
6)
Revise eligibility standards for Social Security and
other disability benefits programs to eliminate total inability
to work criteria, such as "unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity," and put in their place more realistic,
flexible, and nuanced standards.572

(Statement of Sen. Harkin); NCD, National Disability Policy:A ProgressReport (January 15, 2008),
pp.
116
(Recommendation
5.2),
available
at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/pdf/RevisedProgressReport.pdf.
569. Steve Gold, One Simple Proposalto Prevent "Unnecessary Institutionalization"
Information Bulletin #218, STEVE GOLD'S TREASURED BITS OF INFORMATION, July 18, 2007,
available at http://www.stevegoldada.com/stevegoldada/archive.php?mode=A&id=218;&sort=D;
Steve Gold, More on "One Simple Solution to Prevent Unnecessary Institutionalization"Information Bulletin #227, STEVE GOLD'S TREASURED BITS OF INFORMATION, Nov. 16, 2007,
available at http://www.stevegoldada.com/stevegoldada/archive.php?mode=A&id=227;&sort=D.
570. As this article was in final editing for publication, the stated objective was
substantially accomplished with the enactment of the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, § 512 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (October 3, 2008). Regarding the legislative
situation preceding the 2008 law, see the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a
(expiring Dec. 31, 2008); S. 558, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008); NCD,
National DisabilityPolicy: A ProgressReport (January 15, 2008), pp. 97-98, 102 (Recommendation
4.10),
available
at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/pdf/RevisedProgressReport.pdf,
Robert
Pear,
House Approves Bill on Mental Health Parity, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/06/washington/06health.html; Susan Jeffrey, Mental Health Parity
Bill Passes House, But Differs From Senate Bill, MEDSCAPE, March 7, 2008, available at
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/571164.
571. NCD, National Disability Policy: A Progress Report (January 15, 2008), pp. 131132,
134,
139
(Recommendation
7.1),
available
at
http://www.ncd.govlnewsroomlpublicationsl2008lpdf[RevisedProgressReport.pdf.
572. In 2006, the NCD wrote:
Our nation's current disability benefit programs are based on a principle that equates
the presence of a significant disability and lack of substantial earnings with a
complete inability to work. In the real world, however, conditions vary, and a
disability may be partial or temporary. Some disabilities are cyclical, and other
conditions, including mental health issues, have not been adequately studied in this
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7)
Require methods by which, and places at which, states
and localities administer Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF), Food Stamp programs, and other welfarerelated and non-welfare programs be made accessible to and
fully usable by people with disabilities, eliminating all
architectural, transportation, communication, and other types
of barriers that interfere with the ability of individuals with
disabilities to participate in and benefit from such
programs.5 73
8)
Stimulate federal government agencies, either by new
legal provisions or voluntarily, to apply tax provisions and
other incentives to increase substantially the availability of
accessible housing, and to eliminate
barriers to
homeownership facing Americans with disabilities. 574
9)
Convince the Department of Transportation and other
relevant federal agencies to issue pending regulations and
guidance and take other steps necessary to facilitate fully
accessible and usable transportation systems that anticipate
and accommodate the needs of passengers, including
providing accessibility of airline websites, airport kiosks, and
cruise ships, and nondiscriminatory, disability-user-friendly
security screenings.575

context to provide a good match for the method of determining disability and thus,
eligibility for financial supports. People who might be able to participate in part-time
or modified employment are discouraged from making such an attempt, because even
partial employment could delay or even eliminate eligibility for Social Security
disability benefits. Unsuccessful attempts to work are seen to carry a potentially
devastating negative impact, including the loss of benefits and possibly, health care
coverage.
National Council on Disability, Issue Brief: The Basics of the National Council on Disability's
Social
Security
Report,
Nov.
21,
2006,
at
I,
available
at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2006/pdf/issue brief.pdf.
Similarly, see National
Council on Disability, The Social Security Administration's Efforts to Promote Employment for
People with Disabilities: New Solutionsfor Old Problems, November 30, 2005, at 45, available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2005/ssa-promoteemployment.htm; generally, see id. at
41-54.
See also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability,
42 VILL. L. REv. 409, 489-505 (1997) and the authorities cited therein, suggesting at 501 n.482 that
"the statutory eligibility standard for benefits should be framed in wording such as the following:
'[I]s unlikely, in light of the claimant's physical or mental impairment and the reasonable
availability of relevant work opportunities, to obtain paid employment in the near future."'
573. See NCD, National Disability Policy: A ProgressReport (January 15, 2008), p. 144,
available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/pdf/RevisedProgressReport.pdf.
574. See NCD, National Disability Policy: A ProgressReport (January 15, 2008), pp. 149165, available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/pdf/RevisedProgressReport.pdf.
In particular, the NCD recommended that "Congress amend the [The Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit (I.R.C. § 42)] and other provisions of the [Internal Revenue Code] to require that all housing
receiving tax credits, or all housing otherwise subsidized under the tax system through the use of
tax-favored public activity bonds, be required to comply with the same accessibility standards
currently applicable under federal civil rights laws to housing built or supported through direct
federal subsidies." Id. at 163 (Recommendation 9.1).
575. NCD, National Disability Policy: A Progress Report (January 15, 2008), pp. 176
(guidelines for accommodating travelers who have hearing impairments), 177-178 (airline websites
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10) Require the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA); the Department of Homeland Security; other
federal, state, and local security agencies; the Federal
Communications Commission; law enforcement and other
government officials; and emergency communication
providers to ensure that communications of emergency
information are available in forms accessible to people with
various forms of disabilities; 5 6 that emergency evacuation
and rescue procedures and plans address the needs of
evacuees and rescuees with disabilities;57 7 that accessibility
assessments are incorporated into the development and
testing of all new security systems and devices; 578 and that
emergency and post-disaster facilities and temporary housing
are accessible and appropriate for use by individuals with
disabilities.579
V.

CONCLUSION

The National Council on Disability chose the title Promises to Keep
for its report on the first ten years of federal agency enforcement of the
ADA.58 ° Continuing, very respectfully, to draw on the same poem by
Robert Frost, as I look at the numerous challenges that face us in the
disability rights community, I can only conclude that we still have "miles to
go. '581 In many ways we have made remarkable progress since the
disability rights movement began to emerge in the late 1960s; we have
participated in the passage of landmark pieces of nondiscrimination
and airport kiosks), 179 (Recommendation 10.6) (cruise ship accessibility), 179 (Recommendation
10.8) (screening of deaf airline passengers), 180 (Recommendations 10.9 & 10.10) (airport kiosks
and
airline
websites),
available
at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/pdf/RevisedProgressReport.pdf.
576. See NCD, National DisabilityPolicy: A ProgressReport (January 15, 2008), pp. 211212, available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/pdf/RevisedProgressReport.pdf;
"In the Matter of WTTG-TV," FCC press release, Justice For All Archives, Article No. 2971
(November 21, 2006) (consent decree settling complaint against station for failing to make
emergency information visually available to people with hearing impairments), available at
http://www.jfanow.org/jfanow/index.php?mode=A&id=2971;
Congressional Research Service,
Emergency Communications Legislation, 2002-2006: Implications for the 110th Congress, CRS
Order
Code
RL
33747
(December
14,
2006),
available
at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rptsiRL33747-20080319.pdf.
577. See, e.g., National Council on Disability, Saving Lives: Including People with
Disabilities
in
Emergency
Planning,
April
15,
2005,
available
at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2005/saving-lives.htm
578. See NCD, National Disability Policy: A Progress Report (January 15, 2008), p. 60
(Recommendation
2.6),
available
at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/pdf/RevisedProgressReport.pdf.
579. See NCD, National DisabilityPolicy: A Progress Report (January 15, 2008), pp. 208
(Recommendation
2.6),
212
(Recommendation
13.1),
available
at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2008/pdf/RevisedProgressReport.pdf; Brou v. Federal
Emergency Management Agency, No. 06-0838 (E.D.La. Settlement Agreement Aug. 15, 2006)
(federal class action lawsuit challenging accessibility problems with FEMA trailers), available at
http://femaanswers.org/images/a/a6/Brou.v_femasettlementagmt.pdf.
580. NCD, PROMISES TO KEEP: A DECADE OF FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2000).

581. Robert Frost, Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening, stanza 4, lines 3 & 4 (1923)
("And miles to go before I sleep, And miles to go before I sleep.").
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legislation, have helped to transform for the better the architecture of
America, and have seen much progress both in empowerment within our
community and in public attitudes. This article documents, however,
some of the things that remain to be done in the present and some others
that will face us in the near or more distant future. Civil rights leaders
and philosophers have expressed in various ways the fact that rights,
freedom, and independence are not things that are given to people but
must be fought for.582 Regarding the civil rights struggles of African
Americans, Martin Luther King, Jr., indicated the necessity of "agitation
and revolt" that is "persistent" and "continual" and A. Philip Randolph
cautioned that "the struggle must be continuous; for freedom is never a
final fact, but a continuing evolving process to higher and higher
levels
' 583
of human social economic, political, and religious relationships.
In the disability movement, we are sometimes not sure how much

582.

Frederick Douglass declared:

The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows that all concessions yet
made to her august claims, have been bom of earnest struggle. . . . If there is no
struggle there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom and yet deprecate
agitation.., want crops without plowing up the ground, they want rain without
thunder and lightening. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many
waters.

This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may be both
moral and physical, but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a
demand. It never did and it never will.
Frederick Douglass, "The Significance of Emancipation in the West Indies" Speech,
Canandaigua, New York, August 3, 1857, collected in pamphlet by author, Two Speeches by
FrederickDouglass: One on West India Emancipation, Delivered at Canandaigua,Aug. 4th, and the
Other on the DredScott Decision, Delivered in New York, on the Occasion of the Anniversary of the
American Abolition Society, May, 1857 (New York 1857); quoted in THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS
PAPERS. SERIES ONE: SPEECHES, DEBATES, AND INTERVIEWS, Volume 3: 1855-63 (John W.
Blassingame, ed., Yale University Press 1985) p. 204. An earlier version of the quotation appeared
in Frederick Douglass, Letter to an Abolitionist Associate, 1849, quoted in ORGANIZING FOR SOCIAL
CHANGE: A MANDATE FOR ACTIVITY IN THE 1990S (K. Bobo, J. Kendall, and S. Max eds., Seven
Locks
Press
1991).
In a 1957 sermon at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery Alabama, the
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., stressed that "freedom is never given out, but it comes through the
persistent and the continual agitation and revolt on the part of those who are caught in the system."
Martin Luther King, Jr., "The Birth of a New Nation, " Sermon at Dexter Avenue Baptist Church,
April 7, 1957, in THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Volume IV: Symbol of the Movement,
available
at
http://stanford.edulgroup/King/publications/papers/vol4/570407.003TheBirth of a NewNationSermon at DexterAvenueBaptistChurch.htm.
German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche once wrote that "one does not acquire rights
through gifts." Friedrich Nietzsche, SAMTLICHE WERKE: KRITISCHE STUDIENAUSGABE, vol. 2, p.
242 (1878), reprinted in HUMAN, ALL-Too-HUMAN, "Man in Society," aphorism 311, "Against the
Confidential" (Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, eds., Berlin, 1980), quoted on
PoemHunter.com
at
http://www.poemhunter.com/quotations/famous.asppeople=Friedrich%20Nietzsche&p = 105.
Civil rights advocate and labor leader A. Philip Randolph stated that "[qreedom is never
granted; it is won. Justice is never given; it is exacted. Freedom and justice must be struggled for by
the oppressed of all lands and races, and the struggle must be continuous; for freedom is never a
final fact, but a continuing evolving process to higher and higher levels of human social economic,
political, and religious relationships." Speech of A. Philip Randolph, 80th Birthday Dinner, Waldorf
Astoria Hotel, New York, May 6. 1969, quoted by Jervis Anderson, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH, A
BIOGRAPHICAL
PORTRAIT,
epigraph,
p.
vii
(1972),
available
at
http://www.bartleby.com/73/960.html.
583. See the quotations from King and Randolph in supra note 382.
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militance is called for or appropriate. We know that at times we,
individually and collectively, have been the beneficiaries of the
compassion, charitable impulses, and even the discomfort and pity of
others. As a direct beneficiary of the March of Dimes, I certainly would
not disparage or ignore the contributions that have been and are being
made by organizations that rely on the charitable contributions of those
who want to "help" people with disabilities. Yet the disability activists
who promoted the slogan "You Gave Us Your Dimes, Now We Want
Our Rights ' 584 in the late 1970s were onto something fundamental-the
need for a shift to a civil rights point of view that considers persons with
disabilities not as unfortunate, afflicted creatures needing services and
help, but as equal citizens, individually varying across a spectrum of
human abilities, whose overriding need is to be freed from discrimination
and given a fair chance to participate fully in society. Jacobus tenBroek
had anticipated and advocated that shift more than a decade earlier. If
we can have the commitment, steadfastness, resolve, ingenuity, foresight,
savvy, creativity, and good humor of the disability rights advocates who
came before us, 585 we may continue to move forward toward a day when
persons with disabilities can have the opportunity to achieve, as
Professor tenBroek wished, "their potential for full participation as equals
in the social and economic life of the community.' 586

584. Terri Schultz, The Handicapped,a Minority DemandingIts Rights, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Feb. 13, 1977) at E8.
585. During my career, I have the good fortune to get to know many leading disability
rights advocates, including such people as the following departed heroic powerhouses: Jack
Achtenberg, Wade Blank, Burton Blatt, Elizabeth Boggs, Frank Bowe, Tim Cook, Justin Dart,
Gunnar and Rosemary Dybwad, Eunice Fiorito, Ignacy Goldberg, Paul Hearne, Stan Herr, Tom
Hodges, Harriet McBryde Johnson, Jim Lynch, Ron Mace, Durward McDaniel, Bill Mitchell, Lou
Rigdon, Ed Roberts, Henry Viscardi, and Irv Zola.
586. Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54
CAL. L. REV. 809, 815 (1966).
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APPENDIX
CHART COMPARING CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATIONS ABOUT THE
ADA DEFINITION OF DISABILITY AT ENACTMENT WITH THE

SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATIONS

(From Professor Burgdorf s congressional testimony: ADA Restoration
Act of 2007: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
110th Cong., Serial No. 110-76 (2008), p. 47, available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname = 110_house_
hearings&docid=f:40315.pdf,
and
(pp.
42-43)
at
http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/2008-01-29-RobertBurgdorf.pdf)

364

TEXAS JOURNAL ON CIVIL LIBERTIES & CIVIL RIGHTS

CONGRESS SAID

[Vol. 13:2

THE COURTS Now SAY

"COMPREHENSIVE
PROHIBITION OF
DISCRIMINATION ON THE
BASIS OF DISABILITY"

ELEMENTS OF DEFINITION
"NEED TO BE INTERPRETED
STRICTLY TO CREATE A
DEMANDING STANDARD
FOR QUALIFYING AS
'DISABLED"'

"DISABILITY SHOULD BE
ASSESSED WITHOUT REGARD
TO THE AVAILABILITY OF
MITIGATING MEASURES"

MITIGATING MEASURES
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN
DETERMINING EXISTENCE
OF A DISABILITY

EMPLOYMENT IS A MAJOR
LIFE ACTIVITY

EMPLOYMENT MAY NOT BE
A MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY

DENIAL OF A PARTICULAR
JOB IS SUFFICIENT TO
CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL
LIMITATION IN
EMPLOYMENT

THERE MUST BE DENIAL OF
A BROAD RANGE OR CLASS
OF JOBS TO CONSTITUTE A
SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION

FEDERAL AGENCIES ARE
DIRECTED TO ISSUE
REGULATIONS FOR
CARRYING OUT ADA

REGULATIONS
INTERPRETING THE
DEFINITION OF DISABILITY
ARE OF DOUBTFUL
VALIDITY

"MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITIES OF
SUCH INDIVIDUAL"

"ACTIVITIES THAT ARE OF
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE IN
MOST PEOPLE'S DAILY
LIVES"

"SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITS"

"PREVENTS OR SEVERELY
RESTRICTS"
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CONGRESS SAID

THE COURTS Now SAY

"REGARDED AS" PRONG
APPLIES TO PERSON
DISCRIMINATED AGAINST
BASED ON DISABILITY EVEN
IF PERSON DOES NOT HAVE
SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITING
CONDITION

"REGARDED AS" PRONG
SUBJECT TO FIRST PRONG
LIMITATIONS, SUCH AS
CONSIDERATION OF
MITIGATING MEASURES
AND REQUIREMENT THAT
PERSON BE UNABLE TO
PERFORM BROAD RANGE OR
CLASS OF JOBS

"REGARDED AS" PRONG
APPLIES TO PERSON
TREATED AS HAVING A
DISABILITY

"REGARDED AS" PRONG
APPLIES ONLY WHEN
EMPLOYER SHOWN TO
"ENTERTAIN
MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT
THE INDIVIDUAL" AND
BELIEVES THE PERSON HAS
A SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITING
IMPAIRMENT

NO MENTION OF DURATIONOF-IMPAIRMENT
LIMITATION

"IMPAIRMENT'S IMPACT
MUST ALSO BE PERMANENT
OR LONG TERM" TO
CONSTITUTE A DISABILITY

HIV, PARAPLEGIA, DEAFNESS,
HARD OF HEARING/HEARING
LOSS, LUNG DISEASE,
BLINDNESS, MENTAL
RETARDATION, ALCOHOLISM
ARE DISABILITIES

MAYBE SO, MAYBE NOT

